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Abstract
This qualitative meta-data-analysis was designed to identify themes of experience of
Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants. A review of the
literature indicated a scarcity of research that describes the ‘meaning-making’ processes
that these participants undergo while engaged in structured intergroup dialogue, and this
study was designed to address that shortage. The analyst conducted a targeted search of
academic journal articles and Ph.D. dissertations published after 1999. The result of this
search was a set of 17 primary reports, and the findings of this study are based on the
verbatim quotations of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue
participants as cited within the set of primary reports. The analyst performed a thematic
analysis of said quotations and, guided by contact theory, social identity theory, and
intersubjectivity theory, concluded that Israeli Jews, Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel,
and Palestinian Arabs in the Occupied Territories all enter dialogue carrying varying
levels of fear and anger; and if they remain dedicated to dialogue processes, they
eventually—to varying degrees—seek truth, pursue justice, and realize unity. This
study’s primary contribution is its explication of the specific areas intergroup dialogue
facilitators and researchers need to focus in Israel-Palestine. The findings indicate that
more research needs to be conducted on interreligious, narrative, and activist models.
Furthermore, the data evidences the presence of geotheological influences on participant
perspectives. Overall, the findings of this dissertation are consistent with previous
research that affirms the power of dominant group narratives to sustain intractable
conflict and the necessity of intergroup dialogue to foster cross-group friendships that can
overcome intractable conflict.
xiii
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
The Intractable Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
Everybody . . . sees a difficulty in the question of relations between Arabs and
Jews. But not everybody sees that there is no solution to this question. No
solution! There is a gulf, and nothing can fill that gulf. It is possible to resolve the
conflict between Jewish and Arab interests [only] by sophistry. I do not know
what Arab will agree that Palestine should belong to the Jews—even if the Jews
learn Arabic. And we must recognize this situation . . . [and not] try to come up
with ‘remedies’ . . . We, as a nation, want this country to be ours; the Arabs, as a
nation, want this country to be theirs [David Ben Gurion, then-Labor Zionist
spokesman and future Israeli Prime Minister, 1919]. (Caplan, 2010, p. 8-9)
The day negotiations start will indeed be a great occasion for celebration. Yet let
us remember the lessons psychologists teach—that direct contacts between human
groups do not always draw them together, but may make them realize how far
apart they are and thus lead to further estrangement [Yahoshafat Harkabi, 1974].
(Caplan, 2010, p. 178)
Arabs and Jews are destined to live together [Yitzhak Navon, Israel’s Education
Minister, 1985]. (Abu-Nimer, 2004a, p. 409)
These three chronologically presented quotations of prominent Israeli leaders
demonstrate both a) the shift that has occurred within the public discourse regarding the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and b) the power of the multiple narratives, perspectives, and
ideologies that have motivated the parties within this conflict. The latter quotation
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demonstrates the confidence Israel’s leaders have had in the eventual success of the
numerous intergroup dialogue programs that facilitate conversations between Israeli Jews
and Palestinian Arabs. Yet 30 years since this confident declaration, the IsraeliPalestinian conflict remains synonymous with the term ‘intractable conflict.’ The
conflict’s causes, effects, and potential resolution have been analyzed, scrutinized,
dissected, re-framed, and debated by academics, politicians, theologians, clergy, and
commoners alike. Yet despite all this application of critical thought, research, and
theorizing, the conflict persists; and the present state of affairs offers little indication a
comprehensive resolution will come any time soon.
The Roots of the Conflict – Where to Begin?
Summarizing the conflict between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs is a
challenging endeavor for the researcher and academic for numerous reasons, three of
which I will outline here. First, the conflict has undergone so many stages and
developments that it is difficult to choose and thereby justify a starting point of the
conflict: does it begin with the 1967 war in which Israel captured territories from Syria,
Jordan, and Egypt, which placed hundreds of thousands of already displaced Palestinian
Arabs under Israeli military control; or in 1948 with the official declaration of Israeli
statehood; or earlier? Second, the overwhelming volume of research already extant on the
history of the conflict can metaphorically drown the researcher in narratives, testimonials,
statistics, and conspiratorial ‘secret histories’ to the extent that the researcher can quite
literally never ‘know everything there is to know’ about the conflict. Third, the histories
of the conflict and the parties to the conflict have been presented within multiple
frameworks of competing and contradictory narratives and ideologies (national,
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hegemonic, and religious), thereby rendering the researcher’s attempt to present
‘objective history’ virtually impossible (Caplan, 2010). On this third point, numerous
academicians have chosen to abandon any pretense of objectivity and have fully
embraced the narrative and ideology of one of the conflicting parties—a choice that has
resulted in professional ostracism for some (i.e. Norman Finkelstein). However, other
academicians who have advocated one narrative over another have weathered the storm
of criticism and continue to actively play the role of ‘advocate to the oppressed’ (i.e.
Noam Chomsky). (The American Studies Association’s recent academic boycott of
Israeli institutions of higher education points directly to the severity of the rift between
and among Israeli-Palestinian master narratives and the interpretations of academic
responsibility thereto).
The process of generating a comprehensive yet objective historical review of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict for this dissertation has required me to find ways to overcome
these three challenges. On the first point regarding the starting point of the history of the
conflict, I have chosen to begin with an exploration of the earliest histories of the origins
of the claims to the land in dispute between today’s Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs in
order to provide key background narratives that inform (to greater and lesser degrees) the
modern day identity of being an ‘Israeli Jew’ or a ‘Palestinian Arab’. On the second point
regarding the sheer volume of published historical accounts and interpretations of those
accounts, I have limited the historical source material to a) those that have been published
within the past 15 to 20 years (so as to include the events of the Second Intifada) and/or
b) those written by authors who have either expressed a commitment to a “relational
history” between Palestinians and Israelis (Krämer, 2008, p. xi; Adwan et al., 2012) or
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attempted to clarify the historical record and let the “facts speak for themselves” (Caplan,
2010, p. 225). This choice of historical source material that emphasizes ‘relationality’ and
‘fact over interpretation’ also relates to the third point regarding the ‘impossibility of pure
objectivity’ in presenting the history of the peoples and the ongoing conflict. This multimillennial history and its over-arching themes that inform and influence the conflict
today are presented in greater detail in Chapter 2.
Intergroup Dialogue Between Israelis and Palestinians
The perpetuation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is by no means the result of a
lack of effort to prevent its continuation. Israeli Jew-Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue
encounters have been conducted since as early as the 1950’s (Maoz, 2010), and today
there exists in Israel and Palestine a wide variety of policy development groups, peace
education organizations, political activists, and community development groups, all
working towards the purported goal of strengthening relations between Israeli Jews and
Palestinian Arabs. As of 2002, as many as 150 different intergroup dialogue and peace
building programs, backed by investments totaling $9 million annually, were being
facilitated in Israel and Palestine (Maoz, 2010). Generally speaking, these programs have
been based on derivations of the ‘contact hypothesis,’ which states, “intergroup contact
can be effective in reducing negative intergroup stereotypes and mutual prejudices,
provided that certain conditions are met” (Pettigrew, as cited in Maoz, 2010, p. 304).
Running in parallel with the facilitation of the dozens of peace programs in Israel
and Palestine has been the execution of numerous case studies, reports, and analyses of
the purported effectiveness of these respective programs. However, academically
rigorous research of these programs—as opposed to subjective ‘insider’ reports—are
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lacking not only within the body of Israeli-Palestinian peace education research but also
in the field of peace education in general (Salomon, 2002). Though these ‘insider’
perspectives yield valuable insight into the challenges, obstacles, failures, and
accomplishments of Israeli-Palestinian dialogue efforts, they can only go so far in
yielding the kind of data that meet the social scientific standards of reliability and
verifiability.
The Research Problem
As observed by Pettigrew, “the vast majority of [intergroup] contact research
studies outcome, rather than process” (as cited in Hammack et al., 2014, p. 297). To wit,
Hammack et al. (2014) mention the “dearth” of research related to the meaning-making
processes of participants in intergroup dialogue building programs in regions of
intractable conflict (p. 296). These authors suggest that what is lacking in the body of
research on peace programs in regions of intractable conflict is a kind of ‘thick
description’ regarding the experience of peace program participants—a description that is
often best revealed through qualitative research methods.
Despite this perceived ‘dearth’ of qualitative studies on the meaning-making
processes within contact research, Dixon et al. (2005) identified a small number of
studies that utilized qualitative methodologies for the purpose of ascertaining
“participants’ own frameworks of meaning as they are applied within particular social
contexts” (p 704). Though they are few in number, qualitative studies that analyze the
utility of the ‘contact hypothesis’ within a framework constructed by participants’
experiences do exist and include Buttny (1999), Buttny & Williams (2000), Connolly
(2000), Dixon and Reicher (1997), Hubbard (1999), and Morris (1999). Of these
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aforementioned studies, only Hubbard’s (1999) study features verbatim accounts from
Israeli Jew-Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants; however, all participants in
that study were American citizens who did not at the time of the study live in IsraelPalestine.
Taken together, the processual experience of intergroup dialogue participants,
especially within the Israeli-Palestinian context, has thus far not been extensively well
documented in the current literature. Nevertheless, a cursory journal article search on
ProQuest and EBSCOhost reveals the existence of studies that utilize qualitative
methodologies such as narrative analysis, case study, discourse analysis, and participant
observation in relation to the experience of Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs who have
participated in dialogue building programs. Though the number of these types of
qualitative studies is not particularly high, their number is high enough to warrant a
closer look at what these qualitative studies, as a whole, might reveal in regards to the
themes of experience of Israel Jew-Palestinian Arab peace program participants.
Purpose of the Research
As such, the purpose of this dissertation is to identify overarching themes of
experience for Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs who have participated in a structured
intergroup dialogue program. The source material for identifying these potential themes
of experience are primary journal articles and Ph.D. dissertations that contain verbatim
quotations from Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants. In
order to narrow the range of possible reports to those that are most relevant to the present
day conflict and reflect the most current developments in both intergroup dialogue theory
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and intergroup dialogue program design, the included reports have been published
between 1999 (at the approximate start of the second Palestinian Intifada) and May 2015.
To achieve this aim of identifying any overarching themes of experience among
Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants, this dissertation
outlines the procedure and outcomes of the first stage of a qualitative meta-study, as
described by Paterson et al. (2001). This methodology is similar to quantitative metaanalysis in that it seeks to systematically analyze and synthesize a body of data collected
over a particular period of time within a defined topic area. The primary difference
between qualitative meta-study and quantitative meta-analysis is that the former focuses
on data collected through qualitative methods (phenomenology, qualitative case study,
grounded theory, ethnography, etc.), while the latter utilizes data gathered through
quantitative methods (surveys, test scores, statistical tests of significance, etc.). As such,
this study serves as the first stage (meta-data-analysis) of a four-stage qualitative metastudy to identify themes of experience of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup
dialogue programs or workshop participants, as revealed by their verbatim accounts that
have been recorded within select qualitative studies.
Conflict Resolution and Israeli-Palestinian Intergroup Dialogue
‘Conflict resolution’ as a field and Israeli-Palestinian intergroup dialogue
programs both have relatively short histories and are today at a sort of ‘crossroads’. In
regards to history, ‘conflict resolution’ as a field of practice and academic endeavor has
interdisciplinary roots that primarily stem from the human relations movement of the
1940s and 1950s, specifically within the arena of industrial organization (Abu-Nimer,
1999, p. 11). Because conflict resolution as a field is primarily an interdisciplinary one,
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its purpose and definition is multi-faceted and dependent upon the context in which it is
practiced (i.e. alternative dispute resolution in the US judicial system; peer mediation in
elementary and middle schools; victim-offender restorative justice programs in district
and local courts). Generally speaking, conflict resolution as a field has embraced a set of
assumptions and principles regarding ‘conflict’ and the means to (and signs of) its
‘resolution.’ Some of these principles and assumptions are:
conflict is a creative force that can result in either constructive or destructive
outcomes;
conflict is an inevitable component of important human relationships;
conflict is an opportunity to release stored emotions;
conflict can be positive when it results in effective communication, increased
trust, and problem solving;
conflict can be negative when it results in violence, distrust, and
uncooperativeness;
conflict can be resolved by teaching conflict resolution skills such as nonjudgmental observing, listening, and speaking; and through collaborative
problem-solving (Abu-Nimer, 1999, p. 16).
Like the field of conflict resolution, Israeli Jew-Palestinian Arab intergroup
dialogue programs have been operating since the 1950s, but the first “serious
conceptualization of research on Arab-Jewish encounters . . . was conducted by Peled and
Bargal in 1983” (Abu-Nimer, p. 44). Also like the field of conflict resolution in general,
intergroup dialogue programs that engage Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs in
conversation are based on certain principles, namely that ‘peoples in conversation are
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peoples who can achieve understanding of each other’ (Abu-Nimer, 1999). This belief in
the power of contact has its roots in the contact hypothesis, which was originally
explicated by Allport (1954) and has since been re-evaluated multiple times and recently
revised by Pettigrew (1998). As summarized by Abu-Nimer (1999), “The main belief in
the 1950s was that intergroup contact would inevitably lead to a change in mutual
attitudes of interacting members and improve their relations” (p. 1). Furthermore, the
forms of intergroup dialogue programs between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs have
been multifaceted and multifarious, depending on the purpose and context of each
respective program (i.e. student encounter programs emphasizing coexistence and
equality; Israeli democracy building programs; two-state solution diplomacy programs;
interreligious dialogue programs).
The present condition of the field of ‘conflict resolution’ and the role of
intergroup dialogue programs between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs are both at a
sort of ‘crossroads’ today. Fox (2006) laments that despite the movement towards a
‘canon’ of conflict resolution practice, the primary texts around which such a canon could
be developed emphasize the ‘legalistic’ application of conflict resolution approaches and
fail to adequately address “the deeper and differing belief and value systems that underlie
(conflict resolution’s) growing body of scholarship” (p. 235). For example, Fox points
out that the most influential voices in the field of conflict resolution have dismissed any
real discussion of the difference between a ‘conflict’ and a ‘dispute.’ Lamenting this
dismissal of definitional differentiation, Fox states that “language is meaning, and
therefore, different terms represent very different ways of knowing what we seek to
understand” (p. 236). Wing (2008) suggests that one of the primary tenets of conflict and
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dispute resolution—third-party practitioner neutrality—is a culturally-biased tenet that
disadvantages members of non-dominant cultural groups within a predominantly WhiteAnglo context. As such, ‘conflict resolution’ as a field seems to be at a crossroads at
which the field must define itself as either a specifically ‘western positivist model’ that is
best suited for legalistic settings or one that can adapt and accommodate a variety of
socially constructed viewpoints.
In a similar vein, intergroup dialogue practice, especially in regards to those
developed specifically for Israeli Jew and Palestinian Arab dialogue, are also at a sort of
‘crossroads.’ The purported effectiveness and overall value of these programs has come
under scrutiny by those who point out that, despite decades of intergroup practice, the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues unabated. As highlighted by Ross (2013), a 2012
opinion column in the Jerusalem Post lambasted the perceived ineffectiveness of
‘coexistence projects’ (a particular type of Israeli Jew-Palestinian Arab intergroup
dialogue model) because “it is based on nonsense, false analogies, misinformation,
propaganda, and naïveté” (Frantzman, as cited in Ross, p. 3). Another criticism leveled at
intergroup dialogue programs in Israel-Palestine was articulated in a 2007 issue of The
Economist: “[W]hen asked whether their own work influences anyone beyond the
participants, [peace activists] often fall silent; such things are impossible to measure”
(“Still Campaigning,” para. 10). Clearly, the entire Israeli-Palestinian intergroup dialogue
process is at a crossroads too, whereby the pressure to demonstrate actual progress
towards resolving the conflict and influencing Israeli and Palestinian society is perceived
to be a pressing matter.
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This dissertation, completed as a partial requirement for a Ph.D. in Conflict
Analysis and Resolution within Nova Southeastern University’s College of Arts,
Humanities, and Social Sciences, is intended to provide a meaningful contribution to the
respective ‘crossroads’ of both the field of ‘conflict resolution’ in general and the practice
of intergroup dialogue between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs in particular. Though
conflict resolution has its roots in industrial relations and tends to emphasize a ‘problem
solving’ approach to conflict, it also carries within its interdisciplinary missives the more
idealistic goals of social change and personal transformation (i.e. Bush & Folger, 2005).
Intergroup dialogue programs in Israel-Palestine have focused (to varying degrees) on
both of these same idealistic goals of social and individual change. As such, the outcomes
and findings of this dissertation will be relevant in addressing the ‘crossroads’ at which
the field of conflict resolution is today.
Theories Underlying Intergroup Dialogue and the Experience of Participants
Academic explorations of the theoretical bases and practical outcomes of
intergroup dialogue between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs have been published for
decades and continue to the present day. As mentioned previously, the contact hypothesis
has been the primary theoretical foundation from which Israeli-Palestinian intergroup
dialogue programs are based. Generally speaking, the contact hypothesis suggests that in
order for intergroup dialogue to be effective (i.e. to successfully reduce prejudice and
intergroup bias), certain conditions must be met within the intergroup dialogue process
itself, namely:
the participants have equal status in the group;
the groups are working towards a common goal;
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the groups are cooperatively interdependent; and
macro entities outside the dialogue encounter (i.e. laws, customs,
institutions) support the intergroup contact (Cuhadar & Dayton, 2011, p.
277).
In the decades since the original explication of the contact hypothesis, numerous
studies have confirmed these basic conditions for successful contact; however,
subsequent researchers have suggested further conditions be added as well, such as the
active participation of all participants (Maoz, 2005). Pettigrew (1998) suggested that
‘overburdening’ the contact hypothesis with additional conditions would eventually
render the hypothesis useless; nevertheless, he did add ‘a friendly environment’ as a fifth
condition as “a key factor in reducing prejudice and must be included in the generic
framework of contact hypothesis rather than as a facilitating factor” (as cited in Cuhadar
& Dayton, 2011, p. 277).
Despite evidence that the contact hypothesis is successful at reducing prejudice
between groups in dialogue, a chief criticism of the contact hypothesis is that it is not an
adequate framework for reducing prejudice in an environment characterized by
institutionalized inequalities and discrimination. Abu-Nimer (1999) argues that this is a
primary reason why intergroup dialogue programs have largely failed to effect significant
social change in Israel and Palestine: “[T]he contact hypothesis is based on individual
and interpersonal encounter, [and therefore] lacks the ability and potential to address
inter-ethnic conflict and asymmetric power relations” (p. 9).
Asymmetry, as such, is at present a recurring theme within the literature regarding
the Israeli Jew-Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue experience. According to Abu-

13

Nimer (2013), individuals living within a system of institutionalized inequalities tend to
assume a number of norm-regulating dynamics regarding human behavior, such as:
individuals are selfish and self-interested;
collectives will unilaterally compete to meet its self-interested goals;
competition is better than cooperation; and
‘soft power’ such as morality and relationships are measured in tangible
economic and military terms (Abu-Nimer, 2013, p. 179).
Such ‘might makes right’ assumptions tend to color the content of interactions between
Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs in dialogue and, as a result, fail to bring about
meaningful dialogue that can lead to empathy and understanding.
However, the perception of ‘power’ in Israel and Palestine is not necessarily unidirectional. Rouhana and Bar-Tal (1998) outline the dynamics of a ‘double asymmetry’
between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs, whereby members of each group perceive
themselves as both ‘powerful’ and ‘vulnerable’ simultaneously. For example, both
Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews perceive and acknowledge a social asymmetry that
benefits Jewish Israelis. However, from the wider standpoint of the relationship between
Israel and the larger Arab world, “the Arab world surpasses Israel in human and material
resources and . . . in the capability of enduring a [military] defeat. Thus, for many
Israelis, the asymmetry tilts in favor of the Arabs” (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, p. 764). As such,
this perceived double asymmetry, along with other social and intergroup dynamics
specific to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, have run numerous intergroup dialogue
processes into a ‘stalemate’ of irreconcilable positions.
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The Usage of Names
Krämer (2008) opens her A History of Palestine with the statement, “There are no
innocent terms, especially in geography” (p. 1). A primary characteristic of the
postmodern human identity is the concept of ‘nationality,’ and the relationship between
‘nation’ and ‘identity’ for the inhabitants of Israel and Palestine is hardly an innocent
one. A challenge for researchers who delve into the ‘identity-worlds’ of the peoples of
Israel and Palestine is the need for consistent usage of terminology when referring to said
peoples. Furthermore, the choice of terminology a researcher utilizes is often directly
related to the researcher’s own perspective of Israel and Palestine and the nature of the
conflict its peoples are enduring. As a case in point, Hammack (2011) makes explicit in
the opening paragraphs of his Narrative and the Politics of Identity: The Cultural
Psychology of Israeli and Palestinian Youth the names he used to identify both the places
in which he conducted interviews and the peoples he interviewed. Because Hammack
perceives Israel and Palestine as two separate ‘nations,’ he makes explicit the name
‘Israel’ as the nation “internationally recognized by the United Nations” and the name
‘Palestine’ as “those regions internationally recognized as under Israeli military
occupation since the Six Day War of 1967” (p. 4). In line with Krämer’s observation of
the ‘non-innocence’ of geographical terms, Hammack makes clear that his usage of the
word ‘Palestine’ is his way of “[legitimizing] the Palestinian aspiration of national
statehood in these territories . . . and ultimately necessary for a sustainable peace in the
Middle East” (p. 4).
As such, the terms I have chosen to refer to both the regions of Israel and
Palestine and the peoples who call these regions ‘home’ are a reflection of my
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paradigmatic views, belief systems, and chosen epistemological approach to the research
at hand. These latter elements will be explored later in this dissertation as part of the
necessary ‘bracketing’ of my own assumptions and perspectives (i.e. invoking the
epoché) (DeTurk, 2010, p. 570). Whenever possible, and for the remainder of this study, I
refer to the geographical region of ‘Israel-Palestine’ rather than two separate states or
nations of ‘Israel’ and ‘Palestine’ as a reflection of my belief that ultimately a ‘one-state
solution’ is what is needed to ensure lasting peace (for different versions of a one-state
solution, see Abunimah, 2006; or Kelman, 2011). Though the focus of this dissertation is
not necessarily the exact ‘terms and conditions’ under which the peoples of IsraelPalestine must or should live (as opposed to the conditions under which they are
presently living), there remains a certain degree of ‘teleology’ underlying the intergroup
dialogues between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs. To acknowledge the ‘end point’
towards which one wishes a particular venture to proceed is a critical acknowledgement
that engenders transparency and truthfulness—two elements critical for any intergroup
dialogue encounter. As such, making explicit this belief is one I believe is necessary to
ensure my research reflects the values that I believe are important for the subject I am
exploring herein. It should be noted, however, that my use of ‘Israel-Palestine’ versus
‘Israel’ and ‘Palestine’ is not a reflection of my belief or adherence to one particular
historical narrative over another.
However, the names I have used to refer to the peoples who live in IsraelPalestine and participate in the intergroup dialogue programs and workshops included in
this study reflect the current condition of the Israeli nation-state and the United Nations
recognition thereof. Consistent with the terminologies used by Lazarus (2011), I refer to
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the following groups of peoples living in Israel-Palestine as such: Israeli-Jews (IJ),
Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel (PCI), and Palestinian Arabs living in the Occupied
Territories (OPT) (i.e. those regions captured by the Israeli military from Syria, Jordan,
and Egypt in 1967). Whenever possible, I differentiate between different groups of IJ,
such as Ashkenazi Jews (i.e. Jews of central European descent) and Mizrahi Jews (i.e.
Jews of Middle Eastern and North African descent). Similarly, whenever is possible and
relevant, I differentiate between PCI and OPT Muslims, Christians, and Druze. Again,
my choice of identifying individual intergroup participants within these terminologies of
identification is intended to reflect the participants’ current situation; the use of a more
unified ‘Israel-Palestine’ in reference to geography is intended to reflect my belief (or
hope) in a future reality that sees all peoples within Israel-Palestine’s borders enjoying
security and civil rights as citizens of one nation, and not as a preference for either Israeli
or Palestinian historical or national narratives.
Chapter Summary and Dissertation Overview
To tell even a cursory story of the experience of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian
Arab intergroup dialogue participants requires an examination of the history of IsraelPalestine, the peoples who have called this region ‘home’ for well over two millennia,
and the roots of a conflict that has for decades eluded resolution. Despite the elusiveness
of a lasting solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, intergroup dialogue still offers
Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs the opportunity to face the deep-seeded issues that
work to discourage the development of trust, empathy, and other-regarding behavior long
espoused by philosophy, religion, and common sense cultural-social norms necessary for
productive human relations. As Abu-Nimer and Lazarus (2007) state, “Competently
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structured and facilitated encounters can allow Israelis and Palestinians to safely turn the
key, inviting psychological transformation by altering a single variable—relationship
with the ‘enemy’—in the social environment of participants” (para. 9).
Despite years of research into the processes of encouraging this ‘transformation’
through the relationship variable, questions remain: what do these intergroup dialogue
participants experience? What does it mean to experience a ‘transformation’? If a
‘transformation’ happens, what is it that gets transformed? By exploring the verbatim
accounts of Israeli Jew and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants, as reported
in qualitative studies published between 1999 and 2015, within the methodological
framework of a qualitative meta-data-analysis (Paterson et al., 2001), this dissertation
contributes to the overall body of literature that seeks answers to these same questions.
As explained by Paterson et al. (2001), a meta-data-analysis like this one should also
serve as the seeds of a full qualitative meta-study that can “[illuminate] the implications
of the contexts, methods, and theories that have influenced the body of research in the
field [of conflict resolution]; [generate] new or expanded theory; [and articulate] an
alternative overarching perspective about the phenomenon” (p. 125) of the experience of
Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup participants.
Chapter 2 of this dissertation provides a more detailed literature review that builds
upon the theories and gaps mentioned in Chapter 1. Specifically, Chapter 2 provides an
historical overview of Israel-Palestine through the themes of geotheology and
asymmetry, the competing narratives that animate that history, and how those competing
narratives shape the Israeli-Palestinian conflict today. Chapter 2 also explores the
theoretical foundations of intergroup dialogue processes in Israel-Palestine and the recent
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criticisms and new directions proposed by influential researchers of Israel-Palestine
intergroup dialogue models. Chapter 3 provides the methodological overview of this
initial qualitative meta-data-analysis. Chapter 3 also contains my attempt to bracket my
experiences, expectations, and beliefs that shape my decisions as a qualitative researcher.
Chapter 4 describes the process and subsequent results of the meta-data-analysis through
a framework of thematic analysis as outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006). Chapter 5
provides an overview of the relevance the findings from the meta-data-analysis, what the
remaining stages of the qualitative meta-study could yield, and what those findings mean
for the future of intergroup dialogue and peace education program development. Chapter
5 also provides an overview of shortcomings and limitations of the research and future
directions for research in this field.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
The execution of this dissertation necessarily relies on the history of multiple
entities: the land of Israel-Palestine, the peoples who call this land home, and the
intergroup dialogue programs within which Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs have
participated. The histories of these three entities are intertwined, and within each history
there exists competing narratives. Some of these narratives (especially those related to the
history of the land) rest on claims of mutual exclusivity while others (especially those
related to intergroup dialogue programs) are couched within a reflexive stance that allows
for multiple competing narratives. This reflexivity comes in part as a response to the
themes of exclusivity espoused by the peoples who live within the either national or
historical borders of this land; it also comes as greater numbers of these peoples
recognize that these themes of exclusivity can no longer sustain the health, security, and
civil rights of those same peoples. As such, the literature review contained within this
chapter attempts to provide both an historical overview of these entities and an overview
of the theoretical frameworks that have thus far motivated intergroup dialogue programs
and models between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs.
Narrative Histories: Geotheology and Asymmetry
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the history of Israel-Palestine and the peoples who
call this region home cannot be contained within a singular, cut and dry, completely nonsubjective retelling of events. The historical record can identify when and where
particular events happened, but the ensuing ‘interpretation’ and ‘explanation’ of the
motivations and purposes behind those events vary significantly. One of the primary
reasons there exists a multitude of interpretations behind the history of Israel-Palestine is
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because of ancient ‘geotheological’ claims of different peoples to the land. These claims
and the subsequent realization of said claims have helped create a modern history
characterized by asymmetry—imbalances of power; of representation; of population
distribution; and of access to natural resources, security, and land. As such, these
‘geotheological’ claims to the land of Israel-Palestine are (at least in part) a cause for the
asymmetrical relationship that currently exists between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs
that, I will argue, continues to have salient consequences on the conflict today. Therefore,
my intention here is to present an historical review of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
through the elaboration of the two themes of geotheology and asymmetry.
Because the history of Israel-Palestine is an enterprise that, whether intentional or
not, has the effect of boxing the interlocutor within a particular ‘perspectival framework,’
I have attempted to present here historical accounts that either a) emphasize the
‘relational’ history of Israel-Palestine and its peoples or b) are based on a conscientious
attempt to present history as ‘facts’ sans ‘interpretation.’ As such, I rely chiefly on the
work of Krämer (2008) and Caplan (2010) for historical accounts of relational
objectivity. In instances where events in the history of Israel-Palestine cannot be re-told
without invoking an asymmetrical narrative that privileges one people’s identity over
another, I have attempted to share dual narratives primarily based on the work of Adwan
et al. (2012). Finally, the elements included within this historical overview are those that
appear to have the most salience in regards to the themes of experience of Israeli Jewish
and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants. As this study progresses, I intend
to show how these historical elements tend to reveal themselves within dialogue
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participants’ speech, expressed justifications of belief and behavior, and expressions of
identity.
Geotheology: Ancient Ideas Shaping Modern Reality
Caplan (2010) outlines key questions that, from his perspective, summarize both
the tangible and intangible elements of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The first of these
questions—who resided in Israel-Palestine first, and whose land was it to begin with—
will be explored here. It should be noted that the purpose of this initial exploration of the
‘geotheological’ influences on the conflict is not intended to arrive at a conclusive answer
over land rights, but rather to provide insight that suggests the modern problem of Israel
and Palestine—often described as a conflict about land rights and justice and less about
religion—indeed has deep roots in the interpretation of ancient religious texts. For
example, at the time of this writing, the popular Israeli media outlet Haaretz has posted
an article entitled “The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Is Not About Religion” (Diab, 2015),
which suggests that a number of its readers are of the opinion that the conflict is indeed
about religion. Exploring the ancient historical roots of the conflict is not to deny the
existence of ‘secular and modern’ motivations behind the conflict, but rather to revisit the
narratives that tend to underlie the structure of those modern problems and which make
successful intergroup dialogue such a challenging process.
Geotheological influence on the Jewish/Israeli narrative. The term
‘geotheology’ has been most recently explicated by Vann (2008) who defines it as
“aspects of place linked to worship and the divine” (p. 7). Krämer (2008) mentions that
ancient roots of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict “(offer) a textbook case of the
‘territorialization of history,’ in which political claims are anchored in historical
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geography” (p. 2). Because this ‘historical geography’ is based on place names and
categorizations of tribes and groups of peoples that are traced to the Biblical Old
Testament (and more recently to archeological and epigraphic evidence from ancient
Egyptian and other Middle Eastern sites), the Israeli-Palestinian conflict fits within
Vann’s definition of a phenomenon shaped by interpretations of ‘the divine’.
Sketched briefly, modern Jews trace their ancestry and religious lineage to the
ancient Hebrews, whose history is recorded in the Biblical Old Testament and the Torah.
Of note, the earliest record of the name “Israel” has been found on a stone tablet from
ancient Egypt that dates 1210 BC, and which indicates that the word “Israel” denotes a
group of ‘foreign people’ and not a particular terrain. Krämer (2008) states that despite
the archeological evidence of multiple groups of people living in the region (i.e.
Canaanites and Philistines on the coastal plains of modern day Palestine, Israelites in the
mountains to the east) it was “the Israelites (Hebrews, Jews) who profoundly shaped the
subsequent history of Palestine” (p. 4). Of interest is that of all the place-names of the
region that have persisted to the present day, the only one the Israelites did not coin was
the name ‘Palestine’ itself (Krämer, p. 4). The roots of the name ‘Palestine’ can be traced
to “Assyrian and Egyptian sources to designate the coastal plain of the southern Levant”
(Krämer, p. 14). Variations of ‘Palestine’ have been found in numerous ancient Roman
designations of modern day Israel-Palestine regions, such as ‘Syria Palaestina’ for Judaea
(today’s Gaza) and ‘Palaestina Secunda’ (today’s Bet Shean) (Biger, 2008).
Modern day Jews (whose political leanings can be charted on a spectrum ranging
from leftist-secular to right-wing Orthodox and Zionist, and whose ethnic backgrounds
range from European Ashkenazi to Middle Eastern Misrahi to North African Berbers)
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base the Jewish claim to the land of modern day Palestine (to varying degrees) on the
promise of ownership of said land by God (Yahweh) by way of direct communication
with the Biblical figure of Abraham—a promise renewed numerous times through
Abraham’s lineage, namely via Abraham’s son Isaac.
Kallai (1997) distinguishes between three different accounts regarding the ancient
promise that purportedly validates Jewish peoples’ claim to Palestine: a) the ‘location of
ancient Canaan (i.e. the ‘promised land’), b) the area the ancient Israelites actually
settled, and c) the ‘patriarchal boundaries’ of Israel as defined by Jewish law (p. 70).
Regarding the Biblical account of the boundaries of the ‘promised land’ of Canaan, there
exists no consistent, clear geographical mapping. The boundaries of the land and its
promise described to Abraham and renewed through Moses appear in different locations
in the Old Testament and continue to be the subject of historiographical debate today
(Kallai, p. 76). A map outlining the difference between the boundary of Canaan and the
boundary of Israel is provided in Figure 1 below.
According to the Biblical record, the ancient Israelites were an enslaved people in
Egypt, and Moses—who, while in modern day Jordan, received a message from God
commanding him to free the Israelites—successfully entered Egypt and convinced the
pharaoh to release the Israelites. It is from this story the narrative of the ‘exodus’ and the
Israelites’ title ‘the chosen people’ is based. It should be noted that, though the Biblical
record describes the Israelites as ‘taking’ the ‘promised land’ from its Canaanite
inhabitants, “it is not a history book to draw reliable maps from” (Krämer, 2008, p. 8).
There is as of yet no non-Biblical source material (i.e. archaeological findings) that
corroborates an Egyptian exodus.
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Figure 1. Map comparing boundaries of Canaan and Israel. Note. From “The Patriarchal
Boundaries, Canaan and the Land of Israel: Patterns and Application in Biblical
Historiography,” by Z. Kallai, 1997, Israel Exploration Journal, 47, p. 71. Copyright
1997 by Israel Exploration Society.
In regards to Kallai’s (1997) second point—the area of land the ancient Israelites
actually settled—ancient texts and archeological evidence indicate that the ancient
Israelites successfully settled only a portion of the land promised them in the covenant
with Abraham. The land ‘actually’ settled by the Israelites is referred to as ‘Eretz Israel’
and is mentioned numerous times in the Bible. This designation of Eretz Israel is directly
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related to the third consideration: what does Judaic law say about the borders of the
‘promised land’? According to various verses in I Kings, King Solomon, who ruled over
the Kingdom of Israel circa 967-928 BC, had jurisdiction over a territory “from Dan to
Beersheba,” and “from the Euphrates to the land of the Philistines and to the border of
Egypt” (as cited in Krämer, 2008, p. 9). Because King Solomon’s rule would prove to be
the highest point of territorial success for the ancient Israelites, the designation “from
Dan to Beersheba” has come to represent “a kind of core nucleus of Israelite land”
(Krämer, p. 9). As will be explored later in this review, this ‘core nucleus’ would prove to
be such a powerful component of the Jewish narrative that it would shape the present day
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
It was during Solomon’s rule that much of Judaic/Jewish law was consolidated
and codified. Because Solomon established successful trade routes with neighboring
kingdoms and tribes, he raised significant wealth for the kingdom and with that wealth
oversaw the construction of Solomon’s Temple (or the First Temple) on Mount Zion in
Jerusalem. After Solomon’s rule, the Israelite kingdom endured alternating periods of
degradation and re-growth, but within a few centuries the Babylonians overran it.
Solomon’s temple was destroyed and the Israelites (who at this stage tended to be
referred to as Jews) were sent into exile.
Sixty years later, Cyrus of Persia conquered much of the region and allowed the
Jews to return to the region of ancient Judaea and Jerusalem and subsequently rebuild the
Temple. By 332 BC, Judaea was conquered by the Greeks and many parts of the region
became Hellenized. The Jewish people had already successfully rebuilt Solomon’s
Temple, but Greek rulers converted it into a temple for the purpose of worshipping Zeus.
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This led to a Jewish rebellion led by the Hasmoneans who successfully regained political
control over a region that reached “from Dan to Beersheba” (Krämer, 2008, p. 12).
Though the Hasmonean reign was relatively short-lived, the land claimed during this
reign has significant shaped modern conceptions of the extent of historical Israeli land
(Finkelstein, 2015).
After the Romans conquered Palestine in 63 BC, further Jewish revolts were
attempted but with disastrous consequences. By 70 AD, Jerusalem and the Second
Temple had been burned to the ground. (The remains of the Second Temple are today
known as the ‘Wailing Wall’ and are a site of sacred pilgrimage for Jews worldwide.)
Despite the elimination of this primary physical symbol of the Jewish people, Jewish
rebellions continued. The Romans eventually banned Jews from entering the re-built
Jerusalem and attempted to “eradicate any trace of Judaism in that area” by renaming the
province of Judaea ‘Syria Palaestina’ (Biger, 2008, p. 69). Jews centralized their
populations in Galilee, and non-Jews gradually moved in where Jews had previously
resided. By 300 AD, “Jews made up a mere quarter of the total population of the province
of Syria Palaestina” (Krämer, 2008, p. 15). The rest of the population over time became
mainly Greek, Egyptian, Phoenician, or Arab.
Though much more could be included within this sketch of the history of the
ancient Israelites, such an elaboration would go beyond the intention of this section.
Instead, this overview is presented for the purpose of emphasizing the geotheological
influence this history has had on the modern Israeli-Palestinian conflict and how this
geotheological influence shapes the Jewish-Israeli claim to the land. The borders of Eretz
Israel stem from a millennia-old story handed down generation to generation before being
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recorded and codified into Jewish law around the time of King Solomon (Krämer, 2008).
From this ancient history also come themes of Jewish identity that are discernible within
the Israeli-Jewish narrative today: punishment, exile, and redemption. These themes of
identity have been collectively identified by other researchers and scholars and will be
explored later in this review.
Geotheological influence on the Arab/Palestinian narrative. Modern
Palestinians trace their ancestry generally through at least two (and sometimes three)
groups of people: Muslim Arabs who conquered the area of modern day Palestine in the
7th century AD, the ancient Philistines who arrived on the coastal plains of Palestine
(modern day Gaza) from the Aegean region around 1200 BC, and the Canaanites who
also lived on the coastal plains from as early as 3200 BC (possibly even earlier).
However, as indicated in the previous section, by 300 AD Palestine was inhabited by
Greeks, Egyptians, and Phoenicians as well, so ancient Palestinian roots are likely quite
multi-ethnic.
Despite their significant presence in the region of modern day Israel-Palestine,
neither the Canaanites nor the Philistines receive as much credit for having influenced the
region as do the ancient Israelites, in part due to the “dominant perspective (that) has
clearly been informed by biblical associations” which tends to “(place) Jews at the center
(and pushes) all other population groups (even if and when they formed a majority) into
the background” (Krämer, p. 2). Krämer’s point here is not to discredit the ancient
Israelites influence on the region but rather to ‘symmetrize’ the perception of the
presence (and relevance) of other groups of people in ancient times. This point is
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particularly relevant considering that Muslims, like Jews, recognize Abraham as their
common ancestor. As such, from a Muslim/Islamic perspective,
even if God’s ‘eternal covenant’ was made only with [Abraham’s son] Isaac and
his sons, the descendants of Abraham that Genesis 15:18-21 refers to also
included the sons of Ishmael, whom the Bible names as the ancestor of the
‘Ishmaelites’ . . . and whom the Muslims recognize as one of their prophets.
(Krämer, 2008, p. 7).
Modern day Palestinians (which include Christians, Druze, and Muslims) tend to
identify as ‘culturally’ Arab, while some Palestinians also claim an ethnic identification
with the ancient Canaanites. Indeed, with the advent of the human genome era, some
have attempted to resolve the ‘who was there first’ question by way of DNA mapping,
only to receive inconclusive results (Muir & Appelbaum, 2007). Nevertheless, in regards
to religious affiliation, a majority of Palestinians identify as Muslim and, as such, tend to
adhere to a narrative that is also influenced by geotheological considerations.
The chief geotheological claim modern day Muslims have to the region of
Palestine is through the city of Jerusalem itself, and the claim stems from two events in
early Islamic history. The first is related to the qibla—the direction to which Muslims
face while praying—the Prophet Mohammed designated for his followers. Initially the
qibla for Muslims was Jerusalem—the same direction of prayer as the Jews. However,
Mohammed later designated the qibla as Mecca, which essentially had the effect of
differentiating who were Mohammed’s true followers and who were not.
The second event that links Jerusalem to the geotheological history of Islam is
based on Islamic interpretation of the 17th Sura of the Quran. Within this chapter is a
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verse that describes how God/Allah took the Prophet Mohammed from the ‘sacred place
of prayer’ to the ‘furthest place of prayer’ (Busse, 1991). The former element of the verse
has been interpreted as being Mecca, while the latter has been interpreted as being
Jerusalem, specifically Mount Zion, or Solomon’s Temple. Less than 100 years after the
death of the Prophet Mohammed (around 690 AD), the Umayyad caliph Abd Al-Malik b.
Marwan oversaw the construction of the Dome of the Rock at the same site as the
remains of the Second Temple. A few years later, the Al-Aqsa Mosque was built near the
Dome of the Rock, and these sites (including the whole of Jerusalem) have subsequently
become among the holiest sites in Islam (Krämer, 2008, p. 33).
The consequences of Islamic geotheological claims on Jerusalem continue to have
significant reverberations today. Not only do Jewish Israelis and Muslim Palestinians
engage in open conflict on who should administer and govern the sites and the city itself,
but UNESCO recently condemned the “persistence of the Israeli illegal excavations” in
Jerusalem and criticized other Israeli infrastructure projects which UNESCO said
severely affects the “visual integrity and the authentic character of the site” (JTA, 2015).
Thus far numerous Israeli media outlets have responded to UNESCO’s comments by
encouraging ‘Israel’s supporters’ to sign petitions and contact UNESCO to affirm Israel’s
‘Biblical right’ to Jerusalem. Clearly, geotheological claims to Jerusalem and Palestine in
general continue to have a palpable influence on the parties within the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. The sum effect of these geotheological claims has thusly resulted in a stalemate,
rendering a comprehensive and satisfactory answer to the question ‘who was there first
and whose land is it anyway’ virtually impossible (Caplan, 2010). Caplan summarized
the situation as follows:

30

[T]hose inclined to interpret the Bible as a roadmap for the present would cite
references to God’s promises to Moses and Joshua . . . Arabs and Muslims would
fear this as a master-plan for modern Israeli conquest of parts of Egypt, Syria, and
Iraq, while Orthodox Jews would regard it as a deed of entitlement. (p. 7)
Asymmetry: The Wake of Mutually Exclusive Geotheological Narratives
The ancient geotheological claims of Jews and Muslims outlined above have
remained primarily unresolved matters for the better part of the past 1500 years. The
following section of this historical overview is intended to provide a link between the
time of Jewish expulsion from Palestine through the birth of the Islamic Empire and up to
the present day. These events are presented with the intention of demonstrating the
persisting geotheological influence on the modern expressions of the conflict. Accepting
the influence of the persisting geotheological claims explains (at least in part) why the
successful resolution of the ‘tangible’ elements of the conflict (access to natural
resources, land ownership, security, etc.) continues to elude Israeli and Palestinian
leadership today. These claims and their subsequent dual historical narratives—
Jewish/Israeli and Arab/Palestinian—have their roots in geotheological interpretations
and tend to become exacerbated by asymmetrical relationships; and, as this review
intends to show, the contradictory nature of these narratives have had the effect of
perpetuating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the point of cyclical stalemate (Caplan,
2010).
From the Muslim conquest into the Ottoman Empire. From 636 to 1516 AD,
the region of Palestine was conquered and colonized multiple times over by numerous
regional powers. Control over Jerusalem and Palestine alternated between Muslim rulers

31

and Christian Crusaders throughout this period. In 1516, the Ottoman Empire claimed
control over Palestine and for 400 years the region was “repeatedly subdivided and fused
with neighboring administrative units” (Krämer, 2008, p. 16). The region was decidedly
Muslim in character and culture, though Christians, Druze, and (to a lesser extent) Arab
Jews lived in the region too.
Though the vast majority of Jews during this period had been exiled from ‘Eretz
Israel’ to locations throughout Europe and Asia, they maintained a ‘longing’ to return to
Jerusalem, which is evidenced in multiple Jewish prayers and liturgical commemorations
(Ben-Arieh & Davis, 1997). There is even evidence that, as early as the third century AD,
Jews successfully transferred their dead to Palestine for burial in the ‘holy land’ (Krämer,
p. 26). However, as Jews attempted to integrate with other populations and peoples
outside of Palestine, this emphasis on the importance of a ‘return to Zion’ among the
Jewish diaspora fluctuated.
1830 to 1917: From the ‘Tanzimat’ to the Balfour Declaration. During the late
1830’s, Ottoman leaders began issuing and implementing a number of social and
economic reforms known as ‘Tanzimat.’ These reforms included the establishment of
programs to ensure sustainable social order such as a regular census, tax collection,
compulsory military service, and a re-organization of local governing bodies. Some of
these reforms were developed through a process of diplomatic exchanges between the
Ottoman elite and European powers, namely Britain and France. As Krämer (2008) notes,
“the interplay of intended and unintended effects and side effects, of internal and external
factors, makes the Tanzimat era fascinating to the modern observer” (p. 71).
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The rise of Zionist nationalism. Despite persisting ideas that Jews were
effectively banished from all of Palestine from the time of the Roman conquest on into
the Ottoman Empire, there is evidence to suggest otherwise, as was mentioned earlier in
this review by Krämer (2008). Still, at the beginning of the 19 th century, the vast majority
of Jews lived outside of Palestine, and for a short period the Ottomans banned Eastern
European Jewish immigration. According to Sours (1998), a combination of factors made
it possible for Jews to begin migrating in steadily greater numbers from Europe to
Palestine. One of them was a ‘Tanzimat’ edict issued in 1836 “which laid down the
conditions for legal arrangement for the resumption of immigration to Jerusalem from
Eastern Europe” (Hirschberg, as cited in Sours, p. 75). This edict, plus the rise of
European nationalism and the increasing influence European nations had in Palestine
(and on the Ottoman ruling elite), encouraged a steady flow of Jewish immigration into
Palestine throughout the mid-19th century.
The first significant wave of Zionist Jewish immigrants to Ottoman Palestine was
in 1872. Zionism—here loosely defined as a social and nationalistic movement seeking to
establish Eretz Israel as a Jewish territory specifically within the region of Palestine—
was by no means a consensually popular movement throughout the Jewish diaspora at
this time. Zionism was initially proposed as a means to resolve the ‘Jewish question’:
what should be done about the Jewish diaspora in the face of European nationalism?
Where do European Jews belong? As has been mentioned already, Jews had been living
in Palestine well before the first wave of Russian and European Jews arrived in the late
1800’s. Krämer (2008) points out that the ‘New Yishuv’ (i.e. new Jewish immigrants)
purposely distinguished itself from the ‘Old Yishuv’ (i.e. Jews who had already been
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living in Palestine for generations) because it wanted to overcome the Jewish stereotypes
“they detested—tradition, immobility, and reliance on others” (p. 104). The second and
third ‘waves’ of Jewish immigration (between 1904 and 1918) also sought to distinguish
themselves from the previous waves of immigrants and were largely dedicated to a
process of establishing “an egalitarian Jewish society that would be largely self-contained
and self-sufficient” (Krämer, p. 111).
The rise of Arab nationalism. While Zionism as a concept and a cause began
taking shape and gaining momentum among Jews entering Palestine, the concept of Arab
nationalism began taking shape among Arabs under Ottoman rule in the form of both
secular and religious movements. A secular concept of Arab nationalism was motivated
by a) a desire to break away from an Ottoman leadership that had been attempting to
‘Turkify’ the non-Turkish speaking peoples within its territories and b) a vision of
unifying Arabic-speaking peoples under a common identity regardless of religious
affiliation (Caplan, 2010). Krämer emphasizes that both the secular and the Islamic Arab
nationalist movements shared many similar themes, and that they should be considered
political competitors rather than polar opposites (Krämer, 2008, p. 124). Complicating
matters further were the increasingly frequent conflicts between Arab landowners and
Jewish immigrants in Ottoman Palestine. In 1905, Arab nationalist Négib Azoury (as
cited in Caplan) observed the following:
[There exists] two important phenomena, of the same nature but opposed, . . . the
awakening of the Arab nation, and the latent effort of the Jews to reconstitute on a
very large scale the ancient kingdom of Israel. Both these movements are destined
to fight continually until one of them wins. The fate of the entire world [he
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predicted] will depend on the final result of this struggle between these two
peoples representing two contrary principles. (p. 42)
The end of the Ottoman Empire and Britain’s influence. As the Ottoman
Empire gradually fragmented, British influence in the eastern Mediterranean and
Palestine increased to such an extent that one historian states that the British were “more
[involved] than any other foreign power in the creation of Palestine as a modern political
entity and in establishing its boundaries” (Biger, 2008, p. 70). One significant example of
the British government’s influence on boundary creation during this period was the
creation of what is today Israel’s boundary with Egypt. In 1906, Britain successfully renegotiated the border between Egypt (which was under British control) and then-Ottoman
territory in Palestine “in order to place [the border] as far as possible from the Suez
Canal” (Biger, p. 70). At the conclusion of World War I, the Ottoman Empire was
effectively dismantled and Britain became “the sole ruler of the area that later became
Palestine” (Biger, p. 70). Through further negotiations with France (known as the SykesPicot Agreement), Britain established the northern and eastern borders of Palestine.
The Balfour Declaration. It is at this stage in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict—the end of World War I and the British military’s entrance into Palestine—that
the differing narratives between the two sides begin to solidify. In brief, at the conclusion
of World War I both Zion nationalists and Arab nationalists petitioned Britain for
different reasons: Zionists sought a national home for Jews while Arabs sought protection
to establish a nation-state of their own. In an apparent attempt to balance the prior
commitments British officials had made to Arab leaders with the need to help resolve the
‘Jewish question,’ Britain’s Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour issued a statement in
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November 1917 to the head of the English Zionist Federation Walter Rothschild that
obligated Britain to helping establish a ‘Jewish national home’ in Palestine where the
‘civil and religious rights’ of the ‘existing non-Jewish communities’ in Palestine were to
be ‘unprejudiced’. This came to be known as the Balfour Declaration.
However, the wording of this obligation to the Zionist cause in Palestine proved
to be quite problematic. Arab nationalist leaders rejected the Declaration on multiple
grounds. First, the declaration did not refer to the indigenous population of Palestine as
‘Arab’ or ‘Palestinian’ but rather ‘non-Jewish.’ Arab nationalists interpreted this as
meaning that the indigenous Arabs of Palestine would be provided no political or civil
rights. Second, the Balfour Declaration contradicted letters written by British high
commissioner Henry McMahon to Sharif Hussein of Mecca in which the former assured
that Britain would grant independence to various Arab regions including Palestine
(Krämer, 2008). Third, by placing the aspirations of a Jewish national home above the
nationalist aspirations of the indigenous Arabs in Palestine implied that “the Arabs were a
minority in Palestine,” which statistically was not the case (Adwan et al., 2012). Further
complicating matters was the fact that the region known as Palestine “formed no
administrative unit within the Ottoman Empire and thus had no well-defined boundaries”
(Krämer, 2008, p. 145).
Dual narratives crystallized. Arab and Palestinian dissatisfaction with the
Balfour Declaration, compared to Zionist satisfaction with said Declaration, set the stage
for the next chapter in this evolving conflict. As Caplan (2010) has observed, the conflict
at this state began to shift from being a Zionist-Arab conflict to a Zionist-Palestinian
conflict. Furthermore, the British government found itself within a ‘dual obligation’ to
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satisfy both Zionist-Jewish aspirations, as mentioned in the Balfour Declaration, and
appeasing the indigenous Palestinian population which rejected the Balfour Declaration
outright.
To this point I have attempted to present the history of this land and these peoples
through Krämer’s (2008) lens of ‘relationality’ so that facts can ‘speak for themselves’
(Caplan, 2010). However, from this point onward I will present this history through the
lenses of both of the dual narratives (albeit abbreviated versions) of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict because the events of this period (from the Balfour Declaration to the present
day) cannot be related without ‘showing one’s hand.’ In other words, the semantic
choices an interlocutor must make in order to provide a narrative that insinuates neither
villains nor innocents are beyond my abilities. As such, the primary events of this period
will be presented as separate and alternating ‘dual narratives,’ inspired primarily by the
work of Adwan et al. (2012).
The Zionist-Jewish narrative: Balfour Declaration to Israeli independence.
With the support of both the British military and government representation, Palestine
was provided the means to develop infrastructure such as roads, schools, and medical
facilities. These improvements were intended to support both the development of the
Jewish state promised in the Balfour Declaration and the economic development of the
Arab population of Palestine. Despite relative calm between 1922 and 1929, a series of
Arab riots broke out in August 1929 including a massacre in the city of Hebron, whereby
Arab mobs attacked and killed Jews. After these events, the British began to withdraw
from their promise within the Balfour Declaration and a British commission
recommended “ending the Jewish immigration and land purchases by Jews” (Adwan et
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al., 2012, p. 62). Nevertheless, by the early 1930’s Jewish immigration resumed and “a
self-defense capability was established” (Adwan et al., p. 66).
Through the 1930’s the Jewish population enjoyed significant growth and
continued to develop economic opportunities for Jews and Arab Palestinians alike.
However, by 1939 Arab revolts and uprisings resumed in an attempt to a) reverse the
Balfour Declaration, b) break the ties between Britain and the Zionist movement, c) cease
Jewish immigration, d) prohibit the sale of land to Jews, and e) establish a single Arab
state in Palestine. The Palestinians engaged in terrorist attacks and economic strikes in
their attempts to make Britain meet their demands. However, the British strengthened
their ties to Jewish leadership and suppressed the Arab revolts (Adwan et al., 2012).
Nazi Germany’s persecution and mass execution of European Jews brought
increased urgency to the need to establish a Jewish state. However, by 1940 a series of
white papers made it clear that Britain would work to establish an Arab state in Palestine
with a Jewish minority, which would require the limiting of Jewish emigration to
Palestine and a freeze of Jewish land purchases. When it was clear Germany would lose
the war, certain Jewish dissident groups attacked and killed British personnel in an
attempt to force Britain to reverse the restrictions on Jewish immigration. The Yishuv
condemned these tactics and helped British officials capture the guilty parties.
As the atrocities of the Holocaust came to light (6 million Jews killed by Nazi
Germany), the pressing need to relocate the surviving displaced 200,000 European Jews
became the Yishuv’s primary concern. In 1947, the British turned the ‘Palestinian
problem’ over to the United Nations, and by November a partition plan was adopted that
would establish two independent states in Palestine, one Jewish and one Arab. However,
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the entire Arab world rejected the plan and continued attacking and killing Jews, thus
initiating the War of Independence, which concluded with the British military withdrawal
on May 15, 1948. According to Adwan et al. (2012), “Between December 1947 and
March 1948, about 75,000 Arabs had already left the country, mainly people from the
upper and middle classes” (p. 118). Soon after Israel had officially became a nation of its
own, an estimated 600,000 Arabs left the State of Israel (Adwan et al., p. 120).
The Arab/Palestinian narrative: The Balfour Declaration to the Al Nakhba.
Despite the illegality of the Balfour Declaration, the British Mandate ensured an
increasing number of Jewish immigrants to Palestine for the purpose of turning
Palestinians into a minority within their own land. The British also instituted numerous
‘divide and rule’ policies that were intended to pit Arab families against each other and
create suspicion between rural and urban dwellers. These policies and practices had the
effect of weakening Palestinian unity and resistance to Zionist initiatives (Adwan et al.,
2012).
The British also weakened the economic opportunities for Palestinian farmers by
“flooding the market with imported wheat and oil just a few weeks before the wheat
harvest season or olive picking to force the local products to be sold at the lowest prices”
(Adwan et al., 2012, p. 47). Thus, farmers would eventually incur so much debt that they
would be forced to sell their land to Zionist settlers and migrate to urban areas.
Educational opportunities for Palestinians were also restricted due to British interference
with Arab school administration and curriculum.
Under these conditions, the Palestinian national movement grew stronger. When
Jews openly provoked Muslims in Jerusalem over access to the ‘wailing wall’ at Al-Aqsa
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Mosque, rioting broke out and both Jews and Muslims carried out numerous murders.
When the British captured and sentenced the perpetrators, three Palestinians were
sentenced to death while only one Jew received a commuted sentence for the murders he
committed.
Through the 1930’s the Palestinian national movement gained momentum.
However, Arab Palestinians continued to lose land to Jewish settlers and the British
continued to crack down heavily on Palestinian protests. Despite Palestinian attempts to
organize politically, these initiatives were all ignored. When the UN Partition Plan was
passed in 1947, Palestinians immediately revolted against Jewish occupation. When the
British military departed on May 15, 1948, more than 800,000 Palestinian Arabs were
either forced out of their homes or fled to neighboring countries (Adwan et al., 2012, p.
120) creating the Palestinian refugee disaster, the Al Nakhba (Arabic for ‘The
Catastrophe’).
1949 to present: The cyclical stalemate. The events of this period signify the
shift from the Zionist-Palestinian conflict to the Israeli-Arab/Palestinian conflict. The
dual narratives presented in the previous section represent many of the themes and
grievances still animating the conflict today. The Israeli narrative includes themes similar
to those presented in the ‘geotheological’ origins section: victimization, redemption, and
existential threat from outsiders. The Palestinian narrative shares nearly identical themes:
victimization, injustice, and existential threat from outsiders. This final section of the
history of the conflict is presented primarily as a list of events without further elaboration
on the continuing dual narratives.
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The effects of Israeli independence and the Al Nakhba. The Palestinian rejection
of the UN partition plan of 1947 and the subsequent war changed the landscape of the
conflict dramatically. Both Jews and Arab-Palestinian peoples before Israeli
independence were under the protection of the British Mandate, but after the Mandate
ended and the subsequent exodus/forced exile of Palestinian Arabs, the inhabitants of this
region came under one of the following categories:
Jewish-Israeli citizens of Israel,
Palestinian-Arab citizens living inside Israeli borders who accepted
citizenship after the state of Israel was created, or
Palestinian refugees who reside in one of Palestine’s neighboring
countries (namely Syria, Lebannon, and Jordan) and are thus considered
‘stateless’.
The number of ‘Palestine refugees’ in 1948 numbered as many as 650,000
(Caplan, 2010). Because their situation has still not been resolved, subsequent
generations of Palestine refugees eligible for assistance from the United Nations Relief
and Works Agency (UNRWA) now total 5 million (UNRWA, 2015). In December 1948,
the UN passed Resolution 194 which stipulated that the Palestine refugees had the right
to return to their homes and be compensated for their losses. However, this resolution has
still not been implemented.
The effects of the 1967 war. After Israel gained independence in 1949, the
population of the new Israeli state included approximately 350,000 Arab-Palestinians
while the Jewish population numbered nearly 1 million (Caplan, 2010). The Palestine
refugee crisis stretched the capacities of the infrastructures of neighboring Arab states,
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adding further strain to the already hostile relations between Arab states and the JewishIsraeli state. In June 1967, Israel attacked Egyptian planes near their borders, which
obligated both Jordan and Syria to attack Israel on Egypt’s behalf. The six-day war
resulted in the Israeli military conquering territories from each of these Arab states that
consequently added 430,000 square kilometers to Israeli territory (Caplan, p. 145). This
military incursion also placed an additional 600,000 Arab-Palestinians under Israel’s
military control. Since that time, multiple UN interpretations of the Fourth Geneva
Convention have concluded that these territories must be returned to Egypt, Jordan, and
Syria, but as of yet Israel has not fully complied. The result of this military occupation of
the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights created a new Palestinian category
of identity: ‘Arab-Palestinian within occupied territory.’ These Palestinians are
differentiated from both Arab-Palestinians that possess Israeli citizenship and Palestine
refugees living in camps supported by UNRWA in neighboring Arab states.
The rise of the PLO and the Intifadas. Following the events of 1967, the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which had been founded in 1964, expanded
its realm of influence as the primary representative of both Palestine refugees and
Palestinian Arabs in the Occupied Territories. The PLO’s 1968 National Charter,
overseen by its leader Yasser Arafat, called for the “elimination of Zionism in Palestine”
by way of “armed struggle” because this represented the only means of “regaining
Palestine as an Arab state for its original Palestinian inhabitants” (Caplan, 2010, p. 163).
The PLO and multiple Palestinian splinter groups carried out acts of violence against
Israelis both inside and outside Israel, while Israel responded with covert assassinations
of Palestinian leaders and heavy military incursions on Palestinians in the occupied
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territories (Caplan, 2010). Furthermore, Israeli settlers (Orthodox Jews committed to the
pursuit of the Zionist vision of a fully Jewish state) were allowed to establish homesteads
within Gaza and the West Bank, which resulted in further violent confrontations between
Arab-Palestinians and Jewish Israelis. These cycles of violence continued throughout the
1970’s and 80’s.
Due to worsening economic conditions for Palestinians in the occupied territories,
the first ‘Intifada’ (Arabic for ‘uprising’) began in 1987. The violent confrontations
between Palestinians and Israeli police and military had by 1991 resulted in the deaths of
at least 800 Palestinians. During this period, the PLO and Israeli leadership had engaged
in talks that resulted in the PLO’s renunciation of ‘terrorism’ as a means for achieving
Palestinian statehood. Despite the optimism this renunciation created, violence clashes
continued in the occupied territories as late as 1993. That same year Yasser Arafat and
Israeli Prime Minister Rabin signed the Oslo Accords which were intended to begin the
process of reconciliation between Israel and Palestinians and eventually result in a
Palestinian state. However, Rabin was assassinated shortly thereafter by an ultraOrthodox Jew and the Oslo Accords ended up making very little actual change in the
conflict. The cycle of violence continued through the 1990’s.
By 2000, Arafat and a succession of Israeli Prime Ministers had engaged in
multiple talks in an attempt to continue what had begun with the signing of the Oslo
Accords. However, when Israeli and Palestinian negotiators met in Taba, Egypt, they
were unable to overcome ‘thorny’ issues related to the ‘geotheological’ matters
underlying the conflict, namely the governance of Jerusalem and the administration of
Islamic and Jewish holy sites (Caplan, 2010). In September of 2000, Israel’s Likud party

43

leader Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, which prompted violent
responses from Palestinians in Jerusalem. Thus the second Intifada was initiated, which
proved to be even more violent and deadly than the first Intifada: by September 2004,
3,000 Palestinians and 1,000 Israelis had been killed (Caplan, p. 206). In response to the
increase in Palestinian suicide bombings, Israel initiated the construction of a barrier
separating Jewish and Palestinian populations and established multiple security
checkpoints which effectively limited the ability for Palestinians to travel within and
between the occupied territories.
The United States’ role in the conflict. Though the United States has never
officially established or drawn any boundaries in Israel-Palestine, its influence in the
region has been significant. The US supported the UN resolution of 1947 and later
“adopted the English version of Resolution 242, calling for Israel to withdraw from areas
occupied during that war” (Biger, 2008, p. 84). Furthermore, the US has served as a
mediator and peace broker between Israel and the PLO, most notably under Presidents
Carter and Clinton.
Nevertheless, outside of these official diplomatic engagements, the relationship
between the US and Israel has repeatedly been described as ‘special’—first by President
Kennedy in 1962 and again by Carter in 1977. Bar-Siman-Tov (1998) suggests that this
relationship has become characterized as ‘special’ in due to the US government’s
significant military and economic aid to Israel. From 1948 to 1996, the US government
provided more than $65 billion to Israel despite the lack of any formal defense or military
pact (Bar-Siman-Tov, p. 231). More specifically, the relationship between the US and
Israel could be characterized as ‘patron-client,’ whereby the US has provided Israel

44

tangible military and economic support while Israel has provided the US intangible
assurances of ‘self-restraint’ against attacking neighboring Arab states (Bar-Siman-Tov,
p. 261). The future of the US-Israeli ‘special relationship’ is likely to evolve not because
of individual differences between each nation’s respective leaders (i.e. Obama and
Netanyahu) but because of shifts in the nations’ respective national interests (Waxman,
2012).
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict today. Since 2002, a number of high level
resolutions and ‘peace plans’ have been developed, but thus far very little political
progress has been made in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In 2002, a Saudi
Arabian-backed peace plan was approved by the Arab League which, if implemented,
would offer Israel full diplomatic recognition among Arab states (currently there is no
such diplomatic recognition) in exchange for Israel’s withdrawal from the 1967 occupied
territories. In 2003, multiple international players including the UN, the European Union,
Russia, and the United States developed a performance-based ‘Roadmap to Peace’
intended to lead to a two-state solution. Also in 2003, Palestinian and ex-Israeli
negotiators working independently and outside of their respective governments
developed a set of proposals—collectively called the Geneva Initiative—that builds on
the initial agreements achieved during the Taba, Egypt talks.
In 2005, Israel officially withdrew its military operations from Gaza, and in 2006
the Islamic Palestinian party Hamas won major elections in Palestine. Since these events,
Israel has maintained its system of checkpoints and border wall separations, while
Palestinians have struggled to unify around a specific political cause, with loyalties
divided between the PLO, Hamas, and Fatah. Furthermore, millions of Palestine refugees
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remain stateless in neighboring Arab states, and the economic health of Gaza has
worsened due to Israel’s increased military presence on its borders. In 2009 US President
Obama successfully pressured Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to accept the goal of a
two-state solution. However, official Israeli and Palestinian leaders have not been able to
agree on the terms of ‘freezing’ Jewish settlements on land captured in the 1967 war.
Tension around this issue of Israeli settlements remains significant. As of this writing,
ultra-Orthodox Jewish settlers in the West Bank recently firebombed a Palestinian
family’s home, killing two, critically injuring two, and sparking demonstrations
throughout Israel and the occupied territories (Lappin & Lazaroff, 2015).
Sociological ‘Master Narratives’ and the Perpetuation of the Conflict
The preceding overview of the history of the conflict between Jews/Israelis and
Arabs/Palestinians demonstrates that despite numerous attempts at resolving the
conflict—from British intervention in the 1920’s to UN partition plans in the 1940’s to
international peace plan conferences in the 1990’s—the conflict has developed a selfperpetuating characteristic that renders it an ‘intractable ethnonational conflict’ (Rouhana
& Bar-Tal, 1998). As such, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict differs from that of a
‘tractable’ conflict in that the parties involved in the latter type of conflict are more likely
to be moved towards (and achieve beneficial results from) peaceful negotiations. The key
characteristics of intractable ethnonational conflict are the conflict’s threat to a group’s
basic human needs of security and recognition; the conflict’s infiltration into the groups’
social, cultural, and political systems; the conflict’s multi-generational protractedness; the
conflict’s violent manifestations; and the conflict’s apparent irreconcilability (Rouhana &
Bar-Tal, p. 761-762).
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The Israeli-Palestinian conflict exhibits all of these characteristics and is made
unique by further key elements. First, because both the Jewish Israeli and Palestinian
Arab master narratives emphasize exclusive rights to the land, the narratives are, at the
most fundamental level, mutually exclusive of each other. To acknowledge and accept
the Israeli Jewish narrative means rejecting the Palestinian Arab narrative, and vice versa
(Hammack, 2011). As such, Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs who fully accept their
own respective master narrative must reject the other group’s right to security and
recognition for the sake of eliminating cognitive dissonance. Second, both groups see
themselves as victims of the other group’s aggression: Israeli Jews tend to exhibit a ‘siege
mentality’ in the face of external threat (Bar-Tal & Antebi, as cited in Rouhana & BarTal, 1998), while Palestinian Arabs evoke the Al Nakhba and suffering at the hands of
colonizing empires. Third, the relationship is characterized by (either perceived or actual)
‘double power asymmetry,’ whereby Israel possesses superior military and political
power while Palestine possesses greater access to human and material resources
(Rouhana & Bar-Tal, p. 764). Finally, the role of religion has been politicized
considerably, as has already been explored in the previous section on the role of
geotheology.
All told, these master narratives and dynamics of intractable conflict create
psychological dynamics that enable individuals in each society to a) cope with the stress
and anxiety caused by the conflict and b) maintain belief systems that in turn ensure the
perpetuation of the conflict (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998). In order to cope with the stress
of the conflict, both Zionist-Israelis and Palestinian Arabs insist that their claim to the
land is justified by historical precedence (Biblical promises) and the need to correct a
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wrongdoing (the Al Nakhba), respectively. Also, members of each group view
themselves as superior to members of the other group: modern Israeli Jews have
purposely worked against historical negative Jewish stereotypes to present themselves as
morally superior to non-Jews, while Palestinian Arabs view themselves as superior in
terms of courageousness, especially in the light of the power asymmetry described
previously (Rouhana & Bar-Tal).
The stress and anxiety caused by intractable conflict also causes respective
members of each group to become ‘cognitively frozen,’ which means they “commit
themselves to certain beliefs and refrain from critically challenging them” (Rouhana &
Bar-Tal, 1998, p. 766). As a result of this ‘cognitive freezing,’ members of each group
tend to select, interpret, and elaborate information about the conflict and the other group
that is consistent with already held beliefs and biases. As such, new or contradictory
information about the conflict that challenges the master narrative is dismissed
immediately. Neither Israeli Jews nor Palestinian Arabs are immune to this phenomenon
and explains in part why the conflict has been impervious to resolution for so many
generations.
How the Conflict Affects Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs
Understanding the degree to which Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs subscribe to
a master narrative and how they view themselves as members of an in-group in relation
to an out-group are only parts of their respective worlds of experience. Regardless of how
these individuals view themselves in light of their group’s respective narrative, members
of both groups can be considered ‘survivors of the conflict.’ ‘Surviving the conflict’ does
not only mean ‘not dying in a violent altercation’; it also means ‘getting through the daily
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grind of life in spite of the conflict.’ As such, what follows here is an overview of how
this intractable ethnonational conflict has shaped both Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab
opinions about peace and conflict resolution and how the conflict has affected individuals
in both groups—psychologically, physiologically, and relationally.
The role of ‘ethos of conflict’ on perceptions of the conflict. The term ‘ethos of
conflict’ is defined as “a configuration of central shared societal beliefs that provide a
particular dominant orientation to a society and give meaning to societal life under
conditions of intractable conflict” (Bar-Tal, as cited in Lavi et al., 2014, p. 71). As was
mentioned earlier, the Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab ‘ethos of conflict’ share many
of the same themes related to victimization and justness of national goals. However,
individual Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs vary in their degree of adherence to their
group’s ethos of conflict, and these differences in adherence often affect how these
individuals respond to the hardships of the conflict.
Specifically, Lavi et al. (2014) found that Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs who
adhere strongly to their respective group’s ‘ethos of conflict’ were often ‘protected’ from
experiencing depression after experiencing certain conflict-related events such as
financial loss or a home demolition. However, individuals who have a low adherence to
the ethos of conflict experienced greater levels of negative emotions after experiencing
such events. These results suggest “strong ideological commitment can help the
individual find the social context a stable one, with predictability and meaningfulness,
even when this individual is confronted with harsh events that have resulted from the
same social context” (Lavi et al., 2014, p. 84). However, a high ethos of conflict

49

adherence did not protect either Israeli Jews or Palestinian Arabs from ‘post-traumatic
experience’ following the death of a loved one.
Furthermore, the Lavi et al. (2014) study indicated that Palestinian Arabs with a
low ethos of conflict adherence, in the face of extreme conflict-related stressors, are
likely to feel greater levels of ‘national threat’ and, as such, start adhering more closely to
the ethos of conflict. Similarly, Israeli Jews with a low ethos of conflict experience
greater levels of hatred and fear when exposed to extreme conflict situations. This
suggests “threatening contexts result in movement toward conservative views (i.e. strong
adherence to the ethos of conflict) but only among those who did not hold such views in
the first place” (Lavi et al., 2014, p. 87).
Despite evidence that demonstrates some correlation between the experience of
violent conflict events and the likelihood of individuals subsequently advancing conflictperpetuating beliefs and behaviors, survey data collected over the last few decades
suggest that popular beliefs and perceptions among Israelis about Palestinians have been
changing. For example, in the 1970’s, 70% of surveyed Israeli Jews believed that the
Palestinian Arab people did not constitute ‘a nation,’ but by 2009 the percentage dropped
to 32% (Bar-Tal et al., 2014). As such, Israeli Jewish popular opinion suggests that there
has been a significant increase in support for ‘Arab Palestinian national recognition.’
However, popular Israeli Jewish perceptions of the ‘trustworthiness of Arab Palestinians’
have dropped since the beginning of the second Intifada. For example, in 1999 64% of
surveyed Israeli Jews believed most Arab Palestinians ‘want peace,’ but by 2009 that
number had dropped to 44% (Bar-Tal et al., 2014). These trends indicate “if trust could
be rebuilt, Israeli Jews would be considerably better poised to make political and
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territorial concessions for peace than they were at the start of the ‘Oslo Process’”
(Newman, 2012, p. 476).
Physiological effects of the conflict. Though survey data measuring Israeli
Jewish perceptions of Palestinian Arabs in light of the conflict is far more extant than
reliable survey data measuring Palestinian Arab perceptions of Israeli Jews, there are a
number of studies that point to the negative effects the conflict has had on both groups.
The effects on Palestinian Arab children are quite substantial. For example, Palestinian
Arab children are likely to experience ‘loneliness’ and ‘lack of intimate friendship’ after
witnessing severe military violence (Peltonen et al., 2010). Another study showed that in
the aftermath of war, nearly three-quarters of surveyed Palestinian Arab children ages 8
to 14 actively feared their own impending death and nearly all of them believed adults
were unable to protect them (Thabet et al., 2010). Giacaman et al. (2007) report that
Palestinian Arab adolescents who endure or witness as few as one ‘humiliating’ life event
(i.e. one that violates dignity and basic human rights) were subsequently significantly
more likely to report a high number of subjective health complaints. Furthermore, the
stress Palestinian Arab children have experienced due to poverty and social
marginalization has made it extremely difficult for them to achieve academic success
(Diab, 2011).
The negative effects the conflict has had on Palestinian Arab children and youth is
not reflected equally through their population. For example, Lavi and Solomon (2005)
found that Palestinian Arabs living in the occupied territories witness or experience a
significantly higher number of traumatic events than do Palestinian Arab citizens of
Israel. Gaza and West Bank Palestinians also reported higher levels of post-traumatic
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symptoms, expressed greater pessimism about the future, and were less likely to express
positivity about peace negotiations than did Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel. However,
both groups experience similar levels of chronic stress due to the conflict.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has affected both Israeli Jewish and Palestinian
Arab families significantly, especially those that have lost a family member in a violent
event related to the conflict. Though Abbott’s (2009) study cannot be considered
representative of all Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab families who have lost a family
member, Abbott identified key differences in the themes of experience between how
Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs are affected by the death of a family member. For
example, while both Palestinian Arab and Israeli Jewish families expressed shock and
grief at their family’s loss, the former celebrated the deceased as a ‘martyr who has
earned a place in paradise’ while the latter saw only the ‘senseless’ loss of the deceased
(Abbott, p. 121). Israeli Jewish family members in Abbott’s interviews generally did not
express hatred for Palestinian Arabs, but they did express a lack of trust in Palestinian
Arab intentions. Some interviewed Palestinian Arab families, however, expressed hope
that other family members would become martyrs for the ‘cause of Palestine.’ Beyond
these differences, however, Abbott found that both Jewish Israeli and Palestinian Arab
families, especially siblings of the deceased, experienced emotional and psychological
‘devastation’ many years after the loved one’s death. Families from both groups coped by
memorializing the deceased in annual commemorations and, in cases where the deceased
was a child, by giving birth to a ‘replacement child.’ These identified ‘themes of
experience’ are also consistent with Punamäki et al.’s (2005) study that shows that
Palestinian Arab families who had endured loss due to military violence received
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considerably more social support than families who endured domestic violence. For
Palestinian Arabs, ‘heroism’ is strongly related to ‘national sacrifice’ while ‘shame’ is
strongly related to ‘family violence’ (Punämaki et al., 2005). What all this suggests is that
although Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab families cope with tragic loss in similar
manners at a basic human level, each group assigns significance to that tragedy in a
manner consistent with each group’s respective master narrative as described in previous
sections of this review.
The multiple identities of Israeli Jews today. Despite the presence of multiple
culturally-different Jewish populations within Israel, few (if any) of the studies
referenced in the previous section made any mention of these various populations.
Census data within Israel tends to ignore these cultural differences among Israeli Jews by
classifying Israeli Jews under one of only two categories: Ashkenazim (Occidental Jews)
and Sephardim (Oriental Jews) (Leichtman, 2001). These broad categorizations of
Israel’s Jewish population ignore the historical identities of a variety of culturallydifferent Jewish populations which include Egyptian, Moroccan, Ethiopian, Russian,
Yemeni, Indian Jews, and Palestinian Jews (i.e. the Old Yishuv mentioned in a previous
section).
Mizrachi (2004) suggests that this kind of ‘lumping’ of Israeli Jews into a
minimal number of categories is representative of a larger phenomenon of ‘ethnic
hierarchy shaping.’ Mizrachi postulates that Mizrahi Jews (those of Middle
Eastern/Oriental background) have been victimized by a multi-generational process of
‘ethnopsychology’ whereby the behaviors of the Ashkenazi (i.e. Zionist European Jews)
were gradually standardized within Israeli psychological practice as ‘normal’ behavior,
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while the behaviors of the Mizrahi Jewish population were deemed as ‘abnormal’ or
‘sick.’ This has had significant social and political effects on the Mizrahi population
within Israel: “Politically, [Oriental Jews] have been considered as part of the [Israeli]
nation-building project and of the Jewish collective, but culturally they have been the
‘other’” (Mizrachi, 2004, p. 226).
Mizrahi Jews make up nearly half of the Jewish population of Israel (Wurmser,
2005) yet their enrollment in higher education is less than both that of Ashkenazi Jews
and Palestinian Citizens of Israel, and their income levels are significantly less than
Ashkenazi Jews (Shavit, 1990). This suggests that their marginalization within Israeli
society has had significant effects on their overall opportunities for social and economic
advancement. Some post-Zionist writers have referred to the status of Mizrahi Jews
within Israel as a call to action against Zionism: “The Zionist denial of the Arab-Moslem
[sic] and Palestinian East, then, has as its corollary the denial of the Jewish ‘Mizrahim’
who, like the Palestinians, but by more subtle [sic] and less obviously brutal mechanisms,
have also been stripped of the right of self-representation” (Shohat, 1988, p. 1). However,
though the existence of ‘Arab Jews’ would at first appear to be a natural ‘bridge’ towards
reconciliation between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs, “most [Mizrahi] hold an
antagonistic view of the Arab world and find the attempt to define them as Arab Jews
rather than as Israelis insulting” (Wurmser, para. 32).
Peace Education & Dialogue, Social Theory, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
Intergroup dialogue is one of numerous expressions of peace education, whereby
participants are facilitated through a process of conversation in order to reduce prejudice
and build positive relationships with ‘the other.’ Unfortunately, rigorous research and
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evaluative scholarship is lacking in the field of peace education (Salomon, 2002).
Salomon likens the state of peace education research today to a hypothetical medical field
that fails to differentiate between invasive surgeries to remove a malignant tumor versus
non-invasive laser surgery to correct myopia. As such, the field of peace education has
generally lacked the kind of rigorous scientific procedures for ascertaining not only the
type of ‘conflict maladies’ infecting a group of people but also the appropriate
‘treatment’ for said maladies (Salomon, 2002).
One of the reasons there exists such a ‘disconnect’ between scholarship and
practice in the field of peace education is due to the ‘amorphous’ goals of peace
education (Harris, 2002). At the very least, peace education promotes alternatives to
violence, but because there are so many different forms of violence (structural, domestic,
gender-related, police, racial, etc.), peace educators end up trying “to address all the
different forms of violence that occur on this planet” (Harris, para. 3). By trying to offer a
solution for all human conflict, peace education as a whole often fails to address any of
the forms of violence adequately.
Furthermore, one primary reason why the field of peace education exhibits such
an ‘amorphous quality’ is the disagreement among peace education scholars regarding
the definition and conception of ‘peace.’ Peace has been defined on a broad spectrum
ranging from Spinoza’s conception of peace as “not an absence of war, (but) a virtue, a
state of mind, a disposition for benevolence, confidence, justice” (as cited in Danesh,
2008, p. 815), to Galtung’s (1969) systems-oriented conception of peace as the absence
of personal and structural violence. Johnson and Johnson (2006) view peace as “the
absence of war or violence in a mutually beneficial, harmonious relationship among
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relevant parties” (p. 147). A recent conception of peace offered by Firer (2008) defines
peace in terms of personal action, ranging from positive peace (the proactive elimination
of structural violence) to negative peace (conflict avoidance). Whether peace primarily
lies in personal ethics, social systems, the elimination of militaristic conflict, or some
combination of these is still a matter that has not been universally delineated among
peace scholars and conflict resolution practitioners.
Peace Education in Zones of Intractable Conflict
Despite the lack of a universally accepted definition of peace, there is little debate
over the definition of ‘intractable conflict,’ and regions that exhibit intractable conflict
are a significant challenge for peace builders. According to Bar-Tal (2000), ‘intractable
conflict’ is “protracted, irreconcilable, [are preserved through] vested interests in their
continuation, violent, of zero-sum nature, total, and central. They are demanding,
stressful, exhausting, and costly both in human and material terms” (Bar-Tal, 1998, p.
22). Furthermore, because intractable conflicts tend to be both the products of and cause
of a prolonged period of violence, mere conflict resolution is not enough to bring about
any semblance of peace. Instead, peace builders must focus on creating opportunities for
genuine reconciliation (Bar-Tal, 2000).
According to Salomon (2002), peace building initiatives in areas of intractable
conflict can only be effective if a) practitioners shift the focus from individuals to
collectives; b) the narratives of the past that justify essentialized perspectives of the other
can be deconstructed; and c) the expressed animosity over past injustices can be
overcome. Echoing Bar-Tal (2000), Salomon (2002) points out that, in order to achieve
these three goals, peace education programs in regions of intractable conflict (such as
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Israel-Palestine) must lead participants to the following four behavioral and perceptual
outcomes: a) acceptance of the other’s narrative, b) a willingness to examine one’s own
group’s claims in the light of the other group’s claims, c) a readiness to express and show
empathy towards the other, and d) a disposition to engage in nonviolent activities. Each
of these outcomes is fraught with challenges, especially considering that these outcomes
would ideally be pursued in an arena of symmetrical social power. However, regions of
intractable conflict are in conflict largely because there exists a state of asymmetrical
social power.
Theoretical Foundations of Contact: Allport to Sherif to Tajfel
To understand the development of intergroup dialogue programs in IsraelPalestine requires a brief overview of the development of social conflict theories that
have served as the foundational concepts of intergroup dialogue practice in general.
‘Intergroup dialogue’ as a concept and practice can be traced as far back as the days of
Socrates and his introduction of the ‘Socratic method,’ whereby individuals are
encouraged to ask well-conceived questions for the purpose of arriving at truth (Dessel &
Rogge, 2008). ‘Intergroup dialogue’ can be defined as “a facilitated group experience that
may occur once or may be sustained over time and is designed to give individuals and
groups a safe and structured opportunity to explore attitudes about polarizing societal
issues” (Dessel & Rogge, 2008, p. 201). Numerous different models of intergroup
dialogue have been developed over the past few decades, and many of these models are
based on the theoretical implications of the ‘contact hypothesis,’ which was originally
developed by Allport in 1954 (as cited in Dessel & Rogge; Hammack, 2011) as an
attempt to address the problem of prejudicial forms of in-group/out-group conflict.
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According to Allport’s hypothesis, in order for contact work to be ‘optimal,’ four
conditions need to be met: (1) the groups must have equal status with an encounter, (2)
the groups must share common goals, (3) the group members must exhibit cooperative
interactions, and (4) the interactions must have the support of authorities (Dessel &
Rogge, p. 212).
According to Hammack (2011), Allport’s works (which were chiefly intended to
address the problem of racial injustice in America) introduced the concept that
‘prejudiced behavior’ exhibited by in-group members towards out-group members is not
the product of ‘pathology’ but rather the normal consequence of segregation. As
Hammack states:
[F]or Allport, prejudice begins with a problem in the structure of a society: the
physical separation of groups and their subsequent inability to engage with one
another in basic daily contact, to get to know one another as distinct individuals
rather than simply members of an out-group. . . (Allport) viewed individual
reason as ‘superior’ to collective mobilization. (p. 254-255)
This shift from ‘prejudice as pathology’ to ‘prejudice as predictable consequence
of segregation’ led to the development of ‘realistic conflict theory’ as inspired by Sherif’s
‘Robbers Cave’ experiment in 1958 (Hammack, 2011). ‘Realistic conflict theory’ posits
that prejudicial behavior towards an out-group occurs as a natural outcome when multiple
groups compete over scarce resources. Furthermore, prejudicial attitudes and behaviors
are reduced when the competing groups recognize the need to cooperate to achieve goals
necessary for their survival. As Hammack (2011) explains, Sherif’s work demonstrated
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that “the nature of the relationship between groups must itself be altered so that the
original conditions that produced prejudice are eliminated” (p. 256).
Both Allport’s and Sherif’s work suggest that the process of eliminating prejudice
requires the reduction or neutralization of structural and social power (Hammack, 2011).
However, Tajfel (as cited in Hammack) argued that ‘realistic conflict theory’ focuses too
heavily on interpersonal relations rather than intergroup relations. As such, Tajfel
emphasized “the significance of the social psychological process of identification with
the group in the larger context of conflict” (p. 257). Tajfel and Turner (1986) advanced
‘social identity theory’ which places identity as a primary influence on the development
and perpetuation of intergroup conflict. They defined ‘social identity’ as “those aspects of
an individual’s self-image that derive from the social categories to which he perceives
himself as belonging” (Tajfel & Turner, p. 16). Subsequent social experiments of ‘social
identity theory’ showed that intergroup conflict could be created simply by artificially
and arbitrarily assigning ‘group identities’ to previously unrelated groups of people (i.e.
red team and green team). As Hammack (2011) summarizes, “identity itself [seems] to
play a central role in the very creation of conflict” (p. 258).
A recent meta-analysis of over 500 studies that measured the effectiveness of
intergroup contact programs based on Allport’s contact hypothesis showed that even in
the absence of the four ‘optimal’ conditions, many dialogue efforts resulted in a reduction
of prejudice among participants (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006, p. 767). However, as
highlighted by Hammack (2011), “not all (contact) efforts are so successful. There are
clearly situations in which contact may, in fact, produce negative consequences or fail to
reduce prejudice” (p. 248). Hammack suggests that contact sometimes produces negative
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results (i.e. animosity between groups increase after dialogue) because both ‘contact
theory’ and ‘realistic conflict theory’ are based on individualist social psychology—a
framework that generally places the individual as the primary agent of change who can
‘rise above’ any unjust or primitive component of the social structure in which said
individual exists. This ‘elevation of the individual’ over the collective to which the
individual belongs effectively ignores the role of ‘power’ in social relations.
For this reason, Hammack suggests that the contact theory (and the theory’s
subsequent reformulations) is an inadequate foundation for intergroup dialogue programs
between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs. As Hammack states, “If we only discuss
conflict through the lens of individual personality, we miss the larger context within
which those personalities develop: (. . .) structural factors like unequal access to
resources, institutions, or lack of recognition . . . specify the context in which individual
lives unfold” (p. 38). In brief, Hammack elevates the role of social-structural asymmetry
as a primary factor affecting the quality and patterns of dialogue between Israeli Jews and
Palestinian Arabs. In order for dialogue between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs to be
an effective method of prejudice reduction, the foundation of the dialogue approach must
account for the power of the collective sum of the individual’s social world to shape and
determine the power of the individual.
Models of Intergroup Dialogue Programs in Israel-Palestine
As mentioned in Chapter 1, intergroup dialogue programs have been utilized for
decades to facilitate conversations between Israelis and Palestinians. As described earlier,
one of the primary motivations for the creation and utilization of intergroup dialogue
programs in Israel-Palestine is to reduce prejudice and improve relationships between
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Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs. Despite the ‘geotheological’ themes that have colored
and influenced the narratives of each group, many intergroup dialogue models in IsraelPalestine emphasize the social and political elements of the conflict rather than any
specific ‘religious’ themes. According to Newman (2012), this exclusion of specific
religious themes is purposive: “The peace movement in Israel has emerged from secular
Israeli society. The relationship between secularism and the Israeli peace movement is
more than just a correlation. It represents a causal relationship as well” (p. 485). As such,
the peace movement, from a secular Israeli-Jewish perspective, is primarily a product of
post-Zionism: the rejection of an Israeli national identity that dismisses Palestinian Arab
narratives and instead “help(s) Israelis confront the reality of their own past and present
by stripping away the myths and retelling their history warts and all” (Newman, p. 485).
Intergroup dialogue programs in Israel-Palestine can be categorized broadly under
two umbrellas: secular dialogue models and interreligious dialogue models. Under each
of these umbrellas are particular models. Under the secular umbrella are coexistence
models, joint project models, confrontational models, and narrative models (Maoz 2010,
2011). Under the interreligious umbrella are three primary models or formats: cognitive
interpretations of religious texts models, theological dialogue among clergy models, and
reconciliation models (Abu-Nimer et al., 2007). What follows is a brief overview of each
of these umbrellas of intergroup dialogue and the respective models under them.
Secular models. Maoz (2011) provides an appraisal of secular ‘intergroup
encounters’ conducted between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel. These
types of encounters have been conducted in Israel since as early as the 1950s, and have
appeared in various forms and under a wide variety of titles over the past six decades. As
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of 2002, at least 150 active intergroup contact programs were in operation in both formal
and informal Israeli educational institutions, from primary school through higher
education (Maoz, 2010). The theoretical basis of many of these programs is the ‘contact
hypothesis’ as originally explicated by Allport and later developed by Amir (as cited in
Maoz). As such, a primary goal of these intergroup encounters is to reduce negative
intergroup stereotypes and mutual prejudices. Though these Arab-Jewish intergroup
programs all share this overarching goal of reducing prejudice and negative stereotypes,
the methodologies for achieving this goal generally fall under one of four categories:
coexistence models, joint project models, confrontational models, and narrative models
(Maoz 2010, 2011). The identification of these categories is the outcome of a review of
20 years of peace education programs conducted between Israelis and Palestinians in
Israel (Maoz, 2011).
Coexistence models. Coexistence models of peace education and intergroup
dialogue represent the dominant form of peace building approaches in Israel-Palestine
and are the models that adhere most closely to the contact hypothesis. The overarching
theme of these models is the message ‘we are all human beings’ and thus emphasizes
togetherness and cooperation (Bekerman, as cited in Maoz, 2011). Research has shown
this type of model is effective for very young children (Stephan & Stephan, as cited in
Maoz) but could be perceived as ‘irrelevant’ or even immoral by adult participants who
may want to discuss specific issues related to the conflict rather than matters such as
individual-level prejudice (Bekerman, as cited in Maoz).
Joint projects models. Joint projects models of peace-building are intended to
invoke a spirit of mutual understanding and prejudice reduction primarily by bringing

62

Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs together for the purpose of completing a project or
goal. These goals and activities include art projects, orchestras, sporting events, and
environmental service projects, just to name a few. Like coexistence models, joint
projects models tend to avoid dealing directly with issues related to national identity or
political conflict. The outcomes of these types of projects have been mixed: some
projects like soccer matches have been quite successful in forging members of different
groups towards the achievement of a shared goal (i.e. winning a match or tournament)
while other programs (like co-curricular development in a school setting) have not
consistently succeeded in creating a spirit of cooperation and, in at least one case, have
even served to reinforce negative stereotypes (Maoz, as cited in Maoz, 2011).
Confrontational models. Confrontational peace education models (or group
identity models) were developed primarily in response to the shortcomings of the
coexistence and joint projects models. The underlying theoretical framework of these
models emphasizes the reconstruction of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab relationships
by focusing on both the asymmetrical power balance between the groups and the
empowerment of the minority. Retrospective studies have indicated that these types of
peace education models have in many cases successfully raised awareness among
participants regarding injustice towards and victimization of Palestinian Arabs. However,
“Confrontation Models can be more susceptible to destructive intergroup communication
patterns that include verbal violence towards, and degradation and delegitimization of
members of the other group” (Maoz, 2011, p. 120). In short, facilitators of the
confrontational model have struggled to maintain an environment conducive to mutual
respect among participants.
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Narrative models. According to Maoz (2011), narrative and story-telling models,
which were first facilitated in Israel-Palestine in the early 1990’s, represent the most
recent development in peace education in Israel-Palestine. As the name suggests, these
models emphasize the importance of personal story-telling within a mixed group setting
for the purpose of identifying group identities and reconciling anger and pain associated
with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These models emphasize a ‘transformational’
approach to conflict resolution and peace education and assumes that empathy towards
others comes, in part, as an outcome of hearing the personal stories of people from the
other group. While these models of intergroup contact appear to wed the best of both the
coexistence models and the confrontational models, narrative models of interaction face
issues of authenticity and quality: how do narrative facilitators ensure that participants
share stories that are simultaneously factual and poignant yet non-inflammatory (Maoz,
2011)? Like facilitators of the confrontational model, facilitators of narrative models have
struggled to maintain an environment of mutual understanding and respect.
Interreligious models. The secular intergroup dialogue models outlined above
tend to emphasize the goals of prejudice reduction and relationship quality while skirting
issues related to religion. Abu-Nimer et al. (2007) suggest that ignoring the religious
aspect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for the sake of emphasizing “issues of selfdetermination and resources” renders
a superficial understanding of the conflict. Religion in this region of the world has
never been distinct from politics; the centrality of religious affiliation to Jews and
Arabs . . . is a natural part of [their] lives . . . [they] cannot live without asking
what the other religion is. It is part of [their] daily lives. (p. 43)
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As was explicated earlier, both Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs have espoused
geotheological claims to the ‘rights to the land’ for generations. As such, multiple Jewish,
Christian, and Muslim religious groups have deemed intergroup dialogue that places
religion at the forefront of discussion essential for building lasting peace in IsraelPalestine. Abu-Nimer et al. (2007) surveyed interreligious dialogue participants from
2003-2004 and from that data identified three primary models of interreligious dialogue
in Israel-Palestine: cognitive interpretations of religious texts models, theological
dialogue among clergy models, and reconciliation models.
Cognitive interpretations of religious texts models. According to Abu-Nimer et
al. (2007) participants within this interreligious dialogue model gather and listen to
presentations about a number of key elements of Judaic, Christian, and Islamic narratives
and concepts. Typically, an expert presenter will offer an extended talk or lecture about a
particular topic (i.e. jihad, Mohammed’s night journey, Judaic marriage rituals, etc.)
which is followed by small-group discussion. These sessions are intended to be primarily
educational and not an attempt to convert anyone from one faith to another. This model is
based on the assumption that “people learn more through the discussion, and the
encounter becomes deeper and more positive, when participants discover the humanity in
each other” (Abu-Nimer et al., p. 53).
Theological dialogue among clergy models. The purpose of this model is to bring
religious clergy (i.e. rabbis, priests, imams) and other religious theologians together to
explore the differences and similarities between and among their respective religions. The
focus is on ‘intellectual’ exploration rather than ‘spiritual.’ Typically, one participant will
present a particular agreed-upon theme or topic and afterwards the participants offer their
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respective reaction to the presentation. The primary shortcoming of this model is that
these discussions rarely penetrate the real lives of the followers of the respective faiths
and the dialogue remains within the metaphorical ivory tower (Abu-Nimer et al., 2007).
Reconciliation models. A third type of interreligious dialogue models is the
reconciliation model, whereby large numbers of Jews, Christians, and Muslims attend
one or two-day long public meetings and ceremonies that feature dance, music, chanting,
prayers, and speeches. Whereas these types of public ceremonies tend to attract both
religious and secular participants alike, a chief criticism is their “lack of individualized
process, continuity, and follow-up” (Abu-Nimer, 2007, p. 53). Nevertheless, these types
of gatherings tend to reach the largest numbers of people from the three primary faith
groups in Israel-Palestine.
Recent History and Limitations of Intergroup Dialogue Models in Israel-Palestine
A number of compilations and articles have been published that provide
anecdotal, journalistic, or insider reviews of individual structured peace education
programs in Israel-Palestine (for recent examples, see Kuriansky, 2007). Though these
articles provide valuable insights into the challenges researchers face in the peacebuilding process within a zone of intractable conflict, few of them fit the definition of
‘extensive scholarly analysis.’ As such, what follows is an overview of the structured
(primarily secular) peace education and intergroup dialogue programs conducted with
Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs. These scholarly summaries and evaluations are based
primarily on the work of Abu Nimer (1999, 2001, 2004a) and Salomon (2004, 2013).
Taken together, these reports offer a range of critiques, observations, and
recommendations for improving the intergroup dialogue process.
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Asymmetrical social systems replicated within the dialogue. Abu-Nimer
(2001) identified four primary limitations of intergroup dialogue programs in IsraelPalestine, all of which are related in some way to the theme of social and structural
asymmetry. First, intergroup dialogue between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs tend to
emphasize interpersonal relationships at the expense of discussion about social change
that could lead to a broader recognition for civil rights and protections for Palestinian
Arabs (a sentiment later echoed by Hammack, 2008). Second, because many intergroup
dialogue groups emphasize Hebrew as the primary language, Palestinian Arab
participants are forced to utilize the language of the oppressor, while Israeli Jewish
participants are almost never expected to utilize Arabic. This phenomenon of language
dominance is a replication of the asymmetrical relationship in Israeli society. Third, many
dialogue programs tend to focus on processes of ‘similarity seeking’ rather than
‘difference identification’ which effectively mutes any discontent Palestinian Arabs may
wish to express in dialogue. Finally, because most intergroup dialogue groups in IsraelPalestine are funded by the Israeli government, Abu-Nimer (1999, 2004a) questions the
political motivations of intergroup dialogue backers.
Lessons learned from the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue encounter process.
Salomon (2013) reviewed 20 years of research into intergroup dialogue encounter
programs and developed a set of ‘lessons learned’ from said research. The most salient of
these lessons are presented here, namely: socio-political forces can override positive
effects of a dialogue process, monolithic models of dialogue are less effective than
adaptable or tailor-made models in helping dialogue participants bridge differences, and
peace education alone is not enough to ensure long-lasting changes in participants’
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beliefs and behaviors. Taken together, Salomon concludes, “peace education programs
need to affect not only those who actually participate in the programs, but the effects
need to spread to other realms of society” (2013, p. 12).
The power of socio-political forces to suppress peace education outcomes.
Salomon (2013) demonstrates that while many peace education and dialogue programs
can claim short-term success in helping both Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs change
their respective attitudes from hostile to conciliatory, the positive effects quickly
disappear after a contact program concludes. Salomon suggests this ‘erosion’ of positive
effects is due to the strength of each respective group’s larger social narrative that
effectively works against the narrative of reconciliation. However, Salomon demonstrates
that the positive effects can be ‘restored’ if participants get engaged in a reflective
process that requires them to re-tell the narrative of ‘the other’ to members of their
respective in-group. This finding suggests that though empathic concern for ‘the other’
can be inhibited, “(it) cannot be totally erased. [It] may be suppressed by the prevailing
collective narrative, but [it] can still be restored and revived” (p. 6).
The limitations of monolithic models of dialogue. Because members of different
groups involved in intractable conflict usually perceive different causes of, sources of,
and solutions to the conflict, Salomon emphasizes the importance of “addressing the
different needs, aspirations, and motivations of all involved” in a process of peacebuilding and reconciliation (p. 8). Salomon suggests future peace education and
intergroup contact programs utilize an approach akin to Shnabel et al.’s (2009) model of
needs-based intergroup reconciliation, in which the needs of both groups involved in
intractable conflict are both fully addressed, even if those needs appear to be in mutual
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contradiction with each other. As Shnabel et al. found in their controlled study, “members
of the perpetrator group showed greater willingness to reconcile when they received a
message of acceptance, rather than empowerment, from a member of the victimized
group” (p. 1021). This suggests that the path to reconciliation between groups involved in
an intractable conflict characterized by asymmetrical power begins with an unambiguous
acceptance of the current situation at hand, rather than a transformative process of
empowering the weaker group.
Peace education has its limitations. Drawing from the outcomes of numerous
studies, Salomon (2013) demonstrates that dialogue and peace education programs are
effective at helping Israeli and Palestinian participants change their respective
‘viewpoints’ and general ‘attitude’ towards the other. However, these same programs do
not seem to affect change on participants’ ‘convictions’ or emotionally-charged beliefs
about the narrative underlying the conflict. This finding suggests that peace education
programs, especially those of short duration, are not adequate means for ensuring longlasting change, and that the process of helping Israelis and Palestinians move away from
their respective narratives requires more than just dialogue (Salomon, p. 9).
New Directions of Intergroup Dialogue in Israel-Palestine
As the previous sections indicate, the dominant models of secular intergroup
dialogue programs that are based on some derivative of the contact hypothesis (namely
coexistence, confrontational, and joint project models) still have room for improvement,
especially in regards to the observed replication of inequalities in the macro social arena
within the dialogue process. However, there is evidence that these same intergroup
dialogue programs do yield positive outcomes. For example, Abu Nimer (1999) suggests
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that participants generally had ‘good personal experiences’ within the Israeli-Jewish
interactions and became more aware of the problems within Israeli society. Other studies
have demonstrated that intergroup dialogue has helped Israeli Jewish and Palestinian
Arab participants recognize oppression and the roles individuals play in the perpetuation
of that oppression (Halabi, as cited in Abu-Nimer, 2004) and recognize own and other’s
perspectives and beliefs (Khuri, 2004).
All told, these findings suggest that intergroup contact models should explicitly
recognize the role of structural inequities shaping the everyday lives of Israeli Jews and
Palestinian Arabs. While this would certainly be a helpful addition to the underlying
purpose of intergroup dialogue processes, Hammack (2008), Hammack et al. (2014), and
Bekerman & Zembylas (2012) have provided additional criticisms and insights regarding
intergroup dialogue and peace education models in Israel-Palestine and offer specific
guidance on future initiatives in this field. What follows here is a brief overview of
Hammack’s (2008) call for an intergroup model based on cultural psychology, Bekerman
and Zembylas’ (2012) call for a ‘critical design’ peace education pedagogy, and
Hammack et al.’s (2014) call for further research into individual processual change
within the intergroup dialogue experience.
The call for cultural psychology. Hammack (2008) suggests that simply
acknowledging power asymmetry between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs still does
not fully ensure long-lasting, enduring change in the respective group’s relations. Instead,
Hammack advocates the utilization of an intergroup contact model based on a paradigm
concerned with the “cultural psychology of identity and conflict” (p. 38). What Hammack
suggests is that narrative models of engagement and dialogue—rather than
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confrontational or coexistence models—carry the potential to provide both Israeli Jews
and Palestinian Arabs the opportunity to realize that both “the individual and [the] social
structure are dynamically interacting in a mode of reciprocal production . . . and it is
through the individual process of narrative engagement that they come to unwittingly
participate [in the production of a larger social transformation]” (p. 39).
The call for pedagogical ‘critical expert design’. In contrast to Hammack’s
(2008) call for a move towards a cultural psychological foundation of intergroup dialogue
in Israel-Palestine, Bekerman and Zembylas (2012) believe peace education and
intergroup dialogue, especially in regions of intractable conflict, need to move away from
positivist “psychologized perspectives of peace” (p. 224) and instead develop a reimagined form of “educational rhetoric” that conceptualizes ‘peace’ not as an abstract
ideal but as a set of behaviors with real life consequences (p. 226). They call this move
the first step towards the creation of a ‘reconciliation pedagogy’ that would allow
members of groups in zones of intractable conflict to become ‘critical design experts.’
Such a pedagogy of reconciliation would help participants resolve issues that tend to
evade comprehensive resolution. For example,
forgiveness may be offered as an exchange for symmetry when other forms of
symmetry cannot be achieved (e.g., when lives cannot be returned—or returning
territories can be too complex and compensation is offered). Forgiveness . . .
enters the scene when symmetry cannot make its appearance—not because people
do not want to offer symmetry, but because nothing more can be done
pragmatically. (p. 228)
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Documenting the process of identity change. As mentioned earlier in this paper,
Hammack et al. (2014) recognized a “dearth” of research related to the meaning-making
processes of participants in intergroup dialogue programs, particularly in regions of
intractable conflict (p. 296). The authors also identified a lack of research that compares
the participant experiences between different dialogue models. To address this ‘dearth,’
Hammack et al. facilitated intergroup contact dialogue sessions among American, Israeli,
and Palestinian youth (while in the USA) and gathered both qualitative and quantitative
data for the purpose of addressing a variety of gaps in the contact hypothesis literature.
Specifically, the authors “examined the interaction of nationality and contact paradigm on
the experience of contact . . . whether the experience for certain national groups changes
as a function of the contact paradigm employed” (p. 297). Furthermore, the authors
compared participants’ pre- and post-test responses and diary entries to determine (in
part) if the model of intergroup dialogue (in this case, coexistence versus confrontational)
yielded different types of experience for the respective participant.
The authors’ mixed methodology study yielded a variety of findings on the
processes Israeli and Palestinian contact dialogue participants undergo. Specifically, they
found that the confrontational model is effective in helping participants “initiate a process
of self-reflection and intergroup distinctiveness,” and that Palestinian participants in
particular “reported higher levels of empowerment and positive mood throughout contact
relative to all participants” (p. 296). Also, they found that “(Participants’) diary entries in
the [confrontational model] condition were more likely to contain entries reflective of
negative psychological experience (e.g. confusion, frustration, and fear/anxiety) than
diary entries in the [coexistence model] condition” (p. 312). However, the authors found

72

that “participants in a [confrontational] condition of dialogue reported lower levels of
self-consistency and higher levels of intergroup differentiation over time, suggesting the
effectiveness of this approach to initiate a process of self-reflection and intergroup
distinctiveness” (p. 296). Furthermore, participant responses suggest that the
confrontational model of dialogue was more likely to be associated with “higher levels of
empowerment and positive mood throughout contact” especially for Palestinian
participants, which suggests an “effectiveness of [the confrontational] approach to
challenge power asymmetries and its positivity for the low-status group” (p. 296).
Chapter Summary and Chapter 3 Preview
In Chapter 2, I have gone to considerable lengths to outline the recurring themes
of ‘geotheological influences’ and ‘asymmetry’ within a) the histories of Israel-Palestine,
b) the master narratives of the peoples who call Israel-Palestine home, and c) the
development and execution of intergroup dialogue programs that have been conducted
between these peoples of Israel-Palestine. The history of Israel-Palestine was presented
through the lenses of relationality and objectivity; however, when objectivity was
untenable, both narratives of Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs were presented. Both of
the master narratives of Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs are characterized, to varying
and lesser degrees, by double asymmetry, victimization, existential threat; and the violent
conflict these themes both sustain and engender have had devastating outcomes on both
groups of peoples physically, socially, emotionally, psychologically, and physiologically.
The intergroup dialogue programs that have been in place for decades in Israel-Palestine
are generally based on the contact hypothesis and have yielded mixed results. The
primary criticism leveled against contact theory and the programs upon which the theory
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is based is their general inability to generate lasting change in the respective larger Israeli
Jewish and Palestinian Arab societies. Finally, recent initiatives in Israeli JewishPalestinian Arab intergroup dialogue have called for continued reformulations of the
foundational theoretical frameworks of these programs and for further research into the
processual changes these intergroup participants undergo while participating in these
dialogue programs.
As such, this dissertation seeks to address the same question Hammack et al.
posed in their 2014 study: what are the processes intergroup dialogue participants
experience throughout the dialogue process? Hammack et al.’s purpose for conducting
their study was to address the lack of research on psychological processes among contact
participants in general. However, Israeli and Palestinian intergroup dialogue participant
commentary is extant in a number of studies conducted over the past 10 to 15 years.
Assuming answers to that question can be found within those older studies, I revisited those various studies that include Israeli Jew and Palestinian Arab intergroup
dialogue participant commentary. An appropriate qualitative research methodology for
conducting a study whereby the data are previously published studies and reports is
‘qualitative meta-study’. The exact research questions and an explanation of the specific
approach to qualitative meta-analysis I pursued are described in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Bracketing—Identifying My Presuppositions
As mentioned earlier in this dissertation, the process of ‘bracketing’ is a crucial
element of any interpretive qualitative research project. Because qualitative meta-study
falls under the umbrella of interpretive inquiry, I have attempted to bracket my personal
preconceptions, theoretical assumptions, and paradigmatic worldview influences in order
to make transparent how my interpretations of the data are made ‘subjective.’ Taking an
interpretivist constructionist stance means accepting that pure objectivity in social
scientific research is an impossibility. Nevertheless, an open awareness and unambiguous
presentation of those ‘subjectivities’ allows the reader to make a fully informed decision
regarding the validity and acceptability of the researcher’s interpretation. As such, in this
section I have attempted to bracket my experiences and perceptions in order to not only
inform the reader of my subjectivities, but also help me stay “sensitive to how prior
understandings inform analysis” (Roulston, 2014, p. 306).
The Need for a Transformative Solution
In 2002, I recall watching Israeli military campaigns unfold in a number of
Palestinian towns in retaliation against the waves of suicide bombings perpetrated by
members of Hamas. I remember the effect these particular episodes of armed and deadly
conflict had upon me. These military campaigns and suicide bombings continued despite
the Oslo II agreement, the Wye River Memorandum, and a recent UN resolution calling
for an end to the violence. I remember that while watching the news on the continuing
violence that night in 2002, I concluded that there can never be a purely political solution
to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The only true resolution to the conflict, I concluded,
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would come when Israelis and Palestinians experience a complete transformation of their
perception of each other—nothing short of a transformation of comprehension of what it
means to be human.
Within a year of drawing this conclusion of the necessity for a transformation in
Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab consciousness, I had begun pursuing a graduate
degree in conflict resolution. This pursuit took me to Switzerland where I was first
introduced to the Bahá'í Faith. Though I did not complete my master’s degree due to
internal and financial struggles within the university, it was in Switzerland where I also
met my wife Manal, a Syrian Arab Bahá'í. We got married in Damascus and moved to
the United Arab Emirates, where Manal had grown up, and from that point both my
perspectives on peace and conflict and my personal identity underwent a gradual but
discernible reconstruction.
My Multi-Faceted Identity
I was born and raised in the the Midwest US, a fifth generation son of German
immigrant farmers. My grandmother shared stories with me that when she was a child on
the playground (circa 1919) other kids threw stones at her for speaking German. Though
it is normal for third and fourth generation immigrant children to lose their ancestral
mother tongue due to the process of acculturation, in my family’s case that loss of mother
tongue was hastened by threat of violence and social ostracism. Thus begins one level of
my personal identity: I am a descendent of US immigrants who experienced rejection in
the face of the local status quo and chose to shed all indication of membership to any
other identity than ‘English-speaking white American.’
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Though I was raised in the Lutheran church, there is anecdotal yet consistent
evidence that those same German immigrant ancestors were not Protestant Christians but
Jews. If the evidence is indeed accurate, that would mean that my German immigrant
ancestors not only gave up their mother tongues in order to fit the standards of the
American Midwest status quo, they also shed their religious identities. As such, a second
layer of my identity is thus: I am a descendent of German and (potentially) Jewish
converts to Christianity.
After graduating from college, I began questioning Christianity and ultimately
threw off my own Christian faith in preference for a universal, holistic approach to
spirituality. After moving to Switzerland, becoming a member of the Bahá'í faith, and
marrying a Syrian Bahá'í, my identity became further multi-faceted. As such, I am a
formerly Christian convert to the Bahá'í faith who is married to a Syrian Arab.
Because the Bahá'í faith’s international headquarters are located in Haifa, Israel, I,
like the intergroup dialogue participants featured in Chapter 4 of this dissertation,
experience a sense of belongingness to Israel-Palestine. Though I have never visited
either Israel or Palestine, it is towards Haifa I face when I say my obligatory prayers, in
the same way Jews face Jerusalem and Muslims face Mecca. As such, my spiritual
identity is decidedly influenced by the geographical importance attributed to IsraelPalestine.
Finally, the tenets of the Bahá'í faith have had a great influence on my
paradigmatic perspectives on matters of epistemology and ontology. Despite the
seemingly irreconcilable differences between the world’s major religions, I view them as
stages of one ever-evolving faith of God that differ only due to the particularities of the
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age and region in which each respective religion was revealed. I have taken to heart a
tenet of the Bahá'í faith that forbids ‘conflict and contention,’ and I am influenced by the
decision-making framework of Bahá'í consultation which, among other things,
emphasizes the need to ‘seek truth’ rather than merely ‘compromise’.
Taken together, my identity as a descendent of German Jews who was raised in
the Christian church and has since joined the Bahá'í faith and helped create a multi-ethnic
Syrian-American family places me in a unique position to analyze the verbatim speech of
Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs engaged in intergroup dialogue processes. I possess an
active interest in the resolution of the conflict that goes beyond a merely academic or
pragmatic preference for peace. My interest is related more to the gradual processes of
identity transformation that I believe is necessary for lasting peace not only in IsraelPalestine but worldwide. My faith informs me that this peace is only possible through the
realization of justice, equity, and human oneness.
A One State Solution
As mentioned earlier in Chapter 1, I personally tend to support a ‘one state’ vision
as part of the overall solution to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the
subsequent sustainment of peace among the peoples of Israel-Palestine. However, I do
not at this time support any one particular version of a one state solution despite the
existence of multiple versions of said solution (see Abunimah, 2006; or Kelman, 2011).
The primary reason I advocate a one state solution rather than a two state solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is related to my overall epistemological perspectives on the
nature of human reality and social interactions. Because the conflict between Israeli Jews
and Palestinian Arabs is sustained in part by the persistence of mutually exclusive master
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narratives, the acceptance of a two state solution is, in my opinion, akin to a surrender to
the irreconcilability of these narratives. A two state solution to me is a resignation to the
impossibility of genuine peace. A one state solution, on the other hand, is more consistent
with the overall concept of human oneness that animates my paradigmatic worldview.
Furthermore, a one state solution requires that the mutually exclusive master narratives
that animate the conflict be re-written, and such a ‘re-writing’ can only be accomplished
through grassroots and political engagement of both Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs.
The Research Questions and an Overview of Qualitative Meta-Study
As the previous chapter illustrates, the subject of ‘participant experience’ within
intergroup dialogue between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs is tied to a variety of
interrelated topics and has been addressed through a variety of different research
methodologies and theoretical frameworks. Published research about these two groups of
peoples (Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs) and their respective identities and paradigms
of experience has been presented through sociological, psychological, and ethnological
theoretical frameworks. The intergroup dialogue models within which moderators have
facilitated dialogue between these two groups of peoples have been designed within
either ‘secular’ social psychological or ‘spiritual’ religious frameworks. The researchers
who have studied the processes and outcomes of these intergroup dialogue models have
couched their research and analyses within dialogical, discursive, and narrative
terminologies, just to name a few. Clearly, a suitable research methodology for
addressing the topic of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab relations must be both
interdisciplinary and flexible in order to accommodate for such a variety of perspectives
and frameworks.
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As mentioned in the literature review in the previous chapter, one of the gaps in
the research of intergroup dialogue encounters between Israeli Jews and Palestinian
Arabs is related to the general understanding of the meaning-making processes
participants experience throughout the stages of a dialogue encounter. As observed by
Stuhlmacher and Gillespie (2005), meta-analysis is a burgeoning research method in the
field of social theory and conflict resolution. Specifically, they suggest that the field of
conflict resolution can and should become “fertile ground for meta-analytic work” (p.
76). As such, I have chosen qualitative meta-study—a form of qualitative meta-analysis
as explicated by Paterson et al. (2001)—as a suitable methodology for the purpose of
ascertaining whether or not any relevant information related to this research gap can be
found within previously published research about intergroup dialogue encounters
between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs.
Before I outline the central research question and secondary research questions, I
present some of the characteristics of qualitative meta-analysis and how those
characteristics have shaped the process of research question development. Among the
various challenges qualitative meta-analysis presents to the meta-analyst is the
formulation of research questions. As Timulak (2009) explains, “The evolving and
flexible nature of qualitative research may be visible in qualitative meta-analysis by the
fact that the research question may change during the procedure” (p. 593). This may
occur because the data the analyst sets out to find may in reality contain information that
was unexpected and does not relate directly to the research question of the meta-analysis.
As such, as I began to conceptualize the direction of this dissertation, I refrained from
outlining hard and fast research questions until I had conducted a reasonably thorough
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literature review and had located a significant number of potential primary reports from
which data was to be collected. After completing the literature review and completing a
cursory reading of the potential primary reports containing the relevant data, I then
formulated the central research question as thus: what are the experiences of Israeli
Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants?
Because this topic, its subjects, and the processes through which both the topics
and subjects operate are influenced by a wide variety of historical, sociological,
psychological, and spiritual influences, the methodology for answering this central
question needs to be both dynamic enough to allow for an interdisciplinary approach and
flexible enough to allow for original interpretation of the data and its significance.
Qualitative meta-study, as outlined by Paterson et al. (2001), is a form of qualitative
meta-synthesis that fits both of the methodological requirements the specific subject
under study in this dissertation requires. As Zimmer (2006) stated, “Given the dialogic
interpretive approaches used for qualitative meta-synthesis, [this methodology] is
consistent with the aims and processes of interpretive inquiry” (p. 317). Furthermore,
Paterson et al. (2001) suggested that one of the strengths of qualitative meta-study is that
it encourages “a dynamic and iterative process of thinking, interpreting, creating,
theorizing, and reflecting” rather than “definitive procedural steps” (p. 112). As such, this
chapter provides an explication of the central and secondary research questions and an
overview of the steps I followed to collect, analyze, and interpret that data to answer the
respective research questions.
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The Central and Secondary Research Questions
To reiterate, the central research question of this study is: what are the
experiences of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants? With
the central research question established, the secondary research questions are related
directly to both the themes identified in the literature review and the interpretive
flexibility that qualitative meta-study allows. Due to the interdisciplinary nature of this
topic and the dynamic, interpretive flexibility of the research methodology, the secondary
research questions are grouped according to three general areas: A) the speech of
intergroup dialogue participants, B) the intergroup dialogue model within which the
dialogue is conducted, and C) the future of intergroup dialogue in Israel-Palestine. As
such, the secondary questions are:
A1. What do Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue
participants say within dialogue processes?
A2. What do Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue
participants say about dialogue processes?
B1. How do dialogue models affect dialogue processes between Israeli Jewish
and Palestinian Arab dialogue participants?
B2. How do these findings compare to those of Hammack et al. (2014)?
C. What new possibilities can this data offer for intergroup dialogue processes
in Israel-Palestine?
Qualitative Meta-Study Compared to Qualitative Meta-Synthesis
Qualitative meta-analysis shares much in common with quantitative meta-analysis
in that both research methodologies aim to summarize the data within the most salient
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primary studies within a given domain. The main difference between them is the
framework of the primary studies chosen for synthesis (or analysis). Whereas quantitative
meta-analysis requires the gathering of data from studies that present statistical evidence
to support or disprove a given hypothesis, qualitative meta-analysis requires the gathering
of data from qualitative primary studies such as ethnography, grounded theory,
phenomenology, narrative discourse analysis, and the like.
Though qualitative meta-analysis is a fairly new form of research methodology, a
variety of different approaches have been developed. Two of these approaches are the
‘qualitative meta-synthesis’ approach as explicated by Sandelowski and Barroso (2007)
and the ‘qualitative meta-study’ approach as explicated by Paterson et al. (2001). What
follows here is an overview of each of these approaches and an explanation of why I have
chosen to follow the guidelines of a ‘qualitative meta-study’ approach as described by
Paterson et al.
Qualitative meta-synthesis. Sandelowski and Barroso (2007) provided an
authoritative text on the process of qualitative metasynthesis and how this method differs
from other ‘synthesizing’ or ‘meta-analytical’ approaches to analyzing primary
qualitative data. Sandelowski and Barroso (as cited in Thorne et al., 2004) define
qualitative metasynthesis as “an interpretive integration of qualitative findings that are
themselves interpretive syntheses of data, including phenomenologies, ethnographies,
grounded theories, and other integrated and coherent descriptions or explanations of
phenomena, events, or cases” (p. 1358). They differentiate metasynthesis from
metasummary in that the latter “is a quantitatively oriented aggregation of qualitative
findings that are, in turn, topical or thematic summaries or surveys of data” (Thorne et al.,
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p. 1358). Metasummary utilizes quantitative tools for establishing a sort of statistical
validity for the frequency of findings within qualitative research and provides
information that is essentially ‘the sum of all parts’, while metasynthesis utilizes data
from qualitative studies that interpret and explain qualitative findings and concludes with
an end product that is an “[integration equal to] more than the sum of parts, in that they
offer novel interpretations of findings” (Thorne et al, p. 1358).
According to Sandelowski and Barroso (2007), qualitative metasynthesis is the
method best suited for integrating primary qualitative studies that offer interpretations,
explanations, or conceptual and thematic descriptions of the phenomenon under study.
These include phenomenology, grounded theory, qualitative case study, and ethnography.
Qualitative metasummary, on the other hand, is the method best suited for integrating
qualitative data that comes in the form of topical or thematic surveys.
Qualitative meta-study. A method of qualitative meta-analysis that pre-dates
Sandelowski and Barroso’s (2007) publication on qualitative meta-synthesis is Paterson
et al.’s (2001) guide to conducting a qualitative meta-study. Because Paterson et al.’s
work precedes Sandelowski and Barroso’s work, many of the elements found in the latter
guide are also found in the former. However, differences exist between the two guides;
those general differences include the inclusion criteria for primary reports and the
specific stages of data analysis.
While Sandelowski and Barroso (2007) place a strong emphasis on differentiating
between the types of primary reports from which data may be drawn (as explicated in the
previous section), Paterson et al. (2001) tend to emphasize the researcher’s discretion in
choosing which reports should be included in a qualitative meta-analysis. Whereas
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Sandelowski and Barroso (2007) explicitly state that certain qualitative methodologies
are more appropriate for meta-synthesis (i.e. grounded theory, phenomenology) and other
methodologies are less appropriate (i.e. thematic surveys), Paterson et al. suggest that a
range of qualitative methodologies and approaches can provide a richer and more
nuanced picture of the experience under study. They state, “If primary research reports
are regarded as the sample of the meta-study, they can vary in characteristics as would
the sample of participants in an individual research study” (Paterson et al., p. 41).
More to the point, they state that their approach to meta-analysis (or qualitative
meta-study) can handle a range of reports that feature a variety of qualitative
methodological approaches (grounded theory, phenomenology, thematic analysis, etc.) in
part because of the rigorous step-by-step process they recommend. Specifically, they
believe that “building meta-synthesis on an explicit basis of a) meta-data-analysis, b)
meta-method, and c) meta-theory is what makes meta-study so much more intriguing and
complex than the more aggregative meta-synthesis approaches” (Paterson et al., p. 41).
What follows here is a description of these four stages of Paterson et al.’s qualitative
meta-study procedure.
Stage one: Meta-data-analysis. For the purposes of their approach to qualitative
meta-study, Paterson et al. (2001) define meta-data-analysis as “the comparative analysis
of research findings of primary research studies conducted by a variety of researchers” (p.
55). The purpose of meta-data-analysis is “to extend knowledge about a particular
phenomenon in a field of study” (Schreiber et al.; Sherwood, as cited in Paterson et al., p.
56). The term ‘data’ in meta-data-analysis refers to that which is “obtained from the text
of primary research reports. Text may be one or two words or a sentence or a paragraph”
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(p. 57). (The process of identifying which primary research reports are appropriate to use
is described in a later section of this dissertation).
Paterson et al. (2001) explain that the meta-data-analysis process involves three
steps: “(a) the study of the underlying assumptions of various data analysis procedures,
(b) the comparison of different forms of data in terms of their quality and utility, and (c)
the synthesis of research findings of various studies in a particular area of research”
(Cooper, as cited in Paterson et al., p. 59). To complete these steps, the researcher must
first select a specific data analytic approach “that fits with [his] research question and
design, as well as the prevailing paradigm and [his] personal preference” (p. 59). Of the
range of data analytic approaches available, Paterson et al. mention possibilities such as
the grounded theory approach to data analysis, meta-ethnography, thematic analysis, and
interpretive descriptive analysis.
Furthermore, Paterson et al.’s (2001) process of meta-data-analysis emphasizes a
“multifaceted rather than singular grouping system to analyze primary research data” (p.
61). The authors emphasize the importance of categorizing data through multiple
categories and groupings (such as gender of participants, time frame of study, or
methodology utilized) to develop a richer contextual picture of the data and, ultimately,
the experience of the subject being studied. According to the authors, such multi-faceted
groupings of data yield “similarities and differences, as well as outliers and negative and
extreme cases, [that] are more readily identified” (p. 61). If done correctly and
thoroughly, the process of meta-data-analysis “creates the conditions under which the
common insights discernible from a body of qualitative research studies can be rendered
visible, analyzed, and interpreted” (Paterson et al., p. 68).

86

Stage two: Meta-method. As explained by Paterson et al. (2001), “meta-method is
the study of the epistemological soundness of the existing research, as well as the ways
the methodological applications may have influenced the findings that are generated” (p.
71). This stage of the qualitative meta-study process is intended to “determine how the
interpretation and implementation of qualitative research methods have influenced the
research findings and the emergent theory in a particular field of knowledge” (Paterson et
al., p. 71). The meta-method stage requires the meta-study researcher to explore how
particular research methodologies have affected how primary researchers perceive and
explain phenomena within the particular topic area under study. Furthermore, the process
of meta-method yields a sort of historical analysis of the application of a particular
methodology, which thus serves as a useful framework for interpreting the results of the
meta-data-analysis.
Paterson et al. (2001) highlight two primary steps for conducting a meta-method
process: “(a) the initial appraisal of individual primary research studies regarding
research design and data collection, and (b) an overall appraisal of the themes and
patterns evident within the collection of primary research studies included in the metastudy” (p. 74). A high level of knowledge and experience in qualitative research methods
and their respective epistemological bases, controversies, strengths, and weaknesses is
necessary for the researcher to adequately complete this meta-method process. Indeed,
Paterson et al. caution that meta-method “will be considerably more difficult for the
neophyte researcher or for the researcher with limited appreciation for the linguistic and
reference cues by which methodological options are described” (p. 74).
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Regardless of the meta-study researcher’s particular experience and comfort level
with various qualitative research methodologies, at minimum the meta-method process
requires an identification of each primary study’s “research question, the role of the
researcher(s), the sampling procedures, and the data collection procedures for their fit
with the stated research method and their influence on the research findings” (p. 75).
Paterson et al. suggest the meta-study researcher arrange these elements of the primary
studies into spreadsheets and tables in order to more easily identify patterns of influence,
inconsistencies, and historical trends of research findings and influences. Such an
exercise is indeed laborious and often “raises [fewer] definitive answers in comparison
with the number of questions it raises” (Paterson et al., p. 90). However, the authors
suggest that meta-method serves as “a means to introduce new interpretations and
techniques to . . . qualitative research approaches and adds to [the] understanding of the
methodological complexities [of the subject under study]” (Paterson et al., p. 90).
Stage three: Meta-theory. Paterson et al. (2001) describe meta-theory as “a
critical exploration of the theoretical frameworks or lenses that have provided direction to
research and to researchers, as well as the theory that has arisen from research in a
particular field of study” (Neufeld, as cited in Paterson et al., p. 91). Paterson et al.
qualify their definition of a ‘theory’ as being “a system of interrelated propositions that
should enable phenomena to be described, explained, predicted, and controlled” (Duldt &
Griffin, as cited in Paterson et al., p. 91). The process of conducting meta-theory involves
the following steps:
(a) identifying major cognitive paradigms and schools of thought that are
represented in both the theoretical frameworks and the emerging theory of
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selected research reports; (b) relating the theory to the larger sociocultural,
historical, and political context; and (c) deconstructing the implications of
significant assumptions underlying specific theories. (Paterson et al., p. 91)
The purpose, as such, of a process of meta-theory within the unfolding of a meta-study is
to test and potentially re-conceptualize the theories embedded within the primary studies
so that, through a process of meta-synthesis, new theory can be developed (Paterson et
al., 2001, p. 92). The meta-study researcher must therefore be aware of both “the theories
that are used and the way that those theories are used” (Paterson et al., p. 93).
A process of meta-theory begins with thorough readings and re-readings of the
primary texts in order to identify the underlying theoretical assumptions motivating the
research and, after having identified said theoretical assumptions, critically analyzing
them. As with meta-method, Paterson et al. (2001) suggest that the meta-study researcher
be prepared to delve into the historical development of any identified theories and
assumptions motivating the interpretation of the primary report’s data. The authors state,
“Although meta-theory does not produce a complete historical analysis within a specific
field of study, it does entail a critical analysis of why and how certain theories have
evolved or changed over time” (Paterson et al., p. 102). Furthermore, a process of metatheory requires the meta-study researcher to question the ‘quality’ of any underlying
theories within primary research and to sometimes play the role of ‘skeptic’ in
ascertaining whether or not a particular theory holds consistent in light of the outcomes of
multiple studies within the topic of study. In the end, “meta-theoretical analysis within a
meta-study project creates the conditions under which knowledge can be transformed into
wisdom” (Paterson et al., p. 108).
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Stage four: Meta-synthesis. The previous three sections describe the separate
stages in the meta-study project, as explicated by Paterson et al. (2001): meta-dataanalysis, meta-method, and meta-theory. These authors justify the utilization of these
three separate processes because they allow for a complete deconstruction and re-analysis
of the whole of the qualitative data available on a particular subject. As the authors state,
“Because the larger intent of the meta-study is not simply to raise questions about what is
already known but also to build theoretical approaches that may extend what is currently
possible, meta-synthesis represents the visionary and constructive outcome of an
exhaustive analysis project” (Paterson et al., p. 109). What follows here is a brief
overview of how Paterson et al. describe the procedure for the final synthesizing stage of
qualitative meta-study.
Paterson et al. (2001) recognize that qualitative meta-study is a research
methodology located primarily within the framework of social constructivism, yet
endorse a view that “underlying the notion of social construction is a competing ideal of
social responsibility, morality, and accountability” (p. 110). As such, the authors of this
particular form of qualitative meta-study believe that this research methodology can yield
not only insights on the history of a theory motivating a field of study but also new
theories and approaches that speak to more idealistic views on the role of scientific
endeavor. In the authors’ words, “meta-synthesis is driven, not by a frivolous urge to be
creative about ideas or by a presumptuous desire to author a new way of understanding
something, but by the abiding sense that the process may yield truths that are better, more
socially relevant, or more complete than those from which we currently operate”
(Paterson et al., p 111).
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To achieve this end, the meta-synthesis process requires the insights of the three
previous stages (meta-data-analysis, meta-method, and meta-theory) to be synthesized.
However, Paterson et al. (2001) also caution that setting a goal of finding a grand new
theory through meta-synthesis may prove to be elusive, and that the outcome of a metasynthesis may end up raising more questions than providing new answers (p. 119). At the
very least, Paterson et al. believe that the process should yield “a richer, deeper, and more
multifaceted way of theorizing about a phenomenon” (p. 119). Finally, the authors
believe that even if a meta-synthesis project does not yield a grand new theory, “the key
to a successful meta-synthesis effort lies in recognizing that small gains can be as
important as larger ones, and that better ways of theorizing about narrow aspects of a
field may be more useful in the long run than are completely original grand theories”
(Paterson et al., p. 120-121).
The choice of qualitative meta-study over qualitative meta-synthesis. As
mentioned previously, I have chosen to utilize the qualitative meta-study approach as
explicated by Paterson et al. (2001) rather than other forms of qualitative meta-analysis,
such as that described by Sandelowski and Barroso (2007). The primary reason I have
chosen Paterson et al.’s approach is because of the flexibility the meta-study approach
allows in deconstructing and re-conceptualizing the data for the specific topic of Israeli
Jew and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participant experience. Another reason is
Paterson et al.’s explication that the final meta-synthesis that can be derived through
qualitative meta-study can yield “truly magnificent kinds of theorizing” that may not be
possible through the completion of individual studies alone (p. 121). Due to the
teleological nature of the subject matter under study (i.e. intergroup dialogue programs
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between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs are generally purposive in design and
execution) a meta-study of these qualitative studies should also have the flexibility to
comment upon the teleological dynamic of dialogue models. Furthermore, one of my
dissertation committee members, Dr. Robin Cooper, has first-hand experience in
conducting a qualitative meta-study. As such, my selecting this methodology ensured the
greatest likelihood that I would receive proper guidance in executing its steps,
procedures, and protocols.
The qualitative meta-study conducted by Cooper et al. (2012) is only one of
numerous studies that have utilized this methodology. For example, Scruggs et al. (2007)
conducted a metasynthesis of qualitative research related to the phenomenon of coteaching in classrooms. Following the guidelines outlined by Paterson et al. (2001),
Scruggs et al. found a number of dominant themes among 32 qualitative studies,
including the subordination of special education teachers in co-teaching cohorts and the
critical role of administrative support to make co-teaching a productive experience.
Another example of a recent qualitative meta-study is from Edwards et al. (2010).
Utilizing the framework of qualitative meta-study outlined by Paterson et al. (2001),
Edwards et al. identified a framework of spiritual caregiving that provide end of life
patients a crucial element meeting a metaphysical need. These examples show that the
meta-study framework is flexible and dynamic enough to yield useful findings within a
variety of disciplines within the social sciences and helping fields.
Data Search, Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria, and Appraisal Processes
The first step in a qualitative meta-study is the location and collection of suitable
data which, as just mentioned, is the findings of qualitative studies on a particular topic.
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The process of finding, selecting, and appraising studies for inclusion in this qualitative
meta-study is described in this section. The reader is reminded that though this study was
originally proposed as a full, four-stage qualitative meta-study, limitations in time and
resources has restricted this dissertation to the first stage of meta-data-analysis.
Nevertheless, the results of this study will serve as the basis of subsequent stages of
analysis towards a full qualitative meta-synthesis.
Data collection. As stated by Sandelowski and Barroso (2007), “The most
important threat to the validity of any research synthesis, whether of qualitative or
quantitative findings, is the failure to conduct a sufficiently exhaustive search” (p. 35). In
any meta-analysis, whether quantitative or qualitative, ‘recall’ and ‘precision’ are
common indicators that demonstrate the degree of completeness of a data search. ‘Recall’
refers to the overall percentage of potential studies that were obtained, while ‘precision’
refers to the percentage of retrieved studies that are actually relevant to the metasynthesis.
Sandelowski and Barroso (2007) state that for a qualitative meta-analysis, ‘recall’ should
take precedence over ‘precision’ because doing so increases the likelihood that the search
has truly been ‘exhaustive.’
Nevertheless, Paterson et al. (2001) note that “despite one’s best efforts to locate
primary research appropriate to a research question, it is extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to locate all primary research within a specific field of study” (p. 35). They
note that in their experience, even a large team of researchers working together at
retrieving all relevant and pertinent research in a particular area of study can still miss, or
fail to locate, a number of research articles that would have been relevant to the particular
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meta-synthesis. Furthermore, the balance between ‘too few’ and ‘too many’ primary
research reports is a difficult balance to strike. They state:
If the volume of primary research reports used in a meta-study is too great, data
analysis becomes too cumbersome to permit anything but gross generalizations
without appropriate depth and breadth. If the volume is too small, the credibility
and trustworthiness of the meta-study findings will be jeopardized. (p. 37)
According to Timulak (2009), “qualitative meta-analysis can be conducted with as few as
two studies . . . [however, researchers in the nursing field recommend] at least a dozen
studies at minimum” (p. 594). Paterson et al. (2001) state, “we would generally
recommend that at least a dozen discrete studies be available from which to work to make
meta-study meaningful and that working with data sets of more than 100 primary
research reports may be overly ambitious for most investigators” (p. 38).
In searching for and locating primary research reports for this dissertation, I began
with the intention of completing an ‘exhaustive’ search, as described by Sandelowski and
Barroso (2007). However, after many weeks (September to December 2014) of keyword
searches of academic journal databases like ProQuest, Wiley, and EBSCO, I had only
managed to locate a handful of potentially relevant primary research reports. As I perused
these reports and their citation list (a search process called ‘footnote chasing’) I identified
Mohammed Abu-Nimer as a primary researcher in the field of intergroup dialogue
research in Israel-Palestine. His 1999 publication Dialogue, Conflict Resolution, and
Change: Arab-Jewish Encounters in Israel is a sort of benchmark in this field of study
and has been frequently cited in intergroup dialogue research articles since its publication
up to today.
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As such, my search for primary research reports began with a forward citation
search of Abu-Nimer’s 1999 publication. Google Scholar yielded over 250 citations of
Abu-Nimer’s 1999 work, and I searched through all these publications to find potential
primary research reports to include in this meta-study. From these 250 citations I
identified approximately 60 publications that were potentially relevant sources for
providing information about the experience of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab
intergroup dialogue participants. It was at this stage in the process of locating reports that
I began formulating the inclusion and exclusion criteria for finalizing the list of primary
research reports to include in the meta-study.
Criteria for data inclusion and exclusion. As explained by Paterson et al.
(2001), in order to find the balance between ‘too many’ versus ‘too few’ reports to
achieve a meaningful meta-synthesis, the meta-study researcher must develop appropriate
criteria for data inclusion and exclusion. Whereas Paterson et al. advocate including
reports that utilize a variety of methodological approaches, at the very least they believe
included reports should be “congruent with an interpretivist epistemological stance,
regardless of whether or not [the primary research authors] have acknowledged that
tradition” (Paterson et al., 2001, p. 42). Paterson et al. suggest the meta-study researcher
limit primary studies to those that meet certain criteria related to the professional
background of the primary researchers, the location of the primary study, and the
verifiability of the ‘data trail’ from which primary research conclusions and findings were
drawn. Furthermore, Paterson et al. recommend omitting studies that present findings
influenced by political agendas, “[feature] unusual or skewed samples, [omit] significant
data or details of the research design, [or arrive] at conclusions or categories that were not
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supported by the data provided in the report” (p. 42-43). Additionally, Paterson et al. and
Sandelowski and Barroso (2007) strongly recommend excluding studies that represent
“duplicate publications or minor variations on previous reports of the same study”
(Paterson et al., p. 38). This includes published journal articles that are based on the
author’s Ph.D. dissertation or master’s thesis or multi-authored articles that are
subsequently re-published as a solo authored article containing a revised analysis of the
data.
After a cursory overview of the approximately 60 publications I had located that
addressed the experience of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue
participants, I developed the following list of inclusion criteria. I included as primary
research reports those that:
were published between 1999 and May 2015 (which represents the historical
time period of the second Intifada to roughly the present day);
were either published as an academic journal article or as a Ph.D. dissertation;
contain verbatim quotations of Israeli Jewish and/or Palestinian Arab
intergroup dialogue participants;
clearly identify a qualitative research methodology within which data was
analyzed for the purpose of answering an explicitly stated research question
related to intergroup dialogue experience or processes; and
clearly identify a particular peace education or intergroup dialogue program or
model of dialogue within which intergroup dialogue actually took place.
Further inclusion criteria characteristics of the verbatim quotations of the Israeli
Jewish and/or Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants are the following:
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the quotations could have been recorded either before, during, or after actual
participation of intergroup dialogue sessions, bilingual school classroom
sessions, or university dialogue courses;
the quotations can come in either spoken or written form;
the quotations can be translations into English.
In order to include only the most methodologically rigorous studies without
duplication of data sets, I excluded studies that drew from the same data set of a
previously published research article or dissertation, or failed to demonstrate rigorous
methodological research practice. In order to ascertain whether or not a study met the
basic requirements for ‘rigorous qualitative research,’ I utilized a modified version of
Paterson et al’s (2001) ‘primary research appraisal tool.’ This appraisal tool serves two
purposes: “a means to determine [a] report's eligibility for inclusion in the meta-study and
a systematic way to record pertinent data about the primary research study” (Paterson et
al., p. 46). An example of how I used this tool to ascertain primary research article quality
is included in Appendix A.
While conducting the primary report appraisal process, I continued searching for
additional articles by ‘footnote chasing’ within the 60 primary reports I had already
located. Upon completing this additional footnote chasing process while conducting the
primary research appraisals, I found that many of the potential reports did not meet the
criteria I had established. A significant number of articles were excluded on the basis of
‘duplicated data,’ while a lesser number of reports were excluded due to lack of
methodological rigor. Other published material was excluded because they were master’s
theses, book chapters, or conference proceedings. This stage of the data collection and
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primary report appraisal process lasted from January to September 2015. The final count
of primary research reports included in this qualitative meta-study is 17 (13 academic
journal articles and 4 Ph.D. dissertations). Appendix B provides an overview of the focus,
content, theoretical framework, and findings of those primary reports.
Data Analysis
As outlined earlier this chapter, the data analysis process within qualitative metastudy proceeds along four subsequent steps: meta-data-analysis, meta-method, metatheory, and meta-synthesis. Due to the limitations of time and resources for completing
all four stages of a qualitative meta-study (often this process is conducted with a team of
researchers, while I am presently working alone), I completed the first stage of the
process: a meta-data-analysis. What follows in this section is an overview of the steps I
executed. This meta-data-analysis as such will serve as the springboard to completing the
subsequent stages of meta-method and meta-theory at a future date.
Meta-data-analysis procedures. Consistent with the recommendations provided
by Paterson et al. (2001), the meta-data-analysis was conducted within a ‘thematic
analysis’ framework, specifically that which is outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006).
Braun and Clarke provide a step-by-step guide to completing a thematic analysis, and the
first step requires the analyst to define the parameters and purposes of the thematic
analysis. Specifically, they present four dimensions, each with two end points, along
which the analyst should choose how the data will be analyzed.
Four dimensions of thematic analysis. The first dimension is related to the
general level of description the analysis will entail: will the analysis include a ‘rich
description’ of the entire data sat, or will it be a ‘detailed account’ of one or a handful of
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specific aspects? The ‘rich description’ is suitable for analyses intended to yield an
accurate reflection of all the data, whereas the ‘detailed account’ approach is a semantic
analysis focused on a particular set of themes. Because this meta-study is related
primarily to the experience of Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs in intergroup dialogue,
this analysis followed a ‘semantic’ approach with an emphasis on factors related to
participant identity, researcher frameworks, and theoretical assumptions that influence
the findings within the primary reports.
The second dimension is related to the type of analytical process to be utilized.
The analysis could be either an ‘inductive’ analysis or a ‘theoretical’ analysis. The former
tends to be ‘bottom up’ and the themes are strongly related to the data. The latter tends to
be ‘top down’ and is driven by the analyst’s theoretical or analytic interest. Because I had
already engaged with the literature related to this meta-study and the topic at hand, I
followed a ‘theoretical’ analytical approach. My interest lay primarily in data related to
the experience of intergroup dialogue participants and factors that shape and influence
their experience.
The third dimension is related to the identification of themes within the data. A
‘semantic’ approach to theme identification means the analyst looks primarily at the
explicit or surface meanings of the data, while a ‘latent’ approach means the analyst is
seeking “the features that gave [the data its] particular form and meaning” (Braun &
Clark, 2006, p. 84). Because qualitative meta-study is primarily an interpretive
methodology, a latent approach to thematic analysis allowed for this interpretive
element to be realized.
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The fourth dimension of thematic analysis is related to the epistemological
framework of the analysis. Braun and Clarke (2006) define the two ends of this
epistemological continuum as ‘essentialist/realist’ thematic analysis on the left and
‘constructionist’ thematic analysis on the right. The ‘essentialist/realist’ epistemological
approach assumes that there exists a simple and unidirectional relationship between
meaning, experience, and language; while the constructionist epistemological approach
assumes that meaning and experience are socially produced and reproduced (Braun &
Clarke, 2006, p. 85). Because the topic of this meta-study involves a variety of academic
and theoretical disciplines (including religion and spirituality), I chose the
epistemological framework of intersubjectivity as outlined by DeTurk and Foster (2008)
and Gunnlaugson (2009) because intersubjectivity promotes both constructionist ideas
and ontological assumptions that are consistent with the multidisciplinary influences
present within the subject of this dissertation.
Thematic analysis through an intersubjective epistemological framework.
Intersubjectivity as a theory, an epistemology, and ontology is a multidisciplinary
approach to conceptualizing data and the subject-object relationship and has been applied
to a variety of fields and frameworks within the social sciences such as education,
philosophy of mind, transpersonal psychology, and feminist critical theory (Gunnlaugson,
2009, p. 27). Intersubjectivity emphasizes the value and importance of ‘contemplative
practices’ such as meditation, prayer, music, dance, and storytelling (Gunnlaugson, 2009)
within organization practices. Four of the most well known authors within the field of
intersubjective theory and practice include Martin Buber, Thich Nhat Hahn, Christian De
Quincey, and Ken Wilber.
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A fairly recent development within the field of intersubjective studies of
education is related to practices that emphasize ‘second-person’ approaches to education.
‘Second-person’ refers to the exploration of “contemplative experience from an
intersubjective position that is represented spatially as between us, in contrast to inside us
(subjective position) or outside us (objective position)” (Gunnlaugson, p. 27). In other
words, consistent with a narrative perspective of an external shared space between
persons in conflict within which a conflict occupies, a second-person intersubjective
approach to education (or, for our purposes, intergroup dialogue) suggests that
participants in dialogue communicate with each other through first-, third-, and secondperson positions. Whereas first- and third- person utterances tend to place speaker and
listener within clearly demarcated lines of identity and perspective, second-person
utterances point to the creation and shaping of a shared space that refutes the problems
created by Cartesian duality which objectifies and depersonalizes self and other
(Gunnlaugson, 2009). As DeTurk and Foster (2008) stated, “intersubjectivity implies the
mutual creation of knowledge, experience, and also of identity, wherein the being of one
person depends on the being of another . . . [T]he quest to capture the essence of
intersubjectivity is both epistemological [and] ontological” (p. 25).
Steps in the thematic coding of data within an intersubjective epistemological
framework. After identifying the parameters through which the coding of the data was to
proceed (in this case, a theoretical, detailed account of particular aspects of the data
expressed as latent themes informed by an epistemology of intersubjectivity), Braun and
Clarke (2006) provide a six-step guide to coding and analyzing the data. In order to fit the
parameters of the data and the research questions, I modified the process and approached
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the coding and analysis procedure as follows: a) getting familiar with the data; b)
generating initial codes; c) organizing the data according to the code categories; d)
reviewing the data within the coded categories; e) selecting the most representative and
meaningful data from which to generate themes; f) searching for themes; g) reviewing,
defining, and naming themes; and h) producing the report. (A more detailed explanation
of steps C through H is provided in Chapter 4.)
After getting familiar with the data, which in this case required me to read each
primary report at least twice, I began coding features of the primary research reports
relevant to the central research question and the secondary research questions. I coded the
verbatim quotations from intergroup dialogue participants accordingly:
the time frame in which the quotation was recorded (either before, during, or
after the completion of the dialogue program);
the national identity of the speaker (either Israeli Jewish [IJ], Palestinian Arab
citizen of Israel [PCI], or Palestinian Arab living in the Occupied Territories
[OPT]);
the gender of the speaker;
the form of the dialogue program or interview format in which the quotation
was recorded (either solo, uninational, or binational); and
a general description of the topic or purpose for which the speaker’s utterance
was made.
For quotations that were recorded within either a ‘binational’ or a ‘uninational’
dialogue session, I added two additional categorical codes: a) the quality of secondperson space (‘similarity,’ ‘difference,’ ‘separateness,’ or ‘togetherness’) and b) the
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perspective of the speaker according to the ‘integral holon’ as designed by Edwards
(2005, p. 280). I adapted Edwards’ ‘integral holon’ in order to fit the characteristics of the
data with which I am working, so that the verbatim quotations I’ve coded within
uninational and binational sessions fall within one or more of the following categories of
‘holons’:
holon 1: ‘first person singular’ utterances that tend to disclose (or request)
autobiographical information about the speaker (or listener) (i.e. “I think. . .”;
“I believe. . .”; “I feel. . .”);
holon 2: ‘first person plural’ utterances that tend to disclose (or request)
cultural information about the speaker’s (or listener’s) larger cultural or ethnic
group (i.e. “We believe. . .”; “We see. . .”);
holon 3: ‘second person singular’ utterances that tend to disclose (or request)
dialogical information about the other (i.e. “What you say is. . .”; “When you
say that. . .”);
holon 4: ‘second person plural’ utterances that tend to disclose (or request)
intergroup information and observations (i.e. opinions about how
communication patterns should proceed, or how ‘people’ should behave in
general);
holon 5: ‘third person singular’ utterances that disclose (or request)
information about another person or thing (i.e. “He said . . .”; “She thinks . .
.”); and
holon 6: ‘third person plural’ utterances that disclose (or request) information
about a group of other people (i.e. “They believe that. . .”; “They want. . .”).
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These two additional categories are intended to provide insight into the intersubjective
relationship between and among dialogue participants and the role dialogue models play
within dialogue processes. Coding along these terms yielded associations between and
among categories that provided insights into answering the main research question and
secondary research questions A1 and A2.
The primary reports were coded through the qualitative coding software program
Atlas.ti. This software allowed me to organize data in a variety of coding schemes (as
encouraged by Paterson et al., 2001). Upon completion of the coding, I was able to
identify, name, and produce themes and ascertain any associated relationships between
the themes.
Data Collection and Storage
Both the primary research reports and the primary report appraisals are stored
electronically on both my password-protected personal computer and within my personal
password-protected OneDrive cloud storage account. I used this appraisal tool in the form
of a converted Word document into which I added information regarding each collected
primary report. I also have utilized EndNote to save and organize the primary reports and
generate their respective bibliographic details.
Chapter Summary and Chapter 4 Preview
Qualitative meta-study (as explicated by Paterson et al., 2001) is an interpretive
methodological framework for conducting a meta-synthesis of qualitative research
reports. The central research question of this dissertation—what are the experiences of
Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants?—is addressed
through the execution of a qualitative meta-data-analysis of qualitative primary research
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reports. These reports, published between 1999 and 2015, have been selected according
to a set of inclusion and exclusion criteria that were developed for the purpose of
identifying the most methodologically rigorous and relevant studies to answer the central
research question. The coding of the data proceeded within the parameters of a thematic
analysis informed by the epistemological framework of intersubjectivity. Furthermore,
codes were generated in a top down approach, rather than a bottom up approach, because
the thematic analysis was influenced by the literature review presented in Chapter 2, in
which a variety of relevant themes such as geotheology, asymmetry, and the influence of
master narratives on identity were presented as salient to this subject.
The following chapter represents the findings and outcomes of the meta-dataanalysis. From the data identified within the primary reports, the next chapter will present
an overview of the most salient topics contained within Israeli Jewish and Palestinian
Arab intergroup dialogue participant quotations. From this overview is generated answers
to the research questions which then serve as the basis for outlining the overarching
themes of experience for these intergroup dialogue participants.
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Chapter 4: Findings from the Meta-Data-Analysis
Introduction
As mentioned towards the end of Chapter 3, the meta-data-analysis I performed
followed a multi-step process inspired by the guidelines described by Braun and Clarke
(2006). In Chapter 3 I detailed my efforts to complete the first two steps: a) getting
familiar with the data, and b) generating initial codes. Here, Chapter 4 provides details
regarding the outcomes of the remaining steps: c) organizing the data according to the
code categories; d) reviewing the data within the coded categories; e) selecting the most
representative and meaningful data from which to generate themes; f) searching for
themes; g) reviewing, defining, and naming themes; and h) producing the report.
Though I relied on Braun and Clarke’s (2006) linear step-by-step guidance in
conducting this meta-data-analysis, the presentation of the findings rendered from those
steps are presented here in Chapter 4 more as narrative than as a linear rendering.
Through the presentation of the narrative I intend to demonstrate to the reader how
conclusions were drawn throughout the process, thereby allowing the reader to participate
in a reflexive approach to the reading of the data. Furthermore, the narrative approach to
presenting the findings allows for a transparent rendering of the data especially for the
latter steps in which themes are reviewed, defined, and named.
To reiterate, the primary research question for this meta-data-analysis is: “What
are the themes of experience of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue
participants?” The respective secondary questions are:
A1. What do Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue
participants say within dialogue processes?
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A2. What do Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue
participants say about dialogue processes?
B1. How do dialogue models affect dialogue processes between Israeli Jewish
and Palestinian Arab dialogue participants?
B2. How do these findings compare to those of Hammack et al. (2014)?
C. What new possibilities can this data offer for intergroup dialogue processes
in Israel-Palestine?
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the intersubjective coding framework I chose to code the data
is based on an epistemological assumption that the experience of Israeli Jewish and
Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants is interrelated with social,
psychological, cultural, historical, and spiritual factors. The secondary research questions
outlined above serve to limit the number of factors to analyze within the parameters of
this dissertation. Since the answer to the primary research question is contingent upon the
collective answers to the secondary research questions, it is necessary for me to answer
the secondary research questions first.
Furthermore, because research with Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup
dialogue participants suggest that the intergroup dialogue model may have some effect on
the outcome of the dialogue (Hammack et al., 2014), what follows next is an overview of
the key features of the intergroup dialogue models that are included within the chosen
primary reports. After that is a general overview of the coded data and key features that
are relevant to the remaining research questions. After providing answers to the research
questions based on the meta-data-analysis, I conclude with the development of themes
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based on the coded data categories and the content of the intergroup participant
quotations.
Intergroup Dialogue Models Included within the Primary Reports
As described in Chapter 2, intergroup dialogue programs in Israel-Palestine have
been categorized as either secular (such as coexistence, joint projects, confrontational, or
narrative models) or interreligious. The primary reports selected for this meta-dataanalysis feature multiple secular models but do not include any interreligious models
(potential significance of this exclusion is discussed later this chapter). The exact
breakdown of models and the respective primary reports within which they are featured is
as follows:
activist models (Hager & Mazali, 2013; Ross, 2013);
coexistence models (Bekerman, 2009; Pilecki & Hammack, 2014);
conflict management models (Collier, 2009; Ron & Maoz, 2013);
confrontational models (specifically the School for Peace model) (Maoz, 2001;
Helman, 2002; Maoz et al., 2002; Sonnenschein et al., 2010; Halabi & Zak, 2014;
Pilecki & Hammack, 2014);
mixed method models (specifically Seeds of Peace) (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005;
Hammack, 2006; Lazarus, 2011);
narrative/theater models (Maoz, 2000; Bar-On et al., 2007; Ross, 2013); and
a track two diplomacy model (Kellen et al., 2012).
What follows here is a brief description of the specific models featured in the primary
reports. These descriptions are provided because, as described in Chapter 2, the structure
and underlying theoretical presuppositions of any particular dialogue program has been
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the subject of current studies (i.e. Hammack et al., 2014) to ascertain any tangible
difference in participant experience between and among different intergroup dialogue
models. Therefore, highlighting the differences between the intergroup dialogue models
featured within the primary reports included within this meta-data-analysis should
provide relevant insight into the experience of intergroup dialogue program participants.
A tabular presentation of the dialogue models represented among the primary reports is
provided in Table 1 below.
Activist Models
Two primary reports featured a form of an ‘activist model’. Hager and Mazali’s
(2013) journal article features the results of a process called ‘autoethnographic mapping’
as a tool that provides intergroup dialogue participants the opportunity for presenting a
their respective ‘autobiography’ through the tool of a blank map upon which each
participant completes significant place names and experiences that have shaped or shape
their respective identity. These maps are then shared with other intergroup dialogue
participants in order to increase solidarity and mutual understanding. This shared
knowledge is then intended to serve as a bridge to “enabling social solidarity, individual,
and collective empowerment. Potentially, this lays foundations for joint action to change
reality” (Hager & Mazali, p. 263). Hager and Mazali’s study focuses on a college level
classroom and the experiences of the students who utilized the autoethnographic mapping
tool within the activist model.
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Table 1
Dialogue Models Represented within the Primary Reports
Dialogue Model / Program Name
Activist models
Coexistence models
Conflict management models
Confrontational model / School of Peace
model

Mixed method model / Seeds of Peace

Narrative models

Track two diplomacy

Primary Report
Hager & Mazali (2013)
Ross (2013)
Bekerman (2009)
Pilecki & Hammack (2014)
Collier (2009)
Ron & Maoz (2013)
Maoz (2001)
Helman (2002)
Maoz et al. (2002)
Sonnenschein et al. (2010)
Halabi & Zak (2014)
Pilecki & Hammack (2014)
Maddy-Weitzman (2005)
Hammack (2006)
Lazarus (2011)
Maoz (2000)
Bar-On et al. (2007)
Ross (2013)
Kellen et al. (2012)

Ross’s (2013) Ph.D. dissertation features two case studies of intergroup dialogue
programs and their respective participants. One of those programs is Sadaka Reut which
aims to “[develop] a cadre of activists and young leaders from [Israel and Palestine] who
are equipped with skills, knowledge and the ability to create social change and a vision of
a just society for Jews and Palestinians in Israel” (Ross, p. 134). The program conducts
uninational meetings with Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs and offers participants a
year-long ‘communal living’ opportunity to perform joint volunteer service work. Sadaka
Reut encourages its participants to be active in social and political reform in Israel and
purposefully works to increase awareness of injustices facing Palestinian citizens of
Israel (Ross, 2013).
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Coexistence Models
As described in Chapter 2, coexistence models represent one of the more common
secular models of intergroup dialogue in Israel-Palestine. These models tend to
emphasize the mantra ‘we are all human’ and encourage interpersonal relationship
building over political activism and debate. Bekerman’s (2009) study focused on the
experiences of college students enrolled in a year-long dialogue course “aimed at
developing the participants’ sensitivity toward the complexity of the relations between
[Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs]” (p. 206). Pilecki and Hammack’s (2014) study
compared intergroup dialogue participant experiences in both coexistence and
confrontational dialogue formats. Pilecki and Hammack’s dialogue participants were
primarily high school age teenagers.
Conflict Management Models
Conflict management models are those that emphasize conflict resolution skill
building within the context of intergroup dialogue. Collier’s (2009) study focuses on the
experiences of high school age participants with the Building Bridges for Peace Program,
in which participants are taught to “[see one’s self] in an ‘enemy’ and experience the
power of relating. . . Individuals from different groups who are in conflict are taught to
explore their thoughts and feelings in dialogue in order to understand one another in
human terms” (Collier, p. 351). Though the structure and purpose of the BBFP program
shares much in common with ‘coexistence’ programs, I’ve categorized it here as a
‘conflict management’ model because of its particular emphasis on teaching participants
specific communication patterns and behaviors such as “empathy, reflective listening,
and [the] use of ‘I language’” (Collier, p. 345). Ron and Maoz’s (2013) study also
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focuses on intergroup dialogue participant experience within a conflict management
dialogue model and features commentary from participants who had previously had
extensive contact and involvement with Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup
dialogue programs. Participants in Ron & Maoz’ study were all college age and older.
Confrontational Models
As described in Chapter 2, confrontational models represent another one of the
most common secular intergroup dialogue models in Israel-Palestine. In this meta-dataanalysis, six different studies focus on participant commentary regarding experiences
within the confrontational model. The confrontational model in all six of the studies were
facilitated according to the model guidelines created at the School of Peace of Neve
Shalom/Wahat el Salam. In contrast to the coexistence model, this model emphasizes and
encourages participants to ‘take sides’ and dialogue with members of the other side as
opposed to building interpersonal relationships among individuals. Five of the six studies
that feature dialogue within the confrontational model were facilitated with college
students; Pilecki and Hammack’s (2014) study featured commentary from high school
age teenagers.
Mixed Method Models
Three Ph.D. dissertations included within this meta-data-analysis focused on the
experiences of participants with the Seeds of Peace program: Maddy-Weitzman (2005),
Hammack (2006), and Lazarus (2011). Seeds of Peace is a youth development program
that engages youth from Israel-Palestine in intensive dialogue and joint activity programs
at a campsite in the USA. Though the Seeds of Peace program could be designated as a
‘coexistence’ program because of the program’s emphasis on bringing Israeli Jews and
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Palestinian Arab youth together for the purpose of developing a new shared identity as a
‘Seed of Peace,’ I have categorized them here as ‘mixed method’ in accordance with
Maddy-Weitzman’s (2005) definition of Seeds of Peace as a mixed method program. As
Maddy-Weitzman observed:
On a daily basis, opportunities were created for the participants to interact and get
to know each other as individuals (decategorization or coexistence model), as
members of groups in conflict discussing core, conflict issues (categorization or
confrontational model), and as members of one common group - that of being a
Seed of Peace (recategorization approach). (p. 480)
Of note is the fact that these three Ph.D. dissertations on the Seeds of Peace
program make Seeds of Peace dialogue participants the most well-represented and most
thoroughly studied dialogue participants within the selected primary reports for this metadata-analysis. The more than 1000 pages of research within these three dissertations
contain a wealth of observations that extend beyond the research questions posed for this
dissertation. As such, these three dissertations represent a data set worthy of a meta-study
on their own.
Narrative / Theater Models
As described in Chapter 2, another common secular intergroup dialogue model is
the narrative model which emphasizes the role of storytelling in order to develop
empathic responses between and among intergroup dialogue participants. Both Maoz
(2000) and Bar-On et al. (2007) studied the verbatim accounts of participants within a
narrative model of intergroup dialogue. Maoz’s (2000) study featured the accounts of
Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab high school teenagers who “gradually learnt to know
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each other by sharing personal narratives regarding different aspects of their lives in the
conflict” (p. 722-723). Bar-On et al.’s (2007) study also employed personal stories for
facilitating dialogue between and among Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab college
students, specifically by requiring participants to “interview two members of their family,
one from their parents’ generation and one from their grandparents’, about their personal
experiences with the Israeli or Arab ‘Other’, to transcribe the interviews and present them
for discussion in the workshop” (p. 35).
Another study that features dialogue participant accounts facilitated through a
narrative approach to dialogue was Ross (2013). Ross’ Ph.D. dissertation is a
comparative case study focusing on Sadaka Reut (as described earlier) and Peace Child
Israel. Peace Child Israel was a theater and role play-based program that conducted joint
project activities for the purpose of building relationships and empathic understanding
between Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab youth. Theater was the program’s primary
means for achieving these goals, and this emphasis on theater “reflects a belief in the
power of role-playing and improvisation and of the use of plays depicting events in other
societies to raise questions among participants regarding issues they take for granted, to
foster empathy, [to deepen] connections, and [to instill] a more nuanced understanding of
cultural similarities and differences” (Ross, p. 114).
Track Two Diplomacy Models
Another model represented within the primary reports contained within this metadata-analysis is that of track two diplomacy: a dialogue process conducted among
socially influential peoples who are also members of the respective groups involved in an
intractable conflict. Only one study among the primary reports (Kellen et al., 2012)
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featured this approach to intergroup dialogue. This particular study is also unique among
the rest of the studies because the participants who are quoted in the study are
(apparently) much older than the participants in the other studies. Though the ages of the
participants are not stated directly, the authors state that the participants are all ‘elites’
within their respective Israeli or Palestinian social or political circles. Kelman et al.’s
particular study of a track two diplomacy dialogue group in Israel-Palestine is different
from the other studies within this meta-data-analysis because participation with this track
two diplomacy group requires participants to adhere to a two-state solution to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. None of the other dialogue models featured within the primary
reports of this meta-data-analysis required dialogue participants to advocate a two-state
solution to the conflict.
Overview of the Coded Data and the Coding Process
Before proceeding to the narrative analysis of the meta-data, it is necessary to
provide a brief overview of the entire data set of verbatim quotations of Israeli Jewish
and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants found within the aforementioned 17
primary reports. Also, it is necessary to remind the reader that this dissertation was
originally conceived as a multi-stage qualitative meta-study, and this meta-data-analysis
is intended to be only the first step of said project. As such, the research questions (as
outlined in Chapter 3) were developed within a framework that allows for the end goal of
a qualitative meta-synthesis. Were this meta-data-analysis intended to be the sole
component of the study, the research questions and inclusion criteria for primary reports
may very well have been developed differently.
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Furthermore, at this stage of the analysis, my goal here is not to re-interpret the
meanings of the quotations of individual dialogue participants but rather to identify what
are the contents of the quotations that the primary report authors presented within the
primary reports. As such, I have purposely avoided presenting these quotations in terms
of what intergroup dialogue participants ‘said’ but rather what the selected quotations
attributed to intergroup dialogue participants ‘contain.’ This purposeful presentation of
the ‘contents of the quotations’ as opposed to the ‘words people said’ serves to
discourage me from prematurely assigning interpretations to the ‘reasons’ why
participants said what they said and rather focus on the prevalence and occurrences of
‘what’ participants said in relation to the research questions.
How the Data was Read
As was described in detail in Chapter 3, the thematic analysis I performed
followed a ‘latent approach’ to the data, in that I sought details and characteristics within
the data that ‘give it its meaning’ (Braun & Clark, 2006, p. 84). As such, I purposefully
read the primary reports in chronological order (according to publication date) so that I
could see to what extent each author’s respective publication either ‘built upon,’ refuted,
or ignored the work of previous authors. My approach to thematic analysis also assumed
a ‘semantic approach’ to the data, which meant that my reading of the data was
performed with an intention to identify specific content related to the research questions
rather than a production of a ‘rich description’ of the entirety of the data set.
As such, I did not code every quotation uttered by every intergroup dialogue
participant quoted in the primary reports. Instead I coded only those quotations that were:
unambiguously related to the experience of participating in intergroup dialogue;
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provided insight into the perspective or experience of intergroup dialogue
participants either before, during, or after participating in the dialogue program;
recorded by the author(s) of the report; and
verbatim accounts rather than generalized summaries.
Specific types of quotations that were excluded from coding were the following:
quotations related to the social ‘re-entry’ process after participating in a dialogue
process; and
quotations taken from social media postings and online list serv discussions.
(Potential limitations to excluding certain characteristics of data are discussed in Chapter
5). Furthermore, the purpose of this meta-data-analysis was not to find ‘statistical
significance’ regarding the prevalence of any particular quality or characteristic found
within the data but rather to find associations among the various codes, themes, and
primary report groupings and to subsequently report on what potential significance those
associations may have.
Coded Data Categories
As was mentioned in Chapter 3, the data within the primary reports was coded
along a variety of categorical types. These categories included the identifying factors
about the quoted participants, including national affiliation, gender, and age. Quotations
were also coded according to the ‘structure’ of the intergroup dialogue encounter, the
topical content of the quotation, and the intersubjective quality of the quotations. What
follows here is a more detailed explanation of the coding categories and the strategy I
followed in assigning quotations to the various coding schemes.
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Time and dialogue group structure coding. All coded quotations were
categorized according to the time frame the quotation was recorded in relation to the
actual dialogue encounter. The categories were labeled as follows: ‘pre’ for quotations
that were recorded ‘before’ the intergroup dialogue encounter, ‘during’ for quotations
recorded within the actual intergroup dialogue encounter, and ‘post’ for quotations
recorded after the dialogue encounter. Quotations were also coded according to the
‘structure’ of the group within which the participant quotation was recorded: either as
‘binational’ (dialogue where both Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab participants were
present), ‘uninational’ (dialogue where members of only one of the main national groups
was present), or ‘solo’ (quotations recorded as part of individual interviews with the
author(s) of the respective primary report).
Intersubjective perspective and second-person space coding. As mentioned in
Chapter 3, all quotations coded ‘during group dialogue’ were also coded according to two
intersubjective frameworks: the ‘integral holon’ (Edwards, 2005, p. 280) and a ‘quality of
second-person space’ (expressing similarity, difference, togetherness, or separateness).
Quotations were often coded along multiple holons due to the multiple perspectives
participants expressed within single utterances. For example, the following quotation
from a PCI dialogue participant was coded as holon 1 (first person singular), holon 2
(first person plural), and holon 3 (second person singular): “It outrages me that you say
that human life is not cherished by us” (Helman, 2002). It was coded as holon 1 because
the speaker expresses a felt emotion (i.e. ‘I feel angry’); it was coded as holon 2 because
the speaker refers to her own group (i.e. ‘We Palestinians’); and it was coded holon 3
because the speaker refers to a previous quotation made by the speaker earlier in dialogue
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(implies, ‘What you said . . .’). Furthermore, within the ‘second person space’
framework, it was coded ‘difference’ because the speaker is making clear the existence of
a difference of opinion regarding Palestinians’ collective appreciation for human life.
Procedure to Moving from Coding to Identification of Themes
After coding all the relevant intergroup participant quotations, I copied and pasted
the quotations into the following categories:
Israeli Jewish (IJ) participant quotations recorded ‘before’ dialogue;
IJ participant quotations recorded ‘during’ binational dialogue;
IJ participant quotations recorded ‘during’ uninational dialogue;
IJ participant quotations recorded ‘after’ dialogue;
Palestinian citizen of Israel (PCI) participant quotations recorded ‘before’
dialogue;
PCI quotations recorded ‘during’ binational dialogue;
PCI quotations recorded ‘after’ dialogue;
Palestinian Arabs in the Occupied Territories (OPT) participant quotations
recorded ‘before’ dialogue;
OPT quotations recorded ‘during’ binational dialogue;
OPT quotations recorded ‘after’ dialogue.
Whenever feasible and appropriate, I further filtered the quotations within the ‘during’
categories into other categories according to the relative ‘location in time’ of dialogue:
either ‘early stages of dialogue,’ ‘middle stages of dialogue,’ or ‘late stages of dialogue.’
Also, whenever feasible and appropriate, I organized the quotations within these
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categories according to the dialogue model within which the participant quotation was
recorded.
After organizing the quotations within these categories, I selected the most
representative and/or meaningful quotations to include in the final search for themes. By
‘representative’ quotations, I am referring to those participant quotations that contained
topical matter found in multiple reports. By ‘meaningful’ quotations, I am referring to
quotations that provided unique or significant insight into the intergroup dialogue process
regardless of how ‘representative’ the quotation’s content was. This means that the
analysis presented in the next section does not present every quotation that I coded during
the coding process. By focusing on only the most representative and/or meaningful
participant quotations, I was able to balance the competing demands of quantitative and
qualitative aspects of the data in the process of developing the ‘key’ themes (for a
detailed discussion of these demands, see Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 82).
The Analysis of the Coded Quotations
What follows is a narrative presentation of the most representative and
meaningful participant quotations found within the primary reports that address the
research questions of this meta-data-analysis. From these quotations, organized according
to the categories described previously, the ‘themes of experience’ of Israeli Jewish and
Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants are then delineated. The narrative that
follows is shaped by the assumptions that both a) the ‘national’ identities of intergroup
dialogue participants affects the experience the respective individuals have within
dialogue and b) the intergroup dialogue model in which dialogue was conducted
influences the participants’ experience within the dialogue process.
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As such, the narrative I present here is presented in four parts. Part 1 focuses on
quotations from Israeli Jewish (IJ) participants, part 2 focuses on quotations from
Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel (PCI) participants, and part 3 focuses on quotations
from Palestinian Arabs in the Occupied Territories (OPT). Part 4 focuses on the findings
rendered from the intersubjective coding categories. These four parts are then drawn
upon to answer the secondary questions and develop the overarching themes of
experience of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants.
Part 1: The Selected Quotations of IJ Intergroup Dialogue Participants
This section presents the most representative and/or meaningful IJ dialogue
participant quotations found within the primary reports that serve to help identity the
themes of experience as delineated by the research questions. The quotations are
organized according to ‘when’ the quotations were recorded in relation to the execution
of intergroup dialogue: either ‘before,’ ‘during,’ or ‘after’ dialogue. Further
categorizations (i.e. model of dialogue, stage or structure of dialogue) are presented
whenever appropriate or feasible.
IJ participant quotations recorded ‘before’ entering dialogue. Very few of the
coded direct quotations from IJ participants were both a) related directly to the
expectations or motivations for participating within intergroup dialogue and b) recorded
‘before’ the actual dialogue commenced. Those that were coded were found within the
mixed model dialogue program studies on the Seeds of Peace and Hands of Peace
programs. Nevertheless, the quotations contain relevant observations that foreshadow the
topics contained within quotations recorded ‘during’ and ‘after’ intergroup dialogue.
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The following IJ participant quotation contains an explanation of the participant’s
motivations for participating in the Seeds of Peace program:
I know that by words, just talking to them [Palestinians] once or twice, won’t
change their minds. But maybe when they’ll see my point of view, they’ll get
something and I’ll get something. Because they’re calling the suicide bombers
‘freedom fighters.’ I don’t really understand why. I just wanna get it. Maybe it’s
because I wanna understand the enemy, cause if you have an enemy, you gotta
know him, if you wanna beat him or something. No, not beating, that’s not what I
meant. If you wanna live with him peacefully, you have to understand. If he opens
a war against you, you gotta know his ways to fight back. I mean, you can’t fight
terror with terror. This is not the answer. But you can fight terror with strikes
against the terrorist [male, high school aged teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 187188)
This quotation contains a number of elements that proved to be revealing for what IJ
participants actually speak about in dialogue with Palestinian Arabs: a desire to build
interpersonal relationships with Palestinian Arabs, a desire to convince Palestinian Arabs
about the moral depravity of ‘terrorism’, and a desire to understand why Palestinian
Arabs ‘do what they do.’
Other IJ participant quotations contained references to the responsibility
Palestinian Arabs have in ‘making peace’ with Israel. The following excerpts, all from
Hammack’s (2006) dissertation, provide examples of IJ participants’ perception of
Palestinian Arab responsibility for resolving the conflict. These quotations here refer
primarily to the events of the second Intifada.
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[T]hey should stop the terrorist attacks against us. The whole thing started
because of the terrorist acts against us . . . They actually started it. They fired first.
They were the first to use suicide bombers . . . I think of [Palestinians] as liars.
They came in and lied. The more facts you give them, they just keep on lying. I
just saw that in my own eyes, so I don’t really think it’s a stereotype. It’s the
reality [male, high school aged teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 189, 191)
I think that the Palestinians have to get their own state, but not in such as this
condition—like today, they are attacking us. We need to have it quiet before we
are letting them to build their own country. No attacks from the Palestinians, and
then we will talk about the peace process [male, high school aged teenager].
(Hammack, 2006, p. 202-203)
A time when I was very, very angry about the conflict was in 2000 when the
intifada started. Yeah, because it was after Camp David when we tried to talk with
them about the peace process, and we gave them a lot of good conditions before
they are building their own country. But they wanted to return their refugees to
Israel, and they didn’t let it go, and we didn’t want to give them this right,
because then Israel would not be a Jewish state. There would be too many Arabs.
They don’t understand how important this is to us [male, high school aged
teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 203)
[The Palestinians] need to stop complaining about the things they don’t have.
They need to stop and think about what they do have. And they have each other,
and they have families. I think if we go through them, if we help them, because
they barely have technology. Half of them doesn’t even know what a computer is.
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So if we help them, all around Gaza, build them houses, give them games, give
them money a little bit, something like that, I think it will be better. It’s all about
helping each other. Sometimes Arabs can be all the way around there. I’ve heard
stories, some people say, ‘We give one finger, they want the whole hand.’ They
have to be fair if we gonna be fair. Both sides equal [female, high school aged
teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 214)
These IJ participant quotations above contain numerous characterizations of Palestinian
Arabs that describe them deceptive, violent, ungrateful, selfish, primitive, and insatiable.
The following IJ participant quotation, recorded at the time of the second Intifada,
contains the suggestion that a two-state solution is only feasible if Palestinian Arabs
renounce violence and give up the return of Palestinian refugees to Israel.
The desirable solution in my view, in very general terms, looks like coexistence
with the Arabs of Israel and nearly total equality . . . [as] citizens of Israel, of
course . . . But I would really want them to see themselves as part of this state as it
is, accept this fact that the state of Israel exists and will exist as a Jewish state of
course [male, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 54)
This IJ dialogue participant quotation refers to ‘the Arabs of Israel,’ which in this metadata-analysis are referred to Palestinian citizens of Israel (PCI). This quotation represents
a recurring topic about the ‘Jewishness’ of the Israeli state and was found throughout the
stages of dialogue (before, during, and after).
However, not all IJ participant quotations recorded ‘before’ the commencement of
dialogue contain an assignment of blame to Palestinian Arabs. The following quotations
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from IJ participants contain references to a level of responsibility on the part of Israel for
resolving the conflict.
I think that Israel should give the Arabs those territories that we took from them. I
think the Arabs should get their own separate state. This is the situation: there is a
small piece of land [for] both cultures and religions. We should live together, and
if we can’t do it together then we should do it separate [female, high school aged
teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 197)
All the ideology of my school is to be with the Arab neighbors . . . to live in peace
. . . My friends from my town, they are a little more militant than me, and my
friends from school are the opposite of me. Their ideology is the opposite of my
ideology. It’s a bit opposite because they think we should give them the state and
not fight them and not make all the action in Gaza and the West Bank. . . [My
friends from home], they think that we should fight them now, and all the Arabs
are killers and something like that . . . It’s very hard to think from a different way
while you’re always living in one place and you can’t hear the other side, or meet
people from the other side. It’s very hard [male, high school aged teenager].
(Hammack, 2006, p. 205)
The latter quotation contains the idea that Israeli Jews are not homogenous in their
perspectives about the resolution of the conflict, and that the reality of holding a
perspective that advocates the surrender of Occupied Territories to Palestinian Arabs is
a difficult one to maintain as an Israeli Jew. The concept of intergroup dialogue
participants being ‘caught between identities or ideologies’ appears repeatedly within
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participant quotations at different stages within the dialogue process and is explored
further in subsequent sections of this analysis.
Also within the IJ participant quotations recorded before the commencement of
intergroup dialogue are references to the meaning of the Holocaust and elements of
‘geotheology’—references to religious or historical Biblical or Quranic concepts that
define the meaning of the land of Israel-Palestine.
They were here first [the Palestinians]. We came and took this land from them
because God—whoever wrote the Bible—said that this is our land. But if you
look at it the other way, in their Bible, in the Koran, this is their land . . .We just
came from Europe here after the Holocaust before we settled down here and we
started to take control of their lives. I pretty understand their way of thinking right
now— of the Arabs. Come on, they were here, they were having a nice life, and
then we came and we started to take control of everything. Jobs, and basic social
life. So I can totally understand how they feel [female, high school teenager].
(Hammack, 2006, p. 212)
The following quotation contains the suggestion that the conflict’s continuation extends
beyond history books and into perceptions of the Israeli-Jewish self.
To go to the army, that’s to be an Israeli. We’re serving in the army, we’re
speaking Hebrew, we are Jewish. Religion has a major part in Israel. What else?
Being in the conflict, that’s Israeli [male, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006,
p. 204)
Though the number of IJ participant quotations recorded before the
commencement of dialogue are scant, they contain a number of themes that prove to be
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relevant throughout the dialogue processes. Namely, they contain disparaging categorical
descriptions of Palestinian Arabs and acknowledgments of a desire to convince
Palestinian Arabs of their responsibilities to end the conflict. However, other IJ
participant quotations contain references to a potentially empathic reaction to the plight
of Palestinian Arabs in the face of the creation of the Israeli nation. Nevertheless, despite
this recognition of Palestinian Arab suffering, IJ dialogue participants entering dialogue
still potentially define themselves within the perpetuation of the conflict.
IJ participant quotations recorded ‘during’ dialogue. Within this section
representative IJ participant quotations recorded ‘during’ actual intergroup dialogue are
presented. As there are a greater number of these quotations to read in comparison to IJ
quotations recorded before the commencement of dialogue, this next section presents the
contents of IJ dialogue participant quotations according to the stage of intergroup
dialogue in which each quotation was recorded: either within the early, mid, or late stages
of dialogue. In addition, these IJ participant quotations are organized according to the
‘make up’ of the dialogue group: either ‘binational’ (members of both Israeli Jewish and
Palestinian Arab groups were present) or ‘uninational’ (only members of the IJ group
were present). Furthermore, whenever appropriate, the quotations are also organized
according to the dialogue model within which they were spoken and recorded.
IJ participant quotations recorded during the early stages of binational
dialogue. Nearly all the coded IJ participant quotations that were recorded during the
early stages of binational dialogue were from the confrontational model. Nevertheless,
the topics and contents of these quotations are consistent with those found with the
quotations from the previous section and foreshadow the quotation topics found in

127

subsequent stages of dialogue. These quotations from IJ participants again contain
references to a preference for interpersonal dialogue rather than intergroup dialogue, the
assignment of blame to Palestinian Arabs for the continuation of the conflict, criticism of
Palestinian Arab culture, attempts to understand the behaviors of Palestinian ‘terrorists’,
and fear for Israeli safety.
Consistent with the quotation mentioned earlier regarding an IJ participant’s
preference to engage in dialogue with Palestinian Arabs chiefly at an interpersonal level,
the following IJ participant quotation recorded during a confrontational intergroup
dialogue session contains an expressed preference for interpersonal communication
rather than intergroup.
If they (the facilitators) relate to us as two groups, discussion will take place
between groups and not among individuals and this will be rather difficult for me
. . . I want to know about everyday life. I'm not really interested in where your
loyalty lies, to Arafat or to Peres [male, university student]. (Maoz et al., 2002, p.
940)
Multiple coded quotations from IJ participants refer to the perception of potential violent
motives of Palestinian Arabs.
That it wouldn’t bother you [PCI participant] to be part of it [violence targeting
IJ’s]. Not just that you support it, but that you would plan terror attacks. . . Who is
what, this is not my question. Am I sitting with people who could plan terror
attacks? [male, college student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 52)
IJ participant quotations contain criticisms of perceived Palestinian Arab cultural and
behavioral deficiencies.
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I ask you why you feel uncomfortable [as a PCI at university]. You tell me you
have no leisure activities. It shows your own lack of action, that you [PCI’s] aren't
organized [male, university student]. (Maoz et al., 2002, p. 942)
You just want to be a minority: that's all. If I didn't have a state I would go
anywhere I could to live in my own state, never mind the land. Your attitude to
land makes things very difficult for you. You're divided among yourselves and
you cannot resolve it [male, university student]. (Maoz et al., 2002, p. 947)
IJ participant quotations also contain references to the role of the Palestinians for
the events surrounding Israeli Independence and the Al Nakhba.
The, the. . . Arab leadership, and the, the leaders of the Palestinians, said, “We
will not recognize. . .a Jewish country, here, in, in this territory of Palestine. If
there will be, if such a, a decision will be made in the United Nations, there will
be a war, there will be a slaughter . . . And, no. No, wait a second. And, that’s
how [the Al Nakhba] started. Because . . . it’s not that only we were allowed to
declare a country. The Palestinians could [also] say, ‘Oh, now we’re forming
Palestine’ [male, high school teenager]. (Pilecki & Hammack, 2014, p. 106)
[My friends and family] show me the Palestinian Covenant and the different
things [Palestinian] instigators have written and said, and I am sure that you have
relatives that do not really like us [the Jews]. And the question I ask is: What
would have happened to us [the Jews] if in 1948 an Arab state would have been
established here? What would have happened if we were the minority and you the
majority? [male, university student]. (Helman, 2002, p. 331)
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These two quotations contain references to asymmetrical reflexivity that places the
Palestinian peoples in a position of ‘reaction’ to Israeli nationalism. In other words, these
quotations appear to place Palestinian nationalistic motivations as a reaction to Israeli
nationalism rather than as a parallel historical process. In this frame of perspective,
Palestinian nationalism is a ‘spin-off’ of Israeli nationalism—taken further, Palestinian
nationalism wouldn’t exist without Israeli nationalism.
IJ quotations that reference religion and geotheological influences also appear
within the early stages of binational intergroup dialogue sessions.
I would like to know how the Koran conceives of the relations between different
peoples because I don’t know much about it. The reason I am asking is because
you said that under Moslem rule, the Jews were not discriminated against, they
got fair treatment [male, college student]. (Helman, 2002, p. 333)
I think that in Judaism, at least at the time the Jews entered the Land of Israel, the
initial stance was to kill all the inhabitants of the land, and then they changed it
and turned them into ‘hewers of wood and drawers of water.’ And the comparison
is interesting because at least theoretically, it can be said that Islam is much more
tolerant towards non-Moslems [than Judaism towards non-Jews] [male, university
student]. (Helman, 2002, p. 334)
IJ participant quotations also contain queries into the relationship between Islam and
‘terrorism’ and focus on the estimated numbers of potential jihadists in relation to nonjihadist Muslims.
The Islamic Jihad and the Islamic movement scare me, and I know that people
who do things in the name of religion are dangerous to me, even if they are people
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of my faith, I don’t identify with them. I am simply frightened, and I would like to
know if Jihad is a commandment or not? I think that here, in Israel we have a
small group, but in Iran... I would like to know, if there is Jihad and where it
comes from [female, university student]. (Helman, 2002, p. 335)
I don’t understand how it can be a matter of social conditions. We are talking
about the Islamic Jihad, and Islamic Jihad is for killing ... so if there is a law, how
it is that such a significant group distorts the contents of the precept? Among us
there are a few, well, maybe more than a few, but not that many as [the Islamic
Jihadists] [female, university student]. (Helman, 2002, p. 336)
IJ participant quotations also contain challenging questions posited to PCI
participants in such a way as to expose resistance to dialogue and disloyalty to Israel.
These quotations were recorded after IJ participants realized that not all PCI participants
would choose to relocate to a future hypothetical Palestinian state if one were to be
created.
Would you, if I can now allow you to become citizens of Israel, you would not be
denied your own education. . . No one would deny you your language. . . You
would not be denied your prayers. . . You would not be denied access to your holy
sites. . . And you will have total freedom of movement. Would you become
citizens of Israel? [male, high school teenager]. (Pilecki & Hammack, 2014, p.
108)
So, this means that the establishment of a Palestinian state, even with Jerusalem
as its capital, will not resolve the Arab-Jewish conflict . . . Now, if I have an
argument with some hawkish extremist and he says to me: 'Listen, they want the
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Territories, they want Jerusalem and tomorrow they will want Haifa and Jaffa,' I
won't be able to tell him it isn't true . . .You are fighting for a state you have no
intention of living in. In my opinion, you are wrong, because once the Palestinian
state is established and you come along with complaints, the first thing you'll be
told is: 'You have a state, go and live there.' You are only making your own
situation worse [male, university student]. (Maoz et al., 2002, p. 947)
In multiple examples, IJ participant quotations containing questions directed at PCI
participants resulted in an explicit exposure of PCI silence or reluctance to participate.
You're saying, in fact, that when the Palestinian State is established, you won't go
and live there. . . You, Nasser, have you no intention of moving there? He isn't
answering me [looks round in triumph, referring to Nasser] [male, university
student]. (Maoz et al., 2002, p. 946)
No, I am quite listening to what she is saying, that she has a principle that she is
not at all interested in this [Israeli] state. That is, it is a state that conquered her,
and in no way is she willing to contribute to it, right? (to Fida) because you don’t
acknowledge the state as legitimate, this is what you are saying? . . . Why are you
not answering? . . . Just a minute, why are you not answering? [female, university
student]. (Maoz, 2001, p. 202)
Well, I think that besides [PCI participants] Ramzi and Ghazzi there are no... We
talk and we hear things that we already know. There are many silent people here
(dismissing the interventions of Laila and Ibtisam), and maybe there are things
that they don’t want to talk about, because it is uneasy, it is unpleasant. Maybe
some people are used to concealing their ideas, because they feel threatened.... It
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may be that by mere chance in this group (hinting at the Palestinian students)
there is consensus. But I think that there is disagreement on a lot of things. I do
not hear any disagreement from the other side, of the kind that may not be so nice
to reveal, maybe there is somebody that thinks that . . . [female, university
student]. (Helman, 2002, p. 339)
In general, the IJ participant quotations recorded during the early stages of
binational dialogue referenced above contain numerous ‘confrontational’ characteristics.
The quotations contain references to fear of Palestinian Arabs, and, consistent with the IJ
participant quotations recorded before the commencement of dialogue, these quotations
contain challenging questions regarding Palestinian Arab motivations for dialogue and
focus on perceived Palestinian Arab resistance to dialogue. Furthermore, consistent with
the realities of Israeli society, IJ participant quotations referenced above tend to reflect
the position of assumed privilege over Palestinian Arab perspectives on dialogue
processes and the history between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs.
IJ participant quotations recorded during the middle stages of binational
dialogue. The quotations included in this section regarding the middle stages of
binational dialogue were selected from within the confrontational and coexistence
dialogue models (one quotation came from the track two diplomacy model). What these
quotations contain are expressions of the various degrees to which IJ participants respond
to the new information they receive from Palestinian intergroup dialogue participants. In
general, these quotations suggest that IJ participants attempt to reconcile their positions
and opinions in a variety of manners. Furthermore, as the IJ participants attempt to
reconcile the new information they’ve received, IJ intergroup disagreement can occur.
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The following quotations contain references to surprise that not all Palestinians
carry the same opinions regarding religion and terrorism and suggest the difficulty in
relinquishing stereotypes about Palestinians.
For years there have been terrorist attacks, and I have been hearing about Jihad.
All these years I went around with the idea that Jihad is a precept commanding to
kill people, all the non-Moslems. I never heard a different version until I came to
this room. How can it be that a significant group thinks that this is a
misinterpretation, and we never heard about it? [female, university student].
(Helman, 2002, p. 338)
I think that now I understand that Jihad is not a precept in the Koran, and this
knowledge is like a beam of light for me. Because it is very difficult not to be
carried away after each terrorist act and to disregard words that become almost
synonymous: Arabs equal Islam equal Murder equal Terror. This is true even
among people who are humanistic and care about human rights. These things are
there all the time, and I don’t know.... Most of the time I try to look at people as
individuals and not as a group, but I find it difficult not to be carried away after a
terrorist attack or a murder. These feelings last for days and weeks, and the small
things of every day life lose meaning. I don’t know how many of you know the
Tanach (Old Testament), but I think that there are many people who don’t know
the Koran. Last year I took a class in the Department of Middle Eastern History,
but I don’t think I learned anything about the way of thinking. Look even in the
Old Testament there are many theoretical things that do not change, they get
frozen [female, university student]. (Helman, 2002, p. 339)

134

Though these quotations above appear to contain apologetic elements, other quotations
indicate a refusal to consider alternative perspectives.
I want to say that I do not intend to sit in the same room with people who justify
attacks on civilians, in no situation does that seem to me something that I have to
do [male, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 52)
It isn’t balanced, I don’t think it’s okay that [PCI’s were killed by Israeli police],
and it upsets me, too. [But] you can’t persuade me that our police and soldiers just
showed up and shot Arabs [for no reason], you can’t persuade me [male,
university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 55)
You know what, maybe. But, it was a war that it was . . . us or you [female, high
school teenager]. (Pilecki & Hammack, 2014, p. 107)
The last quotation was recorded within a coexistence dialogue session, and contains a
reference to the 1948 war and appears to suggest that the positions between Israeli Jews
and Palestinian Arabs was irreconcilable—only a ‘winner take all’ outcome was possible.
The following IJ participant quotations indicate that not all IJ participants respond
to the new information they receive in dialogue the same way. These differences in
responses can lead to open intergroup disagreement, especially when comparisons are
made between the Holocaust and the Al Nakhba.
(A) [male, university student] I have no other answer but shame. You [PCI] are
right. I don’t know how much you happened to see, but it [the similarity between
the Holocaust and the Al Nakhba] is exactly like this.
(B) [female, university student] You [speaker A] really hurt me. It hurts
that you agreed with her [PCI participant] and you feel ashamed. Because it is not
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the same as they (the Nazis) did to us. You were a soldier in the Occupied
Territories, and I was not. But I have relatives that are Holocaust survivors and I
can’t listen to things like this. This comparison hurts me.
(A) It is not that important in what situation we were persecuted and
discriminated against. But just look at what happened the moment that power was
in our hands. We hurt others. (Helman, 2002, p. 332)
IJ participant quotations indicating intergroup disagreement occurred within the
track two diplomacy model study also. The quotations below refer to what actions
Palestinian leaders should implement before Israel agrees to peace (i.e. preconditions for
peace).
(A) I said that there, the vacuum in the Palestinian entity. They could move and
open the gate from within by the release of Gilad Shalit (Israeli prisoner). It’s a
very small item considering all the (short pause) strategic talking that we are
talking about. This will open the gate for a ceasefire. This will open the gate for
an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. This will open the gate to negotiations.
(B) [in response] History (medium pause) the, the don’t let history always
start (short pause) with the last event [males, adults]. (Kellen et al., 2012, p. 556,
557)
IJ participant [B]’s quotation contains a reference to the importance of having a long
view of history. It suggests that IJ participant [A]’s insistence upon a prisoner release as a
precondition for peace ignores Israeli responsibilities for meeting Palestinian demands.
The above IJ participant quotations recorded within the middle stages of
binational dialogue demonstrate a range of potential responses to Palestinian Arab
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participant quotations. The responses included in this section range from outright
rejection of received information from Palestinian Arabs to the beginning of
reconciliation with competing narratives. These responses can lead to a IJ intergroup
disagreement; and, if the dialogue model allows for it, these disagreements become more
pronounced within subsequent uninational dialogue sessions.
IJ participant quotations recorded during uninational dialogue. As with the two
previous sections, the IJ participant quotations in this next section were recorded
primarily within the confrontational model. The contents of these quotations suggest that
the uninational sessions served as an opportunity for IJ participants to disagree openly
amongst themselves away from the view or observation of Palestinian group members.
These quotations point to topics that have led IJ participants to disagree with each other
openly within the binational intergroup dialogue. These topics are related to Jewish
identity, the future state of Israel, and feelings of frustration regarding Israel’s role in
resolving the conflict.
The following IJ participant quotation contains elements that suggest an outing of
Palestinian Arab sympathizers.
[The PCI participants’] big advantage is that they are really very together, more or
less . . . But anyhow, with no connection to them, I have a problem with our group
[laughs], um, that’s it, so really I will let both of you [two IJ participants], you can
go move to their room, that’s one thing [laughter], the other thing is that people
really are not speaking out and are not really committing themselves. . . It’s really
hard when half of our group is thinking like them [female, university student].
(Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 56)
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Nevertheless, within the same IJ uninational group came another quotation that suggests
a deeper understanding of PCI positions and needs.
They feel a desire to belong here and receive the rights of a citizen. They feel
discriminated against because in an analogous way . . . a minority that feels
oppressed is like a child who feels oppressed by his parents and still hopes to
receive their love [female, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 56)
The following IJ participant quotation from within a uninational setting contains
confessional and apologetic disclosures.
From the start, really from the first meeting, they said, “We are Palestinians” and
to me it felt subversive . . . I said how could [you] be Palestinian. Palestinians are
at war with us . . . When they said “Palestinian,” I heard “terrorist” [male,
university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 52)
Consistent with a ‘pre’ dialogue quotation referenced earlier, IJ participant
quotations within uninational dialogue indicate the perception of (and subsequent
questioning of) a collective Jewish identity in part based on existential threat.
(IJ A) [male, university student] You are really confusing me here . . . It’s very
dangerous to be a Jew. I don’t know, it seems self-evident, kind of axiomatic . . .
that it’s dangerous, that we have been and will continue to be victims if we don’t
watch out for ourselves . . . We don’t want to conquer anybody . . . We do
everything to protect our existence as a Jewish people.
(IJ B) (female, university student) At least that’s what the Zionist
indoctrination has made us think. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 51)
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The following IJ participant quotations contain questions probing into the characteristics
of a future IJ identity and the cultural makeup of the future Israeli nation.
What would happen if there were a different identity; if we take away the aspect
of the threat and we open the door to thinking about a changing identity, and we
don’t unite around the combative, victimized Judaism? [male, university student].
(Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 53)
[Israel] won’t belong to the Jews, it will belong to some other people too. . . How
would a binational state look, one where Arabs also rule and there are Arab
cultural symbols here? . . . For me, it really makes me despair [male, university
student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 53)
Other IJ quotations from uninational dialogue referencing Jewish personal identity and
Israel’s national identity also contain references to painful self-realization and a
subsequent choice between accepting a level of responsibility for the conflict or
intensifying blame towards Palestinians.
This makes us awfully frustrated because we were attacked at the beginning, and
our feelings were not given legitimacy. And we felt terribly guilty. And that’s
what we kept feeling, and in the end we had no way to fix the situation. We were
blamed and our hands were tied [female, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al.,
2010, p. 55)
I feel like there is some kind of feeling that what is hard is to be within this
experience and this process of internalizing. That is, there are two possible
responses: either to say it is really us, we are the murderers . . . And the other
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response is that it isn’t us at all, and they are awful and terrible and like that
[female, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 59)
What frustrates me the most at this workshop is that I came here knowing exactly
what I want, and what is good for them, and with each meeting that passes I leave
the workshop agreeing less with them. Not because of the ideas they present, but
because of how they present it. And I am angrier with myself than I am with
them. Sometimes I'm angry with myself because I don't have the courage to say:
This and this is important to me. Right, it might sound primitive; maybe I sound
like some hawkish representative. But it's important to me. Why can't I say so?
That's the feeling I have at this workshop. Now I can say that I am afraid of what
will happen, of the idea that the conflict will not end with the establishment of a
Palestinian state: I told my family this at home and they said, 'So what's new?'
[male, university student]. (Maoz et al., 2002, p. 949)
The IJ participant quotations above recorded during uninational dialogue sessions
indicate processes of disagreement and disunity among said participants. The quotations
represent a range of responses to the challenging reality of the conflict and the roles each
side play in it. The IJ participant quotations above suggest that the dialogue process leads
said participants to come to terms with the contradictory perceptions they have about the
conflict and their respective role in it, both as individuals and as collective members of
Israeli Jewish society.
IJ participant quotations recorded during the late stages of binational dialogue.
Coded IJ quotations recorded in the late stages of binational dialogue suggest that the
process of reconciling competing narratives and identities of self are quite varied. Only
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four quotations are presented in this section as representations of the full range of
responses. These IJ quotations contain references to togetherness in the human condition,
acceptance of responsibility for the conflict, and a complete rejection of the Palestinian
perspective.
You [PCI] [have] become quite human, in fact [male, university student]. (Maoz
et al., 2002, p. 950)
Perhaps we both suffered from the same god? [male, adult]. (Bar-On et al., 2007,
p. 45)
I am telling you that through this dialogue I understand much more deeply the
wrongs that have been done . . . today I understand this issue much more deeply
and I understand where things come from, and I also think that it is much easier
for me to take responsibility for it. I mean, I think that in the past I would have
said, well, it was different people who did the bad things. Today I say – no, it is
my responsibility [male, adult]. (Ron & Maoz, 2013, p. 79)
The Palestinian group, I don’t know, I feel it’s just one narrative. Like, all the
Palestinian people are always poor, are always under oppression, and they
couldn’t possibly ever. . .could never do anything wrong. . .. And that point just
pissed me off so much in the last session [that] I just threw the whole pluralist
idea out the window and just said [what I] believe [male, high school teenager].
(Pilecki & Hammack, 2014, p. 108)
The first quotation appeared in the final stages of a multi-week long confrontational
dialogue session and suggests a humanization process occurred through the dialogue
sessions. The second quotation was recorded within the narrative dialogue model and was
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offered in response to a story of suffering told by a Palestinian Arab participant. The third
quotation was recorded in the late stages of a conflict management dialogue session and
suggests a readiness to work to end the conflict. The fourth quotation was recorded in the
late stages of a confrontational dialogue session and indicates felt frustration that the IJ
narrative did not receive sufficient legitimization within the dialogue session.
IJ participant quotations recorded ‘after’ dialogue. Of the more than 300
coded IJ quotations identified within the primary reports, approximately two-thirds of
them were recorded ‘after’ the completion of the intergroup dialogue process—which
indicates a comparative lack of direct quotations recorded within actual intergroup
dialogue from IJ participants. The IJ quotations recorded after intergroup dialogue that
are presented here represent six of the seven dialogue models found within the primary
reports (all but track two diplomacy). Because this category of quotations is more diverse
and representative than the previous categories (before and during dialogue categories)
the quotations are organized and presented first according to the model of dialogue each
quotation’s speaker participated within and second by the quotation’s topical contents.
IJ participant quotations recorded after confrontational model dialogue. The
quotations featured here are representative of the range of ‘hindsight’ realizations and
observations IJ confrontational dialogue participants shared after dialogue concluded. In
general, some IJ participant quotations in this section refer to how negative perceptions of
Palestinian Arabs changed as a result of dialogue while other quotations indicate little to
no change in negative perceptions. Some IJ participant quotations refer to an experience
of guilt and shame at regarding the Israel’s role in the conflict, and others quotations refer
to perceived similarities between themselves and Palestinians as a dialogue outcome.
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Some IJ participant quotations refer to frustration and fear experienced within the
dialogue sessions.
It’s not pleasant to feel inferior, when they [Palestinians] are analyzing you,
overall it really gives a feeling of being less. It sounds funny but I felt that my life
was threatened during those segments. I mean, it connects with the feeling from
before, the threat of their wanting to kill me . . . as if showing me the outside, that
if they are so strong, they will start a war and kill us [female, adult].
(Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 54)
This IJ participant quotation recorded post-dialogue contains a characterization of
Palestinian culture as primitive.
I thought that young people our age would be more open, thinking of the future,
in the modern world ... It seems like a state within a state ... Everything is
alienated. The clothes are alienating. They’re wearing scarves so they won’t be
seen, as if they are hiding something . . . They need to change, not because it’s
Arab culture but because it’s a closed culture and not developed. The
undeveloped always has to go in the direction of the developed, because in our
world, without thinking, without an open mind, you can’t do anything [gender
unclear, high school teenager]. (Halabi & Zak, 2014, p. 68)
The following IJ quotation contains a reference to an experience of connectedness with
Palestinians despite their being Palestinian.
[At first] you relate to them as a group, so you start with all the hatred toward
them . . . Then I saw that it’s the opposite, like we connected pretty well with
them and we relate to them, like it isn’t important that they are Arabs and like
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[they are] somebody else. In fact, we sat, we talked with them, we laughed with
them, we danced with them. We didn’t notice that they are Arabs. They were
actually kind of sweet [female, high school teenager]. (Halabi & Zak, 2014, p. 67)
IJ participant quotations contained references to new information about Palestinian Arabs
received during dialogue. The following quotations contain references to two such
examples of new information: the reality of Palestinian struggles and the difference
between PCI’s and OPT’s.
Now their culture does not seem as different from ours. I mean they are basically
students like we are, and we all take exams. Before, I thought it was this culture
like the Bedouin. What stands out more for me is the situation they are in as
opposed to the situation we are in, and not the cultural markers, but that they are
in a situation of the minority, of occupation, of a very hard daily reality [female,
adult]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 58)
You think they’re Arabs who are still living with keffiyas [checkered head
scarves], that they come from a disadvantaged place. I heard that they have YES
[satellite TV] and Digital and I was in shock; I was sure that they live in villages
that barely have electricity. We have this idea that the Arabs are primitive and
backward. I also learned about the distinction between [Palestinians living in] the
territories and Israel [female, high school teenager]. (Halabi & Zak, 2014, p. 67)
Consistent with IJ participant quotations recorded during intergroup dialogue, IJ
participant quotations recorded after dialogue contain references to frustration
experienced when learning about the plight of Palestinian Arabs. The following
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quotations contain descriptions of this frustration and also refers to Israel’s role within
the perpetuation of the conflict.
Frustration is a powerful feeling. I would say, I don’t know what to call this—
pangs of conscience? Thinking about this as you get into bed and it’s on your
mind . . . and why are things this way? And how should things have been
different? And we’re not such innocent, good . . . Like, it’s uncomfortable, like it
was more comfortable to be in that place of, like, everything is sort of clear [male,
adult]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 55)
It wasn’t easy for me to understand this, to accept this . . . [silence]; but it
horrifies me on the level that I understood where they are at, and what we as Jews
did.... I feel that until then, until the weekend, I didn’t, like, didn’t really get it, I
didn’t really absorb this, I didn’t really let myself take it in [male, adult].
(Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 60)
The following IJ participant quotation refers to the experience of consciously accepting
responsibility for the conflict and its future resolution.
This gives me a responsibility, first of all, first of all certainly not to present
myself as weak, as a manipulation. This places a responsibility on me to
influence, to be more political, to go to more demonstrations, to go to activities of
all kinds of . . . And I feel easier with myself now, it’s comfortable for me to
accept responsibility directly, in a mature way . . . I could stop stepping on you
and say that I wasn’t stepping on you at all, that’s the worst [female, adult].
(Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 60)
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The following IJ participant quotation suggests that conscious acceptance of the conflict
strengthens rather than weakens IJ identity.
Today I am ready to hear because I see that this does not hold up against that. As
soon as you take . . . all kinds of guilt, it’s a lot harder for you to keep on
justifying your place. But I think that on the individual level, this is some kind of
growing up, that you know that you can be guilty, not perfect, and still you can
stick to your position, or give some different shades to your position. But that
doesn’t mean that your whole position breaks down . . . that the Jewish people had
done bad things to the Palestinian people doesn’t necessary mean that there is no
justification to my existence here [male, adult]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 59)
These two IJ participant quotations contain descriptions of an internalized process of ‘revisioning’ the conflict and a new teleological venture for IJ society as a whole.
I discovered that, on the one hand, I am very ready to give up the things
connected with my identity, symbols, the desire that this connection between the
state and the people, that this state is only mine. Before that, it was very clear to
me that this state is mine and only mine and something here moved a little [male,
adult]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 58)
The threat defines for you who you are. This is comfortable to some extent, and
when you take it away, you don’t know what to do . . . Something else has to be
put together instead, and that’s hard. You have to start over and create new values
and beliefs [female, adult]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 57)
In all, IJ participant quotations recorded after participation with the
confrontational model contain a range of responses related to processes of reconciling
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competing narratives and differing perspectives on Palestinian Arabs and the resolution
of the conflict. Though some IJ participant quotations contain elements that point to a
tone of patronizing perception of Palestinian Arabs (i.e. “They were actually kind of
sweet”), other quotations indicate a recognition of responsibility to Palestinian Arabs (i.e.
“it horrifies me on the level that I understood where they are at, and what we as Jews
did”). Furthermore, other IJ quotations indicate that this recognition of responsibility
consequently shapes perspectives on the future of Israel and whether or not it can
continue as a by-definition Jewish state.
IJ participant quotations recorded after narrative/theater model dialogue. These
quotations come from participants with Peace Child Israel (Ross, 2013) and the peace
education project at the Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI)
(Maoz, 2000). Though there are only five quotations included in this portion, the
quotations in general contain references to a humanizing process that occurred through
dialogue and the relationship between program activities and the development of a
peaceful future for Israel-Palestine. For example, the following Peace Child Israel IJ
participant quotation highlights the power of theater and role play to open participants’
eyes to the everyday reality of Palestinians and Israeli Jews:
So one of the situations that we were given [to improvise upon] was...um...so, if
you entered an Arab village by mistake, or you entered a Jewish city by mistake.
And, in each of the groups there was a situation where, like, I still get goose
bumps now thinking about it, like, the things that we ourselves wrote and acted
out. On the Jewish side it was 4 girls who mistakenly entered an Arab village and
they were trapped somehow and a mob reached them and wanted to hurt
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them...and to my surprise many of the Arab participants pretended that they got to
Tel Aviv and got in trouble there. I thought to myself, what, Tel Aviv, they don’t
feel safe there? What does that mean? I was very surprised to realize that [female,
adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 117)
IJ quotations from IPCRI project participants describe how dialogue experiences
countered inaccurate media portrayals of Palestinian Arabs.
I thought they were all against peace. This is what you see in television and at
home, you grow in a society where they say that Palestinians are bad, that they are
all the same. The media relayed to us only the negative things. Here, I saw that
they are really similar to us, identical. The same dreams, only that they live like in
jail [female, high school teenager]. (Maoz, 2000, p. 728)
In the beginning of the encounter we generalized that all Palestinians are
murderers, all are stone throwers, all are haters of Israel, but they showed the
opposite side from what we thought [male, high school teenager]. (Maoz, 2000, p.
728)
A quotation from an IJ Peace Child Israel participant contains a description of the
significance of relationships with Palestinian Arabs and the affects those relationships
have had as a dialogue outcome.
It completely, it completely had an influence. In terms of getting to know, that it’s
not, where he is from and that there really isn’t a problem with [Palestinian
citizens] being there, rather they are here and they are part of [this place], and not
to fear the Other, and to understand that...they are like me, the same, exactly the
same. [Peace Child Israel] had a large influence on my life. In terms of
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understanding that everyone, that they are OK. Like, whether they are close to me
it is no different than when they are far from me. It’s something that stayed with
me. That was there and stayed with me [female, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 267)
Consistent with other IJ participant quotations, this quotation from an IJ Peace Child
Israel participant outlines a connection between events occurring within dialogue to a
vision of a peaceful future.
So I’m saying, again, from that small group you develop, you acquire two things
in the long term. And in the immediate term, of course. The relationships and
the...to walk around, like, everyone can walk around freely in Yaffo and feel OK.
And a Jew can go walk around in an Arab village and feel secure and think, “It’s
our people, not your people,” and...and at the immediate level you get the
outcome of breaking fear and relieving tension within Israel. And on the other
hand it can lead to a change in opinions. And then, of course, will come the
optimistic solution the most optimistic that there can be, that one of these days the
Middle East, the borders of Syria and Lebanon will be like the borders with
Egypt. That’s something that we should, that is fun to aspire to. Listen, like
enlistment into the army, instead of it being 3 years and mandatory, it will be
voluntary. There will be a reality that is different, you understand? [male, adult].
(Ross, 2013, p. 186)
In short, post dialogue quotations from IJ participants of narrative and theater
dialogue models contain testimony to the power of theater to generate empathic responses
toward Palestinian Arabs. These quotations also contain references to the inconsistencies
between the messages disseminated in Israeli media versus the experiences they had
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within the dialogue process. Furthermore, within these quotations are explicit
recognitions of the common humanity of Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs.
IJ participant quotations recorded after coexistence model dialogue. Only one
coded IJ participant quotation recorded after a coexistence model dialogue session is
included here. The quotation refers to a strengthening of two dynamics as a result of
dialogue: an identity as a Zionist and a belief in a two state solution.
I think that [the peace education program] really changed me. Like, on both sides.
In one hand it made me be much more Zionistic and believe in . . . the existence
of Israel, and in the other hand, it made me know the other side . . . and to
understand that we have . . . to have two countries [female, high school teenager].
(Pilecki & Hammack, 2014, p. 107)
This quotation contains an explicit recognition and validation of what has largely been
perceived as two irreconcilable positions: Zionism and Palestinian Arab nationalism.
Whether or not such a dual position can be feasibly maintained is not the intended focus
here. Rather, the quotation seems to be a fitting representation of the experience
participants can have through coexistence dialogue model processes.
IJ participant quotations recorded after activist model dialogue. All the
quotations included within this portion were spoken by IJ participants in Sadaka Reut.
These quotations, consistent with IJ participant quotations listed in previous sections,
contain references to a relationship between dialogue activities and social change. Also,
these quotations contain references to an internalization of program identity as a dialogue
outcome. Furthermore, one IJ participant quotation contains a recollection of a dialogue
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story that serves as a potent deconstruction of hegemonic privilege applicable to a variety
of modern social conflicts.
These IJ Sadaka Reut participant quotations refer to the power of activist and joint
action dialogue models within an environment of protracted conflict.
The strength of these organizations is, in some way, the very fact that they exist
[female, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 196)
Like, in my eyes, what happened is still happening there, that it’s a group, it’s
simply the belief in joint action, like, simply to see that it works [female, adult].
(Ross, 2013, p. 224)
The following two IJ Sadaka Reut participant quotations highlight the degree to which
program identity assimilation is possible and how that identity assimilation can increase
self confidence.
I’m a [Sadaka Reut] participant, and, that’s it, it gives me strength and some sort
of tranquility that I know who I am in order to work with myself and with my
community [male, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 196)
I think that it formed for me many things that, at least in the years immediately
following, certainly...formed me to be, not to fear leading battles, I wasn’t afraid
of doing new things [female, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 223)
This IJ Sadaka Reut participant quotation contains an acknowledgement of the
development of the ability to see differences among PCI’s as a dialogue program
outcome.
Look, what it did for me and I hope for others, is to not catalog people. It’s not
Arabs, it’s Mohammad, it’s Akil, it’s people that I know personally, and to know
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that...that not all Arab Israelis or Palestinian Israelis, as they call themselves, are
the same. Each one has his own definition. And to be open to changes and
different thoughts, which is also important. And yes, at the end of the day the
grand idea is to create some sort of change in this country and in the worldview of
its population [female, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 185)
The IJ quotations below indicate recognition of the existence of social power asymmetry
and how that asymmetry directly affects PCI’s.
But still the oppression and racism that they deal with in comparison with an
Israeli child is much greater. And like, that comparison, that standard was created
for me in [Sadaka Reut]. I mean, the fact that, yes, the Arabs who live in Israel,
it’s better for them than Arabs who live in Jordan, who are Palestinians. But the
comparison can’t be like that. The comparison has to be to an Israeli child,
Jewish. [...] And it’s like lenses that have become my eyes, they’re not, they’re
not lenses any more. I can’t take them off at this point. And it became the way I
see the world. I can’t see it otherwise [female, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 289)
My awareness grew exponentially, in a way I couldn’t possibly have imagined,
and my knowledge expanded so much during the three years [during which I was
a participant in Building a Culture of Peace] because I asked questions all the
time, and because I was in an environment that constantly addressed questions
and topics that [other forums in] Israeli society don’t address [female, adult].
(Ross, 2013, p. 138)
I started to see, like, through the fact that I saw the power imbalance in the Sadaka
group, suddenly I started to see all sorts of power dynamics in the street. From the
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fact that I saw what the history books say, suddenly I started to see what isn’t told
in the history books and what isn’t said in the street and what I don’t see and the
entire reality that is hidden from me, and all the stories that aren’t told, um, and
all of the cultures that are disappearing and suddenly I began to see what is
oppressed and what is empowered and, like, how that happens. And then I started
to examine myself within that. All the time, thought processes. Constantly,
questions questions questions, why this and not that, why is it like this and why is
it not like that. And, it’s like, when you live here everything is very clear [...] And
nobody asks questions. That’s what Sadaka Reut changed for me [female, adult].
(Ross, 2013, p. 290)
This recollection of events shared by an IJ Sadaka Reut participant reveals an
understanding of the power of hegemony, and the story shares parallels with the current
‘Black Lives Matter’ versus ‘All Lives Matter’ debate in the United States.
We had a meeting where the facilitator asked us to write down our
identities...words that characterize our identities. And I really couldn’t participate
in that activity. But all the rest of the girls did and everyone, all the rest of the
girls were Ashkenazi and there was one who was, I think she was Moroccan, I
don’t remember, Yemenite. And all the girls wrote as their first characteristic: I
am a human being. Everyone except for that girl who was Mizrachi. She wrote, I
am Mizrachi [...] And then we all started to harass her, [to say] that it doesn’t
matter what you are and what your ethnicity is. And then I think that she left the
meeting, like, she left in the middle. And many years, not many years but maybe a
year and a half two years later, we met the facilitator again and she said to us,
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now that we were in a different place, she told us that what happened in that
meeting, that it was, like, she spoke with us about hegemony. That there is
hegemony in Israeli society. And if you match that hegemony, you can allow
yourself to say, I’m a human being. There are people who don’t match that
hegemony, and they have something to say that’s more important. Like, they have
something to say about themselves aside from the fact that they’re human beings,
because they feel this thing about themselves all the time [female, adult]. (Ross,
2013, p. 294)
Though these IJ quotations all came from one study (Ross, 2013), their contents
point to an explicit recognition of the link between dialogue participation and political
activism. Consistent with quotations cited previously, IJ participant quotations recorded
post activist dialogue model explicitly recognize the importance of building relationships
with Palestinian Arabs for the purpose of breaking down stereotypes and prejudicial
behavior. However, quotations in this section more explicitly reference the power of
Israeli Jewish hegemony on interactions with not only Palestinian Arabs but also with
Mizrachi Jews in Israel.
IJ participant quotations recorded after conflict management model dialogue.
These IJ participant quotations came from Building Bridges for Peace (BBFP)
participants (Collier, 2009) and conflict management workshop participants interviewed
by Ron & Maoz (2013). Many of the same topical material from previous sections appear
in these quotations, such as self-confidence and an increased understanding of the
Palestinian condition as dialogue outcomes. However, other unique information is found
within these quotations as are presented below.
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This IJ BBFP participant quotation attributes an increase in self-confidence to
dialogue group participation.
I learned not to, when I am talking, not to always feel sorry. Because it is not my
fault and I shouldn’t get offended from what other people say all the time. . .
‘Cause at the beginning I got very offended from some stuff the other side said
and then I didn’t anymore because I . . . got more confidence, not only in myself,
in my goals, and in the side of my people, and in our side, the Israeli side [female,
adult]. (Collier, 2009, p. 345)
Another BBFP participant quotation attributes a strengthened Israeli identity to dialogue
group participation.
I think I’m kind of more Israeli now. And, I feel like a new immigrant. I was only
a year and a half in Israel but uhm, I was kind of sliding between new immigrant
and, and, Israeli. And I think it’s more fixed now. I mean I think . . . I know I’m
an Israeli. I mean, (louder) I know I’m an Israeli and I know I am a new
immigrant . . . I’m able to, to, to make a distinction between the two of them, and
to, to behave and to acknowledge the fact that I’m one or the other, at times, I
mean when the situation is right [female, adult]. (Collier, 2009, p. 357)
An IJ participant in another conflict management dialogue group linked a realization of
privilege to participation in a dialogue program.
I had a meaningful and founding experience . . . it [the dialogue encounter]
undermined me, and mostly brought me to an understanding that I was living in
repression and denial, and in ignorance . . . I feel I live like the lord of the manor
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in this country. I live at other people’s expense in a lot of ways [female, adult].
(Ron & Maoz, 2013, p. 87)
IJ participant quotations related to perspectives of Palestinians point to a new
acknowledgment of their daily struggles, especially the struggles of OPT’s.
This other received a face . . . and suddenly [I started] seeing things through their
eyes. And, like, the mere possibility of looking at what was happening differently,
it was very dramatic. The description of their lives in the territories, the
description of their daily life, the way they lived, what happens to them there . . .
What happens at the checkpoints, what the daily routine of life there looks like,
the prices, what happens to the soldiers serving in the territories . . . lots of things
that before I wasn’t even aware existed, or was aware of them in a very general
manner [female, adult]. (Ron & Maoz, 2013, p. 80)
The following IJ participant quotation contains an acknowledgement of the unique
position of PCI’s and how they represent the entire Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Look, it [my involvement in dialogue encounters] did many things to me. Let’s
start from the political – I think that it made me focus much more on the
Palestinians who are Israeli citizens. I think that until then I didn’t pay too much
attention to them . . . and I realized that ultimately they embody in their identity
the core of the conflict. And their case is the most complicated case, and the
solutions proposed up to this point do not provide them with answers. This really
influenced me [male, adult]. (Ron & Maoz, 2013, p. 79)
These IJ participant quotations highlight changes in perspective regarding the definition
of Israel as a Jewish state and the placement of preconditions for peace on Palestinians.
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I used to say, “Fine. First of all accept the existence of the State of Israel as a
Jewish state, and then we’ll start talking.” Nowadays I say: “OK, why place any
pre-conditions?” You know, why should I define for him how he should see
things? And any time someone raises (a claim by the Palestinian citizens, to
define the State of Israel as) the state of all its citizens, I truly listen, and ask
myself – “why not, why yes, and where does this come from?” And when people
speak of national service and civic service, then I understand why, for the Arabs,
it is nearly impossible. Like, I have a much greater sensitivity to it [male, adult].
(Ron & Maoz, 2013, p. 79)
This thing with national rights, the meaning of which may be that the state should
be devoid of a national (Jewish) identity, is a kind of glass ceiling, that even
within the dialogue it was impossible to breach. And to this day I ask myself what
can be done with it. The dialogue ended at a point that I don’t know how to
advance from [male, adult]. (Ron & Maoz, 2013, p. 80)
It’s very hard for me, and I know that it wrongs others, but I still want this to be a
Jewish state, and I know that it’s, like, unfair, but that’s what I want . . . but on the
other hand I understand that it’s very problematic, and I don’t know how much
longer this can go on . . . for instance the Law of Return, and not the right of
return which is something that’s very important to me, as are the anthem and the
flag . . . although I realize it is impossible, it’s like saying to people they can be
my citizens, but yet ignoring them. What else does it mean? This effort to
maintain a Jewish demographic majority, which is unfair, which is discriminatory
[female, adult]. (Ron & Maoz, 2013, p. 82)
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IJ participant quotations also express reservations regarding a two-state solution and,
ultimately, condemn Israeli occupation of Palestinian Territories, as is indicated by these
quotations.
[I]t’s clear to me now, for instance, that the classic paradigm of Oslo, of two
classic nation states for the two peoples, is pure nonsense . . . I think it contains
many issues, that at the time we didn’t even imagine. The issue of the Palestinian
citizens of Israel is only one of these. Once I realized this, I realized that, wait a
moment, there is a whole new series of issues that we didn’t think of . . . and then
I began re-engineering my entire paradigm [male, adult]. (Ron & Maoz, 2013, p.
79)
We are in a problematic place. The occupation corrupts. This is not a proverb, it
corrupts. It turns us into bad people. I can’t sit at home, watch TV, and say, oh no,
we are doing such terrible things [male, adult]. (Ron & Maoz, 2013, p. 80)
Furthermore, according to the following IJ participant quotation, the Zionist pursuit of a
fully Jewish Israeli state (a geotheological aspiration) is akin to racism.
[There is] a kind of racism towards the Arabs . . . a kind of erasure of the other, an
erasure of the voice of the Arab residents, people who are Arabs here in Israel . . .
look, as long as the state has to maintain its majority because it is the “Jewish
State”, and it has to maintain its Jewish majority, then everything there that is not
Jewish, if we do not convert it to Judaism, it is not part of the state. This is a
problem, in my opinion. It’s a kind of erasure . . . we set some kind of ceiling –
twenty percent. In my view its racism, it’s difficult for me to live in this situation.
I find it hard to say I can identify with aspects of Judaism that speak of the
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demographic problem, that speak of “Judaizing” the Galilee, that speak of
conquering the Negev from the Bedouins [male, adult]. (Ron & Maoz, 2013, p.
81)
Consistent with IJ quotations cited in previous sections, IJ participant quotations
after conflict management model dialogue processes contain references to a strengthening
of Israeli-Jewish identity and an overall sense of self-confidence. However, other
quotations contain explicit references to the ‘Israeli-Jewish’ privilege that is had at the
expense of Palestinian Arabs. Whether or not these realizations of privilege were
processed within dialogue or not is not clear. Nevertheless, IJ participant quotations
linking Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories to ‘racism’ are significant and
consistent with earlier IJ quotations that acknowledge the power of Israeli Jewish
hegemony on Palestinian Arab daily life.
IJ participant quotations recorded after SOP/HOP dialogue. The IJ participant
quotations contained within this section all come from the three Ph.D. dissertations about
the Seeds of Peace/Hands of Peace intergroup dialogue programs. As a result, this
category of quotations has the largest number of potentially relevant quotations for
identifying themes of experience for IJ intergroup dialogue participants. The topics
presented here are consistent with earlier sections, and other unique topics are presented
as well.
The IJ Seeds of Peace/Hands of Peace (SOP/HOP) participant quotations recorded
after participation in the program reveal participant motivations for joining the program
that are consistent with earlier quotations—a desire to understand them and a desire to
be understood.
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While I was on a field trip with my school, a suicide bomber killed himself on the
bus in Haifa . . . It really came together with the explosion—the terrorist act—so I
wanted to go here [to the dialogue camp]. At the beginning, when I thought of the
children that were killed, I thought about this place, all the Palestinian children
who would be here. I wanted to go here. I wanted to talk to them. I wanted to see
their side. I wanted them to see my side [male, high school teenager]. (Hammack,
2006, p. 186)
Another IJ participant quotation suggests that participation in the dialogue program
required the participant to become a representative for Israel.
So then when I went there suddenly I became the representative of Israel, not only
my neighborhood, not only Tel Aviv. ... I felt great about it but it was not easy. . .
I never thought as big as Israel as opposed to other countries, it was only me, my
family, my neighborhood, Tel Aviv, and the rest. Not more than that, and
suddenly you had to think those big issues, Palestinians, Israelis, how do we solve
the issue? So there were different transitions I went through . . . putting on the
Israeli patriotism or nationality all of a sudden and having to deal with that. ... I
never liked having to deal with the situation I was born into and suddenly being
treated as equal with all other Israelis and having the honor, the respect of
everyone else, of representing Israel felt good [male, high school teenager].
(Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 96)
The following IJ participant quotations indicate that participation in intergroup
dialogue can represent the first opportunity to talk to Palestinians, understand the reality
of Palestinian life, and learn about Palestinian perspectives on the conflict.
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I was quite terrified actually. I had never spoken to an Arab person. I was afraid, I
didn't even know we were going to sleep in the same bunk as Arab people, I
thought they were going to separate us and meet once a day. I had no idea it was
doing everything together. I was pretty sure we would get together once a day for
a couple of hours and argue the whole time about politics ... I couldn't even
pronounce the Palestinian girls' in my room - their names. I was really shocked,
the first day I didn't talk to anyone other than Israelis [female, high school
teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 100)
When I first saw Dina (a Palestinian) I felt like, “gosh she's normal.” I thought
before they all want to kill us [female, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman,
2005, p. 100)
I had no idea about what was the situation really - and I used to think that they
should be grateful - the Palestinians - because Israel was willing to help them
while other Arabs countries are not even willing to take them. That was my idea
of the situation. They were not grateful, they were really angry and that was not
right [female, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 88)
Before camp I wasn't really aware of the occupation, that it's that big . . . One of
the most shocking experiences were when I heard the guy sitting next to me gets
water once a week which is like the most basic thing for every human being in
this world. And when that guy is not getting it, yeah something is wrong. I know
that I couldn't accept it [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p.
143)
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Other IJ participant quotations contain acknowledgements of both Palestinian Arab
nationalistic pride and the suffering Palestinian Arabs endure.
I could sense their nationalism and the feelings of belonging or even owning the
land, what we call the land of Israel, or Palestine. I really experienced it. I saw it
in their eyes, I saw these feelings, these emotions. I learned, you know the first
time I saw an Arab geographic map of the region, I saw Palestine ... I saw the
Arab names of cities, where there are Jewish communities nowadays, this was
something I learned. I just saw the other side’s emotions in the conflict [female,
high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 142)
I learned they suffer same as we do. Before Seeds of Peace I didn't consider that
they suffer. Now I see their pain. I see what they need to handle each day [female,
high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 433)
But then, after hearing all their stories, I thought, maybe they are the victim, the
real victim. Maybe they suffer more than we do. I came there and I thought that
they might suffer more than we do, but after Hands of Peace, I knew that for sure
[female, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 355)
Other IJ participant quotations contain references to the importance of developing
friendships with Palestinian Arabs at the SOP/HOP program because doing so humanizes
Palestinians.
I think making a friend from the other side, I think that's what humanizes the
conflict because you can no longer say the Palestinians - the Palestinians will
automatically ring a bell and say Mohammed or Mamduh, there will be a name
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for you, it will no longer be a name for all the people [female, high school
teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 132)
When you hear a story from a Palestinian guy telling you how much his life is
miserable, and you don't know the guy, you say, you're just using propaganda, just
coming and saying stuff that he hears and trying to make a fuss for nothing. But
when you hear a friend of yours saying that, you know that he won't lie to you
[male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 135)
I just became so much more aware of what’s really going on—the injustices. And
making friends—I mean, real friends—from the other side, it totally changed me.
Now when something happens in the West Bank, I worry. I think, what if my
friend is hurt? [female, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 342)
This IJ quotation suggests that the process of building friendships breaks down previously
held stereotypes about Palestinian Arabs.
When you see some stereotypes being known as not true, you try to doubt all the
rest of the information. . . One thing I learned is don't do generalizations. If I say
that all Palestinians are terrorists, then I'm actually saying that Rasha and Yusuf
are terrorists. I've spent a lot of time with them. They're not terrorists [male, high
school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 430)
Other IJ participant quotations contain references to a new interest in
understanding the events surrounding the Al Nakhba and the significance of that
understanding as a result of dialogue program activity.
The [Al Nakhba] day. I haven't heard about it, I haven't read it, there's a small
paragraph about it in my history book and that's it. And the Palestinians are
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comparing it to the Jewish Holocaust and if to them it looks like a holocaust it
might be more appropriate to put more than one paragraph about it [male, high
school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 142)
There is one fundamental issue - whether Palestinians fled when Israel was
established or they were kicked out. And obviously they said the Israeli army
butchered us and we had to leave and what I knew, I didn't know much, but what I
knew is that they fled . . . First of all, I was presented or posed with a new
question - wait, is it true that they fled or were they butchered or threatened by the
Israeli army? So even though I didn't get an answer then, at that point I questioned
my facts, my history [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p.
142)
What I regret is that if there's mistakes that Israel made, that we don't learn about
it. If there's massacres that happened, that Israeli kids don't learn about it, which is
really bad. Because no wonder people see this conflict as a good guy / bad guy
conflict. No wonder Israelis will see us as good against evil. I think that if Israelis
were taught to believe that Palestinians fled in 1948 when such wasn't really the
case, some left at gunpoint if not killed a lot of them, which changes everything
[male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 436)
The following IJ participant quotation suggests that a certain degree of ambivalence
about the best way to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains after participation in
intergroup dialogue.
I know now that they live horrible lives, most of them. Part of it is our fault, part
of it is their society's fault. And I know that they love their land as much as we
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love Israel. Their religion and their freedom of religion is very important to them I
know that they're not very happy about us being their neighbors but I think they're
ready to accept it. . . There are going to be two countries here [female, high school
teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 143)
The Palestinians should get a country of their own, not all the territories we have
now, but the majority of them. And we should remove all the settlements from the
area, but some of them should remain. I don’t think they should have a capital city
in Jerusalem. That’s not what I think. And the right of return, I don’t think they’ll
get it. Actually I am sure they won’t get it, because ever since 1948 when we give
up something, they also need to do it [male, high school teenager]. (Hammack,
2006, p. 374)
Other IJ participant quotations do not contain ambivalent perspectives about the specifics
of a two state solution and instead challenge the identity of Israel as a Jewish state.
I’m now in Israel, and I know it’s the state of the Jews. It doesn’t mean it has to
be the state just for the Jews. It is the state of the Jews—Israel. Everyone calls it
Israel, not Palestine or something. But it’s not about Jews only or something. It’s
not realistic at all [female, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 341)
Consistent with the IJ participant quotations from other intergroup dialogue
models mentioned previously, the assimilation of program identity into self identity is a
topic that appears in some IJ participant quotations.
It's very difficult to see where Seeds of Peace stopped and I began [male, high
school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 451)
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However, other IJ participant quotations contain clear criticisms of SOP on the basis that
its format is ‘too American.’
SOP has a good format – fantastic. The summer camp is fantastic. But I will
always have a problem with Americans telling me how to run my life in the
Middle East [female, adult]. (Lazarus, 2011, p. 40)
Sometimes the model of Seeds took the Americanization of conflict resolution too
far. As I said before, you have here two peoples, who are Middle Eastern... the
way of thinking, the way of negotiating is very different. So here is another point
that can help... “Peace and love” [said in English – NL], at the beginning, it’s nice
as kids. It’s not serious, it doesn’t work enough, and it doesn’t respect our
opinions as Jews and Arabs to resolve the conflict in a different fashion [male,
adult]. (Lazarus, 2011, p. 87)
Another IJ participant quotation suggests that participation in the dialogue program
served to reify previously held positions regarding the conflict and its history.
First of all, I felt like the program was somehow not equal, that somehow the
Palestinians were more powerful and we heard so much of only their suffering
and not our suffering as Israelis. What surprised me most about the program,
talking with Palestinians, is the facts. I mean, I know facts, and they know facts,
but it’s not the same facts. They’re changing the facts! I know the facts! I believe
Israelis don’t change the facts. They want the world to see the Israelis as bad
people, but I know that what they say is not true. Like in Lebanon, they say
Sharon ordered the Sabra and Shatilla massacres, and it’s not true! ...I didn’t
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change my mind about anything listening to the Palestinians, but it was interesting
[male, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 372)
Other IJ participant quotations refer to the disappointment felt after returning home from
the US camp participation and that the dialogue program did little more than affirm the
differences of opinion between IJ’s and Palestinian Arabs.
What happens at the beginning, is you return from camp, and you have an
amazing year. Everything is good, SOP is the greatest thing in the world. After
that, all the bad things happen, and after that you finally (stabilize) [gender
unclear, adult]. (Lazarus, 2011, p. 103)
Other IJ participant quotations express a deep conviction of the rightness of the Israeli
state and the invalidity of the Palestinian nationalistic perspective as a dialogue outcome.
Of course, I think that I’m right—that my country’s right. Everybody thinks that
his country’s right. Let’s start from the first thing [Palestinians at camp] say,
when they say, “I am from Palestine.” I mean, there is no such country named
Palestine. You can check the U.N. There is no country written in the U.N.
notebook called Palestine! There is such country called Israel. So he can say, “I’m
a Palestinian from Israel.” But when you say, “Hi. I’m from Palestine.”
“Jerusalem, Palestine” or something, it hurts the people that are from Israel and
are from Jerusalem. ...This is the problem: they don’t have a country, and they
feel like they have it. And they’re speaking like there is no Israel! [male, high
school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 190)
The source of the conflict is the land. They think it is their land, and we think it’s
our land . . . But we brought development to the area, we built the country. That’s
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the problem. We built the country in our territories and now they want it back . . .
They have more rights, they have more opportunities to be successful and they’re
just using Israel as a tool for their life. It was a big shock [male, high school
teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 376)
The IJ participant quotations recorded after SOP/HOP dialogue represented the
largest single pool of coded quotations among the various categories of coded IJ
participant quotations. The three dissertations from which these quotations were drawn
contain extensive analyses on their meaning and significance specifically in relation to
the impact of the Seeds of Peace/Hands of Peace programs. Nonetheless, the contents of
the selected quotations above are consistent with the contents of IJ participant quotations
cited in previous sections and gathered from other dialogue models.
Summary of the IJ intergroup dialogue quotations. This section presented IJ
intergroup dialogue participant quotations that were deemed the most representative and
meaningful IJ quotations that address the research questions of this meta-data-analysis. A
brief overview of the narrative outlined above indicate a wide variety of topics and
potential themes for describing the IJ intergroup participant experience. Though not an
exhaustive overview, the quotations contained within this section represent the following
five categories within which topics developed or progressed through the narrative:
the movement from ignorance to awareness of Palestinian Arabs;
the process of recognizing Israeli Jewish disunity;
either deconstructing or reifying Israeli identity and historical narratives;
remaining a crusader or becoming an advocate; and
recognizing the complexity of a solution to the conflict.
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The movement from ignorance to awareness of Palestinian Arabs. Multiple
quotations recorded ‘after’ dialogue contained references to the fact that intergroup
dialogue represented the first real face-to-face exposure to Palestinian Arabs for Israeli
Jews. Other quotations indicated that prior to dialogue, Israeli Jewish participants didn’t
understand the difference between Palestinian citizens of Israel and Palestinians in the
Occupied Territories. The dialogue experience served as an opportunity to learn about
these differences and what members of each Palestinian identity group endure on a daily
basis. IJ quotations indicate that dialogue serves as an opportunity to learn about the
Palestinian Arab narrative and the relationship between Islam and violence against Israel.
Furthermore, other quotations indicated that the process of befriending Palestinian Arabs
through intergroup dialogue effectively broke through stereotypes Israeli Jewish
participants had previously held about Palestinian Arabs.
The process of recognizing Israeli Jewish disunity. Numerous IJ participant
quotations suggest that IJ participants enter dialogue primarily as individual agents less
interested in representing Israel and more interested in building interpersonal
relationships. However, as dialogue progressed, the quotations indicate that IJ group
members realize their group’s collective disagreement regarding various aspects related
to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Common subjects around which IJ participant
quotations indicate disagreement are parallels drawn between Al Nakhba and the
Holocaust and Israel’s role in ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Quotations recorded
within the uninational sessions indicate IJ participants could work through these
disagreements to varying degrees of success.
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Either deconstructing or reifying Israeli identity and historical narratives. This
category of dialogue topics is closely related to the previous category. Some IJ quotations
suggest that feelings of shame and guilt are experienced when the Palestinian narrative is
juxtaposed against the Israeli Jewish narrative, while other quotations indicate a dismissal
of the Palestinian narrative and a strengthened adherence to the Israeli Jewish historical
narrative. Furthermore, IJ participant quotations indicate that the process of dialogue with
Palestinian Arabs can lead IJ participants to question both the practicality and the
morality of defining Israel as a Jewish rather than a democratic state.
Remaining a crusader or becoming an advocate. IJ quotations recorded in the
‘pre dialogue’ and ‘early binational dialogue’ stages indicate that IJ’s enter dialogue with
the intention of ‘reforming’ Palestinian Arabs by proving to them the correctness of the
Israeli Jewish cause or by convincing Palestinian Arabs of the immorality of suicide
bombings. As dialogue progresses, IJ participant quotations suggest at least two
outcomes of dialogue: some IJ quotations indicate an acceptance of responsibility for the
conflict and its resolution while other quotations indicate a rejection of the Palestinian
perspective. As such, IJ participant quotations suggest that dialogue can result in either a
continuation of ‘crusader’ activity to change Palestinian Arab opinions or a change to an
‘advocate’ approach to work for awareness about the plight of Palestinian Arabs (both
PCI’s and OPT’s).
Recognizing the complexity of a solution to the conflict. IJ participant quotations
indicate that IJ participants may enter intergroup dialogue with a preset opinion regarding
the appropriate course of action to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Some IJ
quotations indicate a belief in Palestinian Arab adherence to certain ‘pre-conditions’
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before entering in further political dialogue, and other quotations indicate a belief in a
two-state solution. As dialogue progresses, IJ participant quotations indicate that changes
in these opinions can occur. Some IJ quotations suggest that the two state solution is
impractical. However, other IJ quotations indicate that a two state solution is still
preferable despite the complexities involved in making such a solution possible.
Part 2: The Selected Quotations of PCI Intergroup Dialogue Participants
Following the pattern established in Part 1 of the data analysis section of this
chapter, the quotations of PCI participants are organized according to the time they were
recorded relative to participation in intergroup dialogue. From the approximately 160
quotations coded within the primary reports spoken by PCI intergroup dialogue
participants, the most ‘representative’ and ‘meaningful’ quotations are included in this
section of the data analysis. The quotations are organized according to ‘when’ the
quotations were recorded in relation to the execution of intergroup dialogue: either
‘before,’ ‘during,’ or ‘after’ dialogue. Further categorizations (i.e. model of dialogue,
stage or structure of dialogue) are presented whenever appropriate or feasible.
PCI participant quotations recorded ‘before’ entering dialogue. Similar to the
previous section about the motivations and expectations expressed within IJ participants’
quotations recorded prior to engaging in intergroup dialogue processes, the vast majority
of quotations from PCI participants recorded ‘before’ actual dialogue commenced come
from the Seeds of Peace/Hands of Peace Ph.D. dissertation case studies within the
primary reports. More specifically, all of the PCI ‘pre’ dialogue quotations presented here
are from Hammack’s (2006) dissertation. Nevertheless, the topics contained within these
PCI participant quotations are consistent with the topics found in other intergroup
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dialogue participant quotations from other stages of dialogue presented in other primary
reports—all appearing in forthcoming sections.
The following two PCI participant quotations contain references to the challenge
of defining PCI identity.
My identity is Arab Israeli. I am Israeli first; I have no question about this. I live
in Israel. Israel is my country. I’m proud of being Israeli, and I’m proud of my
country. When an Arab Israeli says, “I’m Palestinian,” it’s because somebody has
told them: “You are a Palestinian living in Israel. You must remember your
brothers who have been killed,” or something like this. And this happened with
me, in the first day of camp. Somebody came and asked me, “Who are you?” I
said, “I’m Jibril, I’m from Israel. I’m Arab.” He said, “How can you say you’re
from Israel!? You’re a Palestinian!” I said, “No. I’m Israeli!” He said to me, “You
forgot your brothers, you forgot what the Jews did to us.” These kinds of things,
this doesn’t help make peace. This makes it harder! [male, high school teenager].
(Hammack, 2006, p. 297)
I guess Arab Israeli, because I live in Israel, and I am a Palestinian. To that
question, when I think about it twice, I think I would prefer to be called
Palestinian-Israeli or Israeli-Palestinian. Maybe that can be achieved after peace
[male, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 314)
This PCI participant quotation contains a version of Israeli history that generally assigns
blame to Palestinian Arabs for the roots of the conflict.
Because the Jews came to Palestine at that time, it was the start of the conflict. It
was the twentieth century. The Jews built the country, but the Arabs didn’t accept
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what the Jews said. So there was a war between the Arabs and the Jews, and the
Jews won. But there were six Arab countries against the Jews, and the Jews won!
... [The conflict,] it’s not between Jews and Arabs. It’s between Israelis and some
Arabs—not all Arabs. Because I’m Arab, and they don’t have a problem with me.
I’m not involved [male, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 298-299)
Another PCI participant quotation expresses dismay over the manner in which
Palestinian children are taught history:
The [school] books don’t have anything about the conflict. The Hebrew book has
stories about peace between Muslims and Jews. But they don’t have things like
this in Palestine. They’re taught to be against Israel. They learn really bad things
about Israel. Everybody there is against Israel. The European Union gave
Palestine money to make new books, but they were really bad books. All their
books are about war, and against Israel . . . Teaching hate for Israelis will not
help. We don’t learn anything against Arabs in the Israeli schools . . . I don’t
know why the Arabs do it against the Jews [male, high school teenager].
(Hammack, 2006, p. 299)
The same PCI participant is attributed to the following quotations which assign blame to
the Palestinians for the start of the second Intifada:
It’s what the Palestinians say, because Ariel Sharon entered al-Aqsa Mosque. But
a lot of Jews enter the Mosque, so why exactly this man? They say because he is a
killer. He killed a lot of Arabs or something like this. But they were just waiting
for something to start the intifada—the terror organization, I think. Because if
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there is no war, there is no work for the terror organization [male, high school
teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 300)
Another PCI quotations expresses both an objection to and an explanation of the
existence of Palestinian suicide bombers:
Suicide bombers, I think they undergo a mind-wash, brainwash. Yeah, they get
into a very bad situation. Their family, some members of the family are dead
during this conflict, so they feel like they have no choice. They feel like they can’t
do anything else, so they decide to sacrifice their life. But it’s not exactly a
sacrifice, because when someone sacrifices something, he does it to benefit other
people, and I don’t see they are benefiting the Palestinian people as they come
here and kill innocent civilians. So Israel needs to strike back, more strongly. This
is also a circle of violence [male, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 317)
In regards to the resolution to the conflict, another PCI participant quotation contains a
justification for a two-state solution:
I think in this region there are two peoples. There must be two states, and one
future for them. That’s the only way to come to peace . . . The intifada is about the
Palestinians wanting their own land and their own state, cause they have the right
to have their own country. They don’t have the right to leave their village.... There
are all these tanks and guns, and every day there is someone who is killed
[female, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 308)
In comparison to IJ participant quotations recorded before dialogue, PCI
participant quotations focus more heavily on matters of identity. Though these quotations
come from only one primary report (Hammack, 2006), their contents are consistent with
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the contents of other quotations from PCI participants in other studies. The theme of
identity is a recurring one within PCI participant quotations, as subsequent sections
demonstrate.
PCI participant quotations recorded ‘during’ dialogue. Within this section
representative PCI participant quotations recorded ‘during’ actual intergroup dialogue are
presented. Similar to the previous section presenting IJ participant quotations recorded
‘during’ intergroup dialogue, this section is organized and presented according to the
stage of intergroup dialogue in which each quotation was recorded: either within the
early, mid, or late stages of dialogue. Unlike the previous section about IJ participant
quotations recorded ‘during’ intergroup dialogue, the PCI section does not contain any
meaningful or representative quotations recorded during ‘uninational’ dialogue sessions.
Furthermore, whenever appropriate, the quotations in this section are organized according
to the dialogue model within which they were spoken and recorded.
PCI participant quotations recorded during the early stages of binational
dialogue. Again, similar to the section in part 1 of this analysis which presented IJ
participant quotations recorded within the early stages of binational dialogue, nearly all
the selected quotations attributed to PCI participants during the early stages of binational
dialogue in this section were recorded within the confrontational dialogue model.
Because many of these quotations were presented as responses to IJ participant
utterances, a tone of defensiveness is discernible within these PCI participant quotations.
These quotations also contain references to counter narratives to those narratives found
within IJ participant quotations.
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In contrast to IJ participant quotations that indicate a preference for interpersonal
communication, the following PCI quotation expresses a preference for intergroup
dialogue.
We came here to argue, to talk about things, and it isn't at all personal . . . You
aren't in touch with what you're saying. You don't know how things come across.
How we understand you [male, university student]. (Maoz et al., 2002, p. 944)
The early stages of intergroup dialogue in the confrontation model contains quotations
from PCI participants that defend and define the PCI identity.
We have been living here for more than forty years [i.e., we have been Israeli
citizens] and now you say that I do not belong? From your words I understand
that you are not ready to accept me as an Israeli, all the time you speak about me
as an Arab [male, university student]. (Helman, 2002, p. 331)
I am a Palestinian. There is a difference between national and political affiliation.
I will never feel Israeli [male, university student]. (Maoz et al., 2002, p. 940)
PCI participant quotations contain justifications for PCI dissatisfaction as a national
minority within Israel.
I think that when someone has something, he doesn't appreciate it. This is why it
is very hard for you to understand. I have been living here for twenty years now;
on Fridays and Saturdays the shops are closed, there is nowhere to go. I stay here
for the holidays and there's nothing for me to do. A mosque - to go and pray - it's
been turned into the Beer-Sheva Museum. I miss a lot of things here. You don't
feel this because you have it all. There's folk dancing, discos, films, but not one
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film in Arabic, no Arab music [male, university student]. (Maoz et al., 2002, p.
941)
PCI quotations contain a number of comments that appear to carry a defensive
tone. In regards to history, PCI quotations can contain attempts to draw parallels and
highlight similarities between the Holocaust and Al Nakhba.
And you always get furious when people say that you treated the Arabs the same
way the Nazis treated you. You went through a terrible time, you did not have a
state, you did not have a home, you had nothing, and you came here and treated
us the same. That is my question [female, university student]. (Helman, 2002, p.
332)
PCI quotations also contain counter-narratives to terrorism and Islamic Jihad.
Islam is a religion that has a tolerant attitude towards non-Moslems, they live
together. Let me tell you a story: Mohammed, the Prophet, had a Jewish neighbor
that used to dam- age his property, to burn his door and to abuse him. One day the
neighbor did not show up and Mohammed went to the fields to look for him and
asked: Where have you been all these days? I thought you were ill, so I came to
visit you...” [male, university student]. (Helman, 2002, p. 334)
[Jihad] [i]s not only a matter of religion, there are other intervening factors, such
as socio-economic conditions. There are people that join the Islamic Jihad
because the movement provides them and their family with money and helps
them. Take for instance the Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt, why do their ranks
grow all the time? It is because they work on socio-economic issues, they go to
poor neighborhoods in Egypt and help them with money and food. During the
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earthquake in Egypt, who was there to help? The Moslem Brotherhood, people
see it and join them [female, university student]. (Helman, 2002, p. 336)
PCI quotations also frame Palestinian violence as an exception. The following quotation
refers specifically to violence against women as exceptional events.
It is strange that you say that we [the Arabs] value human life less. First, there
were some cases of women that were killed to restore family honor, and they were
widely reported by the media. It is true that they were killed, but these are a few
cases. There are many cases of women who betrayed their husbands and cheated
on them, but they were not killed; they divorced or an agreement was reached
within the family. People who killed [their sisters] are a minority [female,
university student]. (Helman, 2002, p. 341)
The selected PCI participant quotations above tend to contain explicit defenses of
Palestinian Arab identity, culture, and nationalistic aspirations. This characteristic of
‘defensiveness’ results chiefly as a consequence of Israeli Jewish participant challenges
and critiques to Palestinian identity, culture, and nationalistic aspirations. While PCI
participant quotations indicate consistent resistance to IJ participant challenges and
critiques, the subject of PCI personal identity continues to develop through the
subsequent stages of dialogue.
PCI participant quotations recorded during the middle and late stages of
binational dialogue. The number of representative and meaningful quotations spoken by
PCI participants ‘during’ the middle and late stages of intergroup dialogue is
comparatively smaller than those included in the previous section regarding IJ participant
quotations recorded ‘during’ the middle and late stages of intergroup dialogue. As such,
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the ‘middle’ and ‘late’ stage PCI dialogue participant quotations are combined into one
section here. These quotations were recorded primarily within the confrontational
dialogue model, and a smaller number of quotations presented here were recorded within
narrative and coexistence dialogue models. The quotations continue to contain references
to the challenges of possessing a mixed or dual identity. Other quotations appear to
continue to function as tools of defensiveness against IJ participant accusations and
suggestions.
PCI participant quotations recorded within both a narrative dialogue session and a
coexistence tradition include comments intended to clarify the differentiations in identity
among Palestinian Arabs.
There are (Palestinian) Christians as well! [female, university student]. (2009,
Bekerman, p. 214)
You call it ‘Sephardic tradition.’ You have to understand that there is no
‘Sephardic tradition.’ This is an Arab tradition, and at my home also we have the
same traditions that were in your home [male, university student]. (Bar-On et al.,
2007, p. 47)
The first PCI quotation refers to the existence of Christian Palestinians for the apparent
purpose of emphasizing that not all Palestinians are Muslims. The second quotation
refers to ‘Sephardic Jews’—Jews who are primarily of Middle Eastern ancestry rather
than European (Ashkenazi) ancestry. The quotation is apparently offered for the purpose
of ethnically aligning Sephardic Jews with Palestinian Arabs.
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PCI participant quotations can also contain elements expressing frustration with
comments received from IJ participants that criticize or generalize Palestinian Arabs. The
following is an example from a confrontational model dialogue session.
It outrages me that you say that human life is not cherished by us. . . You are
wrong when you say that among us (the Arabs) the value of human life is inferior
to you (the Jews) [female, university student]. (Helman, 2002, p. 341)
Expressions of empowerment can also be found in PCI participant quotations, such as the
following recorded within a confrontational model dialogue session.
Maybe the power of the Arab group here, the Palestinian group, [is] to bring
things, like, to the same level, and you feel that there’s a group here that has rights
. . . Maybe you have that sense of a threat [female, university student].
(Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 54)
PCI participant quotations also contain counter-narratives to the IJ participant
condemnations of Palestinian Arab suicide bombings and terrorist actions that appear to
both denounce violence yet express solidarity with OPT’s.
No, she meant that there is something reciprocal [in suicide bombings]. Let’s say
that a state, let’s say like Israel, that bombards Gaza in the middle of the night,
this is not called a terror attack even though everyone there relates to it as a terror
attack. I definitely think that it’s not justified to hurt any side if they are innocent
civilians, let’s say he blows himself up on a bus or that a state like Israel
bombards [male, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 52)
I condemn, in every way, any form of terrorism involving killing innocent
civilians . . . But I can’t ignore what is happening there in the territories and in
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Gaza when the Israeli army is attacking them all the time [female, university
student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 52)
Further examples of empowerment contained within PCI participant quotations is
the following which apparently serves to challenge Israeli-Jewish privilege in Israel.
You don't appreciate it because you have the land. You want to get rid of us. Do
you want me to convert [to Judaism]? Soon you'll want us to celebrate your
Independence Day [male, university student]. (Maoz et al., 2002, p. 948)
PCI quotations also attempt to expose a flipside of Jewish-Israeli privilege by lamenting
the comparative lack of cultural and social development among Palestinian Arab peoples.
Palestinian Arabs Israelis are here in front of you, we are more conservative about
our culture, more than other Palestinian countries:: yes. We are here on: on the
subject of the culture um: we are barricaded in um: for more than fifty years: we
um . . . in the Palestinian sector we don’t really have theater um: that’s considered
developed. Um: we don’t have um: actors that are so um: they [the Jews] have the
talent and the standards [gender unclear, university student]. (Bekerman, 2009, p.
215)
PCI quotations also contain references to varied forms of social and media asymmetry.
[The media] highlights all the cases of blood feuds and women’s killings as a
symbol of the inferiority of the Arabs. But you can also find cases in (Israeli Jewish society) [female, university student]. (Helman, 2002, p. 343)
So can you simply explain to me the results? Do they seem balanced? Thirteen
[PCI’s killed by Israeli police]? [male, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al.,
2010, p. 55)
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At least one PCI participant quotation contains a counter narrative to IJ
participant quotations that question the loyalty of PCI’s to the state of Israel. The
following quotation contains a suggestion that Israeli Jews, if given the option to create a
homeland somewhere else in the world, would refuse to go there.
My land is here. Most Palestinian people, should a state be established, will feel
they belong there. But there are those who won't leave their land to live with their
own nation. Do you understand? There are two issues here. Why didn't you agree
to go to Uganda? You said that you differentiate between the nation and the land.
So why didn't you go to Uganda? After all, you wanted a Jewish state. Had you
gone to another country, you would have felt comfortable [there] with each other
and you would not have felt anti-Semitism. [But] another place has no meaning
for you; it's the same for us [male, university student]. (Maoz et al., 2002, p. 946)
At least one PCI participant quotation contains a suggestion that the creation of
Palestinian state (i.e. a two state solution) will allow PCI’s to reconcile their divided
identities as Israeli citizens and Palestinian Arabs.
I think that once there is a Palestinian state, it will be easier for us to define
ourselves as Palestinians living in Israel [male, university student]. (Maoz et al.,
2002, p. 947)
In short, the PCI participant quotations recorded during the middle and late stages
of binational dialogue tend to contain clarifying statements on Palestinian Arab identity,
especially for Palestinian Arabs who are citizens of Israel. These quotations also indicate
a persistence, at times to the point of exasperation, in defending Palestinian Arab culture
and nationalism to Israeli Jewish participant critiques. PCI participant quotations also
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indicate solidarity with OPT participants, which further serves the purpose of defining
PCI identity.
PCI participant quotations recorded ‘after’ dialogue. This category of PCI
intergroup dialogue participant quotations was the most well-represented category
included within part 2. Five of the seven intergroup dialogue models represented among
the primary reports are represented within this section of PCI participant quotations
recorded after dialogue. The topic contents of the quotations are varied yet discernable
connections can be made between the contents of these quotations and those quotations
presented in the previous sections of PCI participant quotations.
PCI participant quotations recorded after confrontational model dialogue. PCI
participant quotations recorded after confrontational model dialogue refer to the benefits
of participating in the dialogue encounter. Two examples below highlight an increase in
self-confidence and the opportunity to have difficult discussions with Israeli-Jews as
dialogue benefits.
This encounter increased my self-confidence. Just as I stood before the Jews in
that meeting, I can do it again in the future. In the past, I was not involved with
these things, but this encounter encouraged me to do things like this in the future
[female, high school teenager]. (Halabi & Zak, 2014, p. 64)
I think it is better to confront and even hurt one another than just sit around
playing games. . . [without that] I don't think I would have been able to talk to
anyone here. I came to this workshop to learn new things, I came to voice my
opinions, so that people would be able to see things the way I do [male, university
student]. (Maoz et al., 2002, p. 951)
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At least one PCI participant quotation frames the dialogue experience as an opportunity
to memorialize Aseel—a PCI Seeds of Peace participant who was killed by Israeli police.
I wanted to come today dressed in a map of Palestine, so that they would know
that this is a message from [Aseel], so that they’d know that I am not giving up
my religion or my nationality. It’s true that I am with you and I love you, but I am
not giving up my national identity [female, high school teenager]. (Halabi & Zak,
2014, p. 65)
Another PCI participant quotation contains an emphasis on the importance of
maintaining cultural uniqueness through a lamentation about the manner in which young
Palestinian men socialized with young Israeli Jewish females during dialogue.
I’m not in favor of assimilating . . . I know that the Arab boys were influenced. I
saw that with my own eyes, how they behaved with the Jewish girls. I got angry
and told some of them off, and they kept quiet and didn’t know what to say to me
[female, high school teenager]. (Halabi & Zak, 2014, p. 66)
What these handful of PCI quotations recorded after confrontational model dialogue
chiefly demonstrate is an explicit expression of self-confidence and determination to
maintain Palestinian Arab culture and nationalistic aspirations.
PCI participant quotations recorded after narrative/theater model dialogue. All
PCI participant quotations in this section were attributed to Peace Child Israel dialogue
program participants (Ross, 2013). Similar to PCI quotations recorded after participation
in confrontational dialogue sessions, PCI Peace Child Israel participant quotations
recorded after dialogue point to an increase in self-confidence as a result of dialogue.
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[W]hen I started in Peace Child it simply, I met new people from a different
group, um, different customs, all sorts of different things that were very new to
me, that I didn’t, I simply didn’t grow up with them. And [...] the project was, it
included theater and that also gave me the confidence to speak, to state my
opinions. . . [I]t came from theater, which is...we would work on all sorts of, um,
improvisations and so on through acting. And that was...it made it easier for us to
express ourselves and state our opinions and so on [female, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p.
227-228)
PCI quotations from post-Peace Child Israel participation also include references to an
increased confidence in creating social change as a result of dialogue.
The fact that we, as individuals, can create social change. I don’t wait, if I want to
create some sort of change I don’t wait for anyone [female, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p.
207)
PCI Peace Child Israel participant quotations also include references to a deeper sense of
critical self-reflection as a dialogue outcome.
I didn’t just gain knowledge in Peace Child. I also learned how to think in a
different way and to understand my own opinion [female, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p.
227)
Though language asymmetry has been a concern raised by intergroup dialogue
researchers (Abu-Nimer, 1999), this quotation from a PCI participant suggests that
bilingualism offered the empowering opportunity to improve communication between the
Israeli Jew and Palestinian Arab participants.
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Every Jew who would speak, I would translate. And it was very important for
each one of them to understand what that one was saying, what that one says. I
felt that I had an advantage and I used it well and it helped the whole group
female, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 229)
In brief, whereas IJ participant quotations recorded after narrative/theater model dialogue
contained references to the power of theater to generate empathic responses, PCI
participant quotations tend to emphasize an increase in self-confidence.
PCI participant quotations recorded after activist model dialogue. All PCI
participant quotations presented in this section were attributed Sadaka Reut dialogue
program participants (Ross, 2013). Again, some of these PCI quotations refer to an
increased level of self-confidence as a program participation outcome.
In fact I came actually not so politically aware into the details of the conflict, and
I left with much more, I'd say, more confidently standing behind a defined
perspective that I had. And not being afraid of saying whatever I wanted in front
of Jewish people, who might not agree with what I say.[...] I guess that was
something that I didn't have before [male, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 225)
This self-confidence can be linked to an expressed perception of an increased conviction
in the possibility of social change, as these two PCI quotations suggest.
And the fact that Sadaka Reut succeeded in internalizing within me, it’s not just
Sadaka Reut, but it started with Sadaka Reut. Um...it gave me...it gave me this
thing, this feeling that...the belief that it’s possible to create change [male, adult].
(Ross, 2013, p. 208)
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And that’s really what Reut contributed to me, and I feel it and it’s very good – to
live, to live as though life is beautiful, as though life is really good. It’s possible to
change, it’s really possible for things to change [male, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 213)
Closely related to self-confidence is the concept of self-awareness, and at least one PCI
participant quotation referenced enhanced self-awareness as a dialogue program
outcome.
At the start I didn’t speak much. At the start I would listen, I also didn’t know
many facts. And then when I started, I tried to be objective. I started to say things
that I thought and [...] at the end of a seminar, we did [an activity where] everyone
had a piece of paper with his name on it and everyone, in a way that others
couldn’t see who wrote it, like in an anonymous way, everyone wrote a short
sentence about what they think about that person, and someone wrote about me
that I am an extremist, that I have extreme opinions. And...it was, I still remember
this, someone came to me directly and said to me yes, I wrote that because that’s
how I felt. [...] And...it raised some questions about, within me, and about me.
And that was a very important activity for me...because you, all the time, people
are good at judging other people. But to judge yourself, that’s something else
[female, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 222)
The following PCI participant quotation contains the suggestion that because the
social and political climate in Israel-Palestine make friendships between the groups of
people difficult, dialogue groups like Sadaka Reut are all the more important for
introducing Israelis and Palestinians to each other.
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This type of friendship is much more, much more stable. Because already, a
friendship that is built on commonalities, with a small argument over difference
or distinction, it can be lost. But if you build friendship on, on the very fact that
everybody, that nobody gives up his opinion and that everyone from the start says
what he thinks, that’s a friendship, that’s an ideal friendship in my opinion. And
it’s too bad, because it’s very difficult to build friendships like that today in...in
the existing conditions. But it’s also one of the things that contributed, that
Sadaka gave to me [female, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 186)
Another PCI Sadaka Reut participant quotation contains the suggestion that participation
in these types of dialogue programs serves to break down and eliminate prejudices and
stereotypes.
[Sadaka Reut] developed and provided a lot for its participants. Participants didn’t
know what Jews were. They feared Jews. Why? They thought that Jews
conquered the country, that’s what they thought. Jews, police, they give their
fathers tickets...and Jews would come, Jews didn’t know what Arabs were. Aside
from what fact that Arabs have hummus and their father has an Arab worker,
what did they know about what Arabs were? Or their fathers take them on
Shabbat to eat falafel in an [Arab] village and they see Arabs. That’s what they
know about Arabs. But if you see [friends] who are alumni of [Sadaka Reut], you
come and speak with them, and say an Arab is, just an example, shitty, no good,
they will tell you, no way Karen, Arabs are good people, I met them, I was in
[Sadaka Reut]. I met wonderful Arabs and we spoke and we laughed and we sat
together and ate together, they are so sweet. That’s what they will tell you . . . But
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a Jew who never met an Arab, just knows what his parents drove into his head,
he’ll tell you, yes, of course, Arabs are shitty. And the opposite is true as well. If
they meet and speak, all the...the ice between the two sides is broken. And that’s
how it needs to be. That’s how it needs to be [male, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 180)
Similar to the PCI participant quotation earlier that contained a lamentation
regarding the comparatively lesser developed social and cultural world for Palestinians,
this PCI participant quotation suggests investment in Palestinian Arab society is a critical
component for peace.
It’s necessary to invest more in my own side, which doesn’t have resources
invested in it, and which is very depressed. And after I see that my society, and
myself within my society, we are satisfied and things are good and we are living
with respect, then, then I’ll start to speak about coexistence [female, adult]. (Ross,
2013, p. 275)
Consistent with the goals of activist models of dialogue, PCI quotations suggest that
greater levels of political awareness and political action are outcomes of dialogue
participation.
[I] began to build my political identity as a Palestinian...to define myself as a
Palestinian who lives in Israel with Israeli citizenship [male, adult]. (Ross, 2013,
p. 274)
Before [joining the Sadaka Reut commune], I was not at all politically aware. I
barely took any interest in politics. I hated politics [male, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p.
158)
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Another PCI participant quotation suggests that through dialogue, politically active PCI’s
discover new IJ partners in political activism.
I was very much surprised to see how much [Jewish participants] were really
supporting the Palestinian cause and boldly pointing out inequalities, on the
responsibility of Israel in the situation. And generally speaking I mean in the
Palestinian Israeli conflict. That was something that I never saw before [male,
adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 221)
However, other PCI quotations contain pessimistic messages regarding the
potential for intergroup dialogue programs to bring about meaningful social change.
Let’s say that [Sadaka Reut] had an impact on 2000, 3000 people, at an individual
level. But change at a broader level, this society is moving only towards
extremism and only...listen, I don’t need to tell you [...] I don’t want to denigrate
[Sadaka Reut], the opposite. I grew up there, and I’m very proud of what I do. But
I don’t believe that they will bring about change [male, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p.
200)
[Sadaka] Reut was the shock for me that...that you try and try and talk and talk,
and try to get somewhere, and we never got anywhere, we only spoke...and I
understood the other side, but the other side, it’s easy to understand for anyone
who lives in this country - all the media is like [how the other side thinks], all the
newspapers are like that, everyone around you thinks like that, and [the other
side] is totally closed off in its thinking. They live in some sort of bubble...they
are simply people who live in a bubble. You try to talk to them but it’s difficult,
it’s almost impossible, because there is a strong side and a weak side, our
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[Palestinian] side that does want to try to get somewhere, because [the situation
here in Israel] is not good for us. And the other side, it’s good for them, so they
come, have this experience in Reut Sadaka, but many of them went afterwards to
the army, which doesn’t really make me happy [female, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p.
274)
Nevertheless, PCI participant quotations also contained references to identity assimilation
akin to quotations from former IJ SOP participants: “[Sadaka Reut] is me [male, adult]”
(Ross, 2013, p. 323).
Consistent with previous PCI quotations related to other dialogue model
experiences, PCI participant quotations recorded after activist model dialogue
(specifically Sadaka Reut) explicitly refer to an increased level of self-confidence as a
dialogue outcome. This self-confidence appears to be related to other PCI participant
quotations that refer to a heightened sense of self-awareness as a dialogue outcome.
Furthermore, both PCI and IJ Sadaka Reut participant quotations tend to contain
references to the importance of friendship and relationship building within dialogue
processes as a key process for ensuring continued social and political activism post
dialogue participation.
PCI participant quotations recorded after conflict management model dialogue.
This section contains only two quotations, both of which are attributed to female PCI
participants in the Building Bridges for Peace (BBFP) program (Collier, 2009).
Consistent with PCI quotations referenced earlier, PCI quotations recorded after BBFP
participation reference the challenge in living with two identities.
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Sometimes we have to be Israeli girls, and sometimes Palestinian girls, but all the
time we have to be Israeli/Arab girls . . . the ones who understand the problems
with Jerusalem and understand what’s happening in Tel Aviv and everything. To
be between two sides [female, adult]. (Collier, 2009, p. 361)
However, at least one PCI participant quotation refers to a strengthening of Palestinian
identity as an outcome of intergroup dialogue.
And I found myself, that’s when I recognized (small laugh) that I had, I found
myself defending my . . . (long breath) . . . I mean I am Palestinian before ’48. My
grandparents were here and my grandparents are still here. And, wow! I’m turning
Palestinian [female, adult]. (Collier, 2009, p. 361)
Consistent with PCI quotations cited previously in relation to other dialogue models, the
subject of dual identity processing among PCI’s remains a salient theme.
PCI participant quotations recorded after SOP/HOP dialogue. The PCI
participant quotations contained within this section all come from the three Ph.D.
dissertations about the Seeds of Peace/Hands of Peace intergroup dialogue programs. As
a result, this category of quotations has the largest number of potentially relevant
quotations for identifying themes of experience for PCI intergroup dialogue participants.
The topics presented here are consistent with earlier sections, and other unique topics are
presented as well.
Like IJ participant quotations cited earlier, PCI participant quotations contain
acknowledgement of a lack of contact with members of the other group prior to the
dialogue program.
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Actually, to tell you the truth, even if I lived here all of my life I never had the
opportunity to talk with Jewish youth, or Jewish kids about politics. I kind of
lived in my town and I didn’t have political awareness. . . .1 live in this country
and I didn’t know about their culture, their religion, only prejudiced thoughts.
Stereotypes - Jews had peyote [side curls], and they’re funny, look how they are
dressed in black, like they’re going to funerals, they’re so funny the way they
pray. Look how they took our land. That’s basically what I heard [female, high
school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 91)
Consistent with quotations cited earlier, the above quotation also contains the suggestion
that lack of friendship between and among Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs leads to
negative characterizations and stereotypes of the other.
PCI participant quotations recorded after SOP program involvement also refer to
the dual identities PCI’s maintain and express how those identities fluctuate depending on
the context of social interaction.
When I am with an Israeli group, I feel more Palestinian, and when I am with a
Palestinian group, I feel more Israeli [gender unclear, adult]. (Lazarus, 2011, p.
347)
Before going to camp . . . let's say small things such as identity, my personal
identity, or how would I relate to Palestinians or Israelis, were things I didn't
really care about - they were secondary. I didn't have obvious answers for them
and you didn't need to think about it a lot. But once you're at camp everything
shifts and you start to know that every word you say and your identity means a lot
[male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 97)
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I think I probably called myself Arab-Israeli, then [at camp]. But we all did... In
the early 1990s, a lot of the Arabs in Israel called themselves Arab-Israelis, and
it’s changed a lot recently... now they call themselves more Palestinian or
Palestinian-Israelis [female, adult]. (Lazarus, 2011, p. 349)
PCI quotations from SOP participants refer to particular moments when program
activities seemed to require PCI’s to choose a national identity.
We had the flag-raising and then you had to decide to stand with which delegation
and sing the national anthem. And you know it's the most tough point at camp
when you have to go and stand with which country that represents you and which
flag that show who you are. And at that point we had a lot of difficulties to choose
which country - Palestine or Israel. Cause I'm a Palestinian living in Israel so it's
pretty hard for me to decide. The thing is that in the Israeli national anthem there's
nothing there that shows who am I as an Arab living in Israel. All of the Israeli
anthem says Land of Zion, so I'm an Arab, hello. And in the flag itself, there's
nothing that represents Arabs, it has a magen David (Jewish star), and there's no
reason for me as an Arab in this flag. And so I couldn't sing the national anthem,
but for respect to my country, because I live in this country, and they give my dad
money to feed me so I stand at the flag, but I didn't sing, I just stand for respect.
And with the Palestinian national anthem, when the delegation came up, I went
and did the same thing with them. I went and stand with them also without
singing [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 109)
PCI quotations also refer to the varying degrees of ‘Palestinian-ness’ within themselves
and as perceived among other PCI’s.
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I still feel confused sometimes, but now I understand that I’m Palestinian, and
how important that is. After I came together with everyone involved, Palestinians,
Israelis, and other Arab Israelis like me, I realize I’m more Palestinian than
Israeli. The Palestinians understand me, and I understand them. I side with them
cause I’m Palestinian, and now I have a better sense of that [male, high school
teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 382)
[We] were not a group that [was] very unified... everyone was Palestinian in
opinion, [but] some were very pro-Palestinian, some were less, some were in the
middle... everyone said that they understood the Israeli side, [but] very few of us
actually agreed with the Israeli side [male, adult]. (Lazarus, 2011, p. 350)
Some PCI quotations suggest that the variability of PCI identity leads to feelings of
estrangement while participating with SOP activities.
I had nowhere to go and no one to talk to... we were like kids there, looking for
their parents, and everyone found their parents and I couldn’t find mine [gender
unclear, adult]. (Lazarus, 2011, p. 354)
It just seemed to be the normal explanation for any teenager who wants to see it as
there’s a Jewish side, there’s a Palestinian side and there are us that are not fully
Palestinians, we’re not fully Israelis, we understand both sides so the conclusion
is we are the middle solution, I mean it’s the simplest explanation for a teenager
but it’s not, we’re not the middle part, we’re not the solution, we’re just a third
side. And regardless what the solution is going to be, it’s probably not gonna
involve what we think. It’s going to be a middle ground between the Palestinians
and the Jewish Israelis and nobody cares what we think . . .When we’re sitting in
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a session and there’s the Palestinians and the Israelis, we’re not actually bridging
between them, we’re another side, another point of view and it does not agree
with either one of them and it’s not, and it does not mean this is the middle
ground, this is where they should come [male, adult]. (Lazarus, 2011, p. 361)
PCI participant quotations also contain references to the manner in which the presence of
OPT participant in the dialogue program further complicates PCI identity.
When I was at camp in 2002, and there were Palestinians (from the OPT) in the
group, I felt less Palestinian. We laughed about – I’m Palestinian, but not kosher
Palestinian [kasher, ya‘ni], that is not 100% Palestinian. Especially in Seeds, I
saw that, the Palestinian identity, the more you suffer, and the more you have
horror stories about the occupation and everything, then you are more Palestinian.
The Palestinians who come from Jenin [refugee] camp, they are more Palestinian.
[To] the Palestinians that come from Haifa, they say “what do you know?” Even
the Palestinians say “you have a very good life, and what are you complaining
about?” Even when we are in the dialogue, when they are talking about
checkpoints, and the Palestinians from Israel say that there is racism against
Palestinians in Israel, you feel that there is no place for your “suffering” [gender
unclear, adult]. (Lazarus, 2011, p. 347)
PCI participant quotations refer to a realization of the realities of Israeli-Jewish
life and their history as an outcome of dialogue participation.
I thought that the Israeli-Jews didn’t have worries, this is their state, they can do
whatever they want. But I learned that they also have so many worries in life, they
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have to go to the army. Before Seeds of Peace I didn’t know that . . . For them it’s
also a struggle [female, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 432)
So I didn’t know I have this gift of listening to people and of really understanding.
Especially when I went to the Holocaust Museum and I felt like wow. I felt so
connected to humanity. Not to nationality, not to ethnic, not to gender, no, I’m
related to humanity. That’s something I never knew. When you’re 15 you don’t
know these things. When you work on these things, and you develop them, you
learn to empathize with the other side. That’s something I never knew I had
[female, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 451)
One PCI participant quotation outlines a process of opinion modification regarding the
purpose and morality of suicide bombings as an outcome of dialogue processes.
After Seeds of Peace, I have been changed a lot. I really agreed with the suicide
bombings, like my family and like most of the Arabs in Israel. But after Seeds of
Peace, I totally disagreed. Because, you know, I don’t see any human thing in the
suicide bombing. And I don’t think this is the kind of jihad that Islam talks about.
And suicide bombing gives the world the reason to take Islam in the wrong way,
to misunderstand Islam. So I totally disagree with it now. And after I had a lot of
friends, Jewish friends, after Seeds of Peace, I would see the news and I kept
thinking, how would that be if a Jewish friend of mine would die in a suicide
bombing? How would I respond? Everyone can be hurt. Even me, I’m an Arab
Israeli, but I can be hurt by a suicide bomber. So I’ve been changed a lot, and I
have to say that after Seeds of Peace [female, high school teenager]. (Hammack,
2006, p. 346)
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However, the same PCI participant who articulated the quotation above voiced another
quotation two years later which contains a complete reversal of opinion regarding suicide
bombings and Islamic jihad.
I feel hatred. Not to my friends, which is weird, not to my Jewish friends, because
I know this is not their fault, but to the Jews. . .When I watch TV and I see how
they treat people so unhuman, I just feel this kind of “Oh my God, I just want to
kill this soldier.” Just like this. I feel this hatred inside. But not all the Jews. You
know what I mean? Those Jews.
Jihad is good. I mean, it’s better if it won’t be, but jihad is not bad for our
religion. Jihad is to kill the one who came to take your land, the one who came to
take your money, if you have money, to take your honor. By defending those
things, you have to defend yourself by killing him. . . They’re not my society, the
Jews. We are different societies right here, the Arabs and the Jews. And I cannot
think of myself as one of their society because they won’t take me, they won’t
accept me [female, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 399, 400)
PCI participant quotations also contain references to a deeper understanding of
the roots of the conflict and a newfound motivation to engage others in dialogue
developing as a dialogue outcome.
I just now understand a lot of this – I can understand when I hear Jews say this is
my land - Jews – I can understand why they curse the Arabs, the hate, I can
understand a lot of things - it took me a long time to understand these things. Now
when my classmates talk about the Jews they think twice because they know I can
convince them and they want to believe what they’ve been told and they know
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that I know now stories and facts that I could convince them easily [male, high
school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 313)
It really helped me a lot, to listen more and more and more because you never get
enough. Right now I want to go and I want to listen to settlers, I want to listen to
right wing people. ... I want to hear what the settlers have to say, maybe I can, I
know it will sound, but maybe I can understand them even. I want challenge
[female, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 440)
Though the Seeds of Peace program is primarily promoted as a coexistence program
rather than an activist development program, some PCI participant quotations suggest
that SOP was the source of a motivation to become engaged in political action.
It was the first time I was put in a situation where I had a right to frame my
opinions, and to reflect on where I’m coming from, and what is... When I first
went to Seeds of Peace, it was the beginning of my political formation [gender
unclear, adult]. (Lazarus, 2011, p. 351)
All the demonstrations, and the rallies, and the protests, and all the different forms
of resistance that I’ve been doing... and many of these decisions that I’ve made in
my life, I had the strength to do it because of my experiences in Seeds of Peace
[male, adult]. (Lazarus, 2011, p. 379)
Another PCI participant quotation suggests that participation in dialogue led to a
realization that the solution to conflict cannot come through uninational dialogue alone.
When I sat only with the Arabs, I also felt there was something missing. I also
couldn’t find answers to the questions that I was asking. And when I went to the
uni-national seminar, we also didn’t find answers. And I realized that the
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frustrations that I had two years ago, I’m not going to find the answers by myself
[gender unclear, adult]. (Lazarus, 2011, p. 127)
Despite the PCI quotations indicating positive change as a result of dialogue
participation, other quotations point to disappointment experienced after returning to
Israel-Palestine, especially in relation to the perceived odds against lasting social or
political change.
I understand what they were trying to do, but the world is not the way they
present it to you in Seeds of Peace. As a teenager, you don’t understand; in the
real world, you get really surprised, you get really shocked [gender unclear,
adult]. (Lazarus, 2011, p. 374)
The world is way more complicated than you thought it was going to be,
especially more than what you thought at Seeds of Peace. You have to fail, you
have to struggle, there is no equality, especially living here in Israel, trying to find
a job, trying to find education in Israel, going to work with Jewish people that you
never talked to before, the vibe that goes around them, it’s so weird, you’ve never
felt it before. When you’re with Seeds of Peace, you’re under this protective hat,
but when you go out, especially in Israel as an Arab, it’s not like that, it’s so
depressing, it’s literally depressing... And that’s why Seeds of Peace disappointed
me, because they took us to a certain point but then they just abandoned me. You
took me to prepare me but you didn’t do a good job. I wish I didn’t know so much
that I know right now [male, adult]. (Lazarus, 2011, p. 375)
I thought about Seeds of Peace and my experience, and I thought about the
situation, and I had this point where I realized the situation and the reality is much
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harder and much stronger than Seeds of Peace . . .The influence of the reality is
much stronger than the influence of Seeds of Peace.... We are seeing things,
seeing facts on TV, in radio, in internet, but Seeds of Peace, it’s just words you
learned at camp.... I really regret the idea that I was in Seeds of Peace, but the
thing is I just felt that it’s going nowhere. I was really depressed and hopeless . . .
I know it affected me personally. I met so many intelligent people, and it affected
my language, lots of things. And my social things, but it’s still, the political thing
is not going anywhere [female, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 398)
Still other PCI quotations indicate participant realization of the Seeds of Peace ‘ideology’
and an experience of assimilation of the SOP identity.
It’s an ideology, what’s unique about it is that all of us have our own opinions and
views, but we have this common thing called Seeds of Peace [female, high school
teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 154)
It's not just seeing them as human and that's it. It's to get the spirit of Seeds of
Peace - to really feel so equal to each one who are nearby you and to treat them as
well as you want people to treat you [male, high school teenager]. (MaddyWeitzman, 2005, p. 433)
Humanity is the most important thing in Seeds . . . The most important part of my
identity is being a Seed, but at the same time being Muslim, because they’re
connected somehow. ...The first thing really is being a Seed. I so feel Seed in
being everything I am. Being a Muslim, I still feel Seed [female, high school
teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 347, 348)
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At least one PCI participant quotation frames the SOP identity in a manner akin to being
a mediator.
Being a Seed after you've practiced a while is having the ability first of all to say
that you were wrong and that you can say in order to have a conflict you need to
have two sides, you must have mistakes that both sides have done, if only one
side is wrong then the conflict should be solved really easily by a neutral country
or the UN if only one side is wrong [male, high school teenager]. (MaddyWeitzman, 2005, p. 440)
Consistent with quotations cited earlier, PCI participant quotations contain references to
increased self-confidence to effect social change as a dialogue outcome.
Being a Seed of Peace is also having the will and the power to resist and stand
against or stand for every person you have ever known in the whole of your life.
Like be ready to show people how you've changed, sometimes it's a drastic
change, and also to be brave, to stand against a big number of people not in Seeds
of Peace [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 450)
Consistent with the contents of PCI participant quotations cited in previous
sections, PCI participant quotations recorded after SOP/HOP dialogue refer to the
importance of relationship building as the key to moving past stereotyping and prejudicial
behavior. PCI participant quotations recorded after SOP/HOP participation indicate that
the program’s rituals and routines generate experiences of stress, alienation, and
uncertainty in regards to the program’s emphasis on ‘choosing’ to represent Israel or
Palestine. Furthermore, these PCI quotations contain a range of perceived solidarity with
the Palestinian cause from advocating Islamic jihad to disavowing suicide bombings. It
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appears the general lack of a unified identity among PCI’s entering dialogue remains
generally disparate post dialogue.
Summary of the PCI intergroup dialogue quotations. This section presented
PCI intergroup dialogue participant quotations that were deemed the most representative
and meaningful PCI quotations that address the research questions of this meta-dataanalysis. As was done at the conclusion of part 1 of the data analysis section of this
chapter, what follows here is a general overview of the topical contents that point to
potential themes for describing the PCI intergroup dialogue participant experience. These
PCI quotations can be placed within the following five categories within which topics
developed or progressed through the narrative:
the process of clarifying and defining PCI identity;
shifting perspectives on the history of the roots of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict and Israeli Jews in general;
demonstrations and acknowledgements of a growing self confidence to
challenge IJ dialogue participants;
evidence of malleability in the moral acceptability of suicide bombings and
terrorism; and
a linking of dialogue program participation to an increase in or an avoidance
of political activism and social change.
The process of clarifying and defining PCI identity. PCI participant quotations
containing references to the difficulties in maintaining a PCI identity were found within
all stages of dialogue. PCI quotations outline a variety of circumstances that cause this
identity to fluctuate in terms of felt ‘aligned-ness’ to either an Israeli identity or a

203

Palestinian identity. PCI quotations indicate that dialogue program participation serves to
clarify and define individual PCI identities—frequently these quotations point to an
increased sense of ‘Palestinian-ness.’ However, PCI quotations suggest the presence of a
sort of ‘Palestinian identity measurement scale’ which places Occupied Territory
Palestinians higher in terms of ‘Palestinian-ness’ than Palestinian citizens of Israel. Other
PCI quotations contain references to an assimilation of dialogue program identity into the
PCI identity.
Shifting perspectives on the history of the roots of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict and Israeli Jews in general. Similar to IJ participant quotations cited in part 1,
PCI participant quotations contain acknowledgements of a social separation between IJ’s
and PCI’s prior to dialogue. As such, these quotations indicate that dialogue participation
served to provide an environment where friendships could be built. These PCI quotations
suggest that through these personal friendships, PCI participants experienced a new
motivation to dialogue with others about the history of the conflict and the reality of
Israeli-Jewish life.
Demonstrations and acknowledgements of a growing self-confidence to
challenge IJ dialogue participants. Numerous PCI quotations contain a linking of
dialogue participation to an increased sense of self confidence to engage in challenging
and difficult conversation with Israeli Jews. The most significant example of this can be
found in PCI quotations that contain comparisons between the Holocaust and the Al
Nakhba. Other topics that appeared in PCI quotations that contain challenges to IJ’s are
Israeli-Jewish privilege, the lack of Palestinian social and cultural development, and the
prevalence of negative Palestinian Arab media portrayals.
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Evidence of malleability in the moral acceptability of suicide bombings and
terrorism. PCI participant quotations contain reflexive responses to the subject of suicide
bombings and terrorism. While some PCI quotations contain counter narratives to the IJ
condemnation of terrorism, other PCI quotations indicate strong support for these actions.
Explaining why these quotations indicate such a range of responses is beyond the scope
of this study, yet the presence of such a range indicates a potential theme of experience
that PCI participants struggle to reconcile—how to maintain both solidarity to a
Palestinian national cause and maintain a positive relationship with Israeli Jews.
A linking of dialogue program participation to an increase in or an avoidance
of political activism and social change. PCI participant quotations recorded after
involvement with activist and mixed method models of dialogue contain a linking
between program involvement and political activism. However, the quotations vary in the
description of the degrees of political and social activity post dialogue. This range of
responses suggests that the experience of accepting or rejecting political and social
involvement is a potential theme to explore to describe the PCI participant experience.
Part 3: The Selected Quotations of OPT Intergroup Dialogue Participants
Following the pattern established in Parts 1 and 2 of the data analysis section of
this chapter, the quotations of OPT participants and organized according to the time they
were recorded relative to participation in intergroup dialogue. Of the approximately 120
quotations coded within the primary reports spoken by OPT intergroup dialogue
participants, the most ‘representative’ and ‘meaningful’ quotations are included in this
section of the data analysis. The quotations are organized according to ‘when’ the
quotations were recorded in relation to the execution of intergroup dialogue: either
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‘before,’ ‘during,’ or ‘after’ dialogue. Further categorizations (i.e. model of dialogue) are
presented whenever appropriate or feasible.
OPT participant quotations recorded ‘before’ entering dialogue. All OPT
participant quotations recorded ‘before’ entering dialogue cited in this section come from
Hammack (2006). These OPT participant quotations contain references to the opportunity
to present the plight of OPT’s as motivation for joining the dialogue program.
I came here to show, first of all, I want to show all the people that Palestinians are
suffering. The Israelis occupied our land. They don’t have any rights, no human
rights. They use all the ways to torture us. Plus, freedom fighters are not terrorists
because they are fighting for the country, and we don’t have an army. I came to
show all the people, Israelis, Americans, Jews, and nationality, I want to show
them all what Palestinians are actually going through, how much we suffer [male,
high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 261)
In spite of the hardships OPT’s face, OPT participant quotations also contain expressions
of pride in Palestinian identity:
The most disturbing thing is, like, little kids, throwing stones. It’s like, you see the
courage in your people. And I’m really proud of being a Palestinian. I’m really
proud. It’s like, you see men in 8-year-old children. Men. Real men [male, high
school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 246)
Other OPT participant quotations contain details about the plight and hardships OPT’s
experience and witness on a regular basis.
[As a Palestinian in East Jerusalem,] you’re so humiliated, discriminated against,
everywhere. ...Checkpoints everywhere you go, soldiers looking at you. You are
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not allowed to look at soldiers. You get beat up if you do anything. If you
do...you’re fucked up. You can’t be yourself. And if you do, you’re in danger.
Like a guy was shot next to my house, just because a soldier felt like killing
somebody [male, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 243)
Being Palestinian, and living the Palestinian life, going through hundreds of
checkpoints, getting beaten by soldiers [male, high school teenager]. (Hammack,
2006, p. 264)
OPT participant quotations also contain references to traumatic events.
When I was a child, always soldiers were there. They came to our house to take
my brother. I remember I was four years old. The soldiers came to our house. I
was in another room, and they stayed the whole night waiting for my brother to
come home. And my mother, she was crying. It was a terrible experience [female,
high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 249)
OPT participant quotations contain both statements expressing willingness to
perpetrate violence and justifications for suicide bombings and Islamic jihad—if dialogue
programs were not active.
[The suicide bombers,] they’re depressed. I’m depressed. I’m here, I don’t know.
I feel that I’m going to explode.... I don’t know, it makes me angry. If I wasn’t in
this Seeds of Peace camp, I would kill any Israeli, I don’t care [male, high school
teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 264)
And how come do they call the suicide bombers “terrorists” and not the Israeli
government? They started all the violence! They invaded Palestine! It’s like,
we’re just defending ourselves. What else can you do?! If your wife was raped
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and killed, your mother and father, your whole family was killed in front of you,
and you were humiliated, your wife being raped in front of you, and your home
destroyed, and you have no reason to live, and all the hate, and you have all the
hate inside you, and all you could think of is revenge, right?! . . . It’s wrong, but
it’s the only way. And it’s like every Israeli has to join the army. It’s like, so no
one’s innocent [male, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 242)
[The intifada,] it’s a bad thing, but it’s a good thing because it made, the second
intifada made me stand for Palestine. The first intifada I was small, I didn’t
understand much. But now, I like understand more about it. People are dying for
their country, for Palestine, and I think the second intifada was good too because
people are fighting, not like the first intifada because now we have suicide
bombers and the first intifada was just throwing rocks and small things. And now,
we have small weapons . . . Plus the whole world gets to know what’s happening
now in Palestine [male, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 261-262)
Other OPT quotations express support for martyrdom for the sake of Palestine, and at
least one quotation contains geotheological justifications for martyrdom.
I believe, if we’re not gonna get our land back, we don’t have to make peace.
Everyone should fight until they die [male, high school teenager]. (Hammack,
2006, p. 242)
And there’s this thing in Islam, if someone dies for his own country, he’s like,
these are the best people. If you die for your country, you go straight to heaven.
That’s what we believe. It’s in the Koran also . . .The whole Islamic population is
supposed to fight for Palestine because, you know, there is the prophet
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Mohammed was there. It’s a holy land [male, high school teenager]. (Hammack,
2006, p. 246)
However, other OPT participant quotations express support for finding a
compromised solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
So maybe I’m not against the negotiations, and I’m also not against the selfdefense . . . It’s our destiny, to live side by side with Israel. If you want to live
peacefully, you have to give up some things . . . You know my mother once told
me, it’s like Japan, when they were beaten in the second World War, after the two
bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, they gave up. It’s not that they are weak, but
they were fighting against the strongest power in the world. So they gave up.
Until now they’re beating many countries in economics, cars . . . I’m not against
to go and fight, but not like people do it sometimes. If they have to do this thing,
they can go to the settlements [female, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p.
271)
Other OPT quotations reference support for a two-state solution.
But we are two nations, we must decide to stop killing and live peacefully in the
two separated countries in 1967 borders [female, high school teenager].
(Hammack, 2006, p. 252)
Though all the OPT participant quotations recorded before dialogue came from
one primary report (Hammack, 2006), the contents of these quotations foreshadow
subsequent sections. OPT participant quotations recorded before dialogue contain
emphases on Palestinian Arab nationalistic aspirations and the high degree of suffering
experienced on a daily basis. Whereas PCI participant quotations tend to contain

209

references to the difficulties of living as a second class citizen and the inability to fully
reconcile dual identities, OPT participant quotations often refer to the effects of trauma
and the pursuit of justice.
OPT participant quotations recorded ‘during’ dialogue. Because of the overall
lack of OPT intergroup dialogue participant quotations recorded ‘during’ dialogue within
the primary reports, it was not feasible to divide these quotations into ‘early,’ ‘mid,’ and
‘late’ stages of dialogue. As such, the quotations cited below are organized into a
narrative that presents the most representative and meaningful quotations and their
respective topical content. In general, these quotations contain primarily references to the
importance of political and social activism as means for improving the Palestinian Arab
condition.
The following OPT quotation, recorded in the early stages of a track two
diplomacy dialogue, contains references to OPT’s who identity as peace activists—a
sharp contrast to OPT quotations attributed to much younger participant quotations that
advocate violence quoted in the previous section.
I am speaking about ourselves, the people who are peace-loving people, who want
to work for (short pause) peace built on reconciliation [male, adult]. (Kellen et al.,
2012, p. 553)
The following OPT participant quotation contains an example of a dialogical turn that
was presented in response to an IJ participant that inquired about where Palestinian
Arabs would choose to live in a future hypothetical Palestinian state.
I want to ask you the same question . . . In Palestine . . . there are many Christians.
They are living with us, we’re living as Palestinians with each other, peacefully . .
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. Why don’t you become Palestinians? [male, high school teenager]. (Pilecki &
Hammack, 2014, p. 108)
OPT participant quotations contain counter challenges to IJ participants. The following
quotation occurred in response to an IJ who stated that Israeli prisoners must first be
released before any Israeli military can be withdrawn from the Occupied Territories:
“You have occupied lands, free it also” [male, adult] (Kellen et al., 2012, p. 555).
Another example of OPT participant quotations that contain challenges to IJ
participant quotations are these which posit clarifications on the historical record of the
events of 1948.
And, I want to say, all the people who fled to other countries [in 1948] were not,
most of them and ninety-nine percent were not, like, they wanted to. They were
forced by force, by terror [female, high school teenager]. (Pilecki & Hammack,
2014, p. 106)
Do you remember—you may ask your father or your mother or your grandfather,
whatever. At the beginning of the [19]70s, in the beginning of the [19]80s, there
[was] peace...between Palestine and Israel, and Fatah and Hamas [existed] in
these times. And from [19]93 to 2000, there [was] peace. . .and there were. . .no
rockets. . .because there were less checkpoints and there were no military
operations each night.... So when you decrease the number of checkpoints so and
release some of the prisoners, the refugees, when you solve these things—I’m
talking about the Israeli government—when you solve these things, peace will be
inevitable [male, high school teenager]. (Pilecki & Hammack, 2014, p. 108)
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At least one OPT quotation contains an inquiry that seeks moral justification for the
events of 1948.
I’m not going to question that the partition plan stated that 55% of the land [was]
for Israelis. Why did they take 78% of the land? [male, high school teenager].
(Pilecki & Hammack, 2014, p. 105)
OPT participant quotations also include references to the media as a source of distorted
and inaccurate portrayals of Palestinians.
I understand that [the fear of the Jews from the Palestinians], and the source is
from television, and the media and the continuing policy of the Israeli
government. And it disappears from the eyes that we differ personally from each
other. You did not see the part that wants peace, only the part that wants to bomb
[male, high school teenager]. (Maoz, 2000, p. 728)
OPT participant quotations, consistent with the previous section, contain
references to the violence OPT’s experience and witness in relation to Israeli police and
military.
Two months ago, a child in the village of Lid, a soldier came and killed him with
blows of the M16 gun, in front of people, in a very violent way. And a child like
me is afraid to go out [male, high school teenager]. (Maoz, 2000, p. 729)
Many of your soldiers stop our innocent people when they want to go to work and
shoot them. Shout stop, stop, and when they don’t – they shoot them [female, high
school teenager]. (Maoz, 2000, p. 729)
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In spite of the violence and difficulties, and consistent with a quotation from the previous
section, OPT participant quotations contain expressions of hope for reconciliation
through unapologetic activism.
So I think. . . in order to be responsible (short pause) we should SHOUT
LOUDLY, enough is enough and peace and control, (short pause) and let us try to
be courageous to get to the peace of reconciliation, which, the, which INCLUDES
(short pause) accepted the other, eh, clearly, accepting the other (short pause)
dealing with the other according their needs, not according to (short pause)
arrogant positions (short pause) and ideas of dominance and control [male, adult].
(Kellen et al., 2012, p. 558)
Like PCI participant quotations recorded during binational dialogue, OPT
participant quotations recorded during dialogue contain defensive commentary in
response to IJ participant critiques and challenges. The role of the media in perpetuating
inaccurate portrayals of Palestinian Arabs in the Occupied Territories is a theme that
again appears in OPT participant quotations. Furthermore, OPT participant quotations
reference personal experience with violence and trauma for the assumed purpose of
proving to IJ participants the role the Israeli military plays in their daily lives.
OPT participant quotations recorded ‘after’ dialogue. Consistent with the
‘post’ dialogue quotations sections in Parts 1 and 2, the OPT participant quotations
recorded after dialogue make up the largest portion of OPT participant quotations.
However, these quotations represent only 3 of the 7 dialogue models found within the
primary reports. This comparative lack of OPT participant quotations is due chiefly to the
difficulty intergroup dialogue programs and researchers have had in physically reaching
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dialogue participants living in the Occupied Territories (see Hammack, 2008, for
narrative on his experiences in gathering data among OPT participants).
OPT participant quotations recorded after coexistence model dialogue. Only
one OPT quotation is included in this portions, and it makes reference to a potentially
new realization that violence is not the best answer to resolving the OPT situation.
If we want to fight and resist this occupation, we should. . .get better education,
and have more knowledge, because I think that it would be more effective than
violence [male, high school teenager]. (Pilecki & Hammack, 2014, p. 107)
Such a quotation from an OPT participant points to the power of dialogue to break
persistent nationalistic narratives.
OPT participant quotations recorded after conflict management dialogue. All of
these quotations come from OPT participants of the Building Bridges for Peace (BBFP)
dialogue program as researched by Collier (2009). OPT quotations recorded after
dialogue, like those from previous stages of dialogue, reference the plight of OPT’s.
There is nothing happening in peace, there is no improvement. It is not advancing.
There is closures, there is no work. There is travel restrictions [female, adult].
(Collier, 2009, p. 355)
OPT quotations suggest that these continuing difficulties necessitate less dialogue and
more social and political action.
I think we will not do dialogues; we will stop that because we had enough, we had
enough in America. . . So I think we have now to work. To do things. To, for
example, to meet together. For example Netanyahu is going to make a settlement
and both, we both don’t want this kind of action. So we both have to go and make

214

a little demonstration to express ourselves [female, adult]. (Collier, 2009, p. 344345)
OPT quotations make reference to a frustration with Israeli leadership.
[Netanyahu’s] doing nothing for the peace. He is doing everything against peace.
He is taking lands and he is taking . . . yeah and they are taking lands and building
more settlements, and they’re just, he just, he keeps talking [female, adult].
(Collier, 2009, p. 355)
OPT participant quotations contain references to a realization that Israeli Jews
and Palestinian Arabs learn different histories.
As a Palestinian, I was taught the history that the Palestinians think, which is
different than . . . actually nobody knows what is true . . . And I used to think that
these people, Israeli people, should know that they are doing. . . But then I learned
that they think it is a completely different history [female, adult]. (Collier, 2009,
p. 354)
Consistent with the IJ participant quotations from previous sections, OPT quotations
contain descriptions of a perceived disunity among IJ participants in dialogue.
(A) In the dialogue sometimes two Israelis, they get into a disagreement together.
(B) Yes! A disagreement together! We never did this!
(C) We were prepared here, we knew everything about the Israelis, their
culture, their—everything about them. We didn’t find it difficult to communicate
with them, to talk with them, to understand them.
(D) But the Israelis . . . I felt like they didn’t know us very good, as well as
we know them.
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(C) They [Israelis] only met one or two times before going to Colorado
but we met more than twenty times! [females, adults]. (Collier, 2009, p. 356)
OPT participant quotations also refer to surprise that IJ perspectives on Palestinians and
the conflict are diverse.
I had a general idea of what the other side thinks of us as me as Palestinian, but
then I just got to talk to her about these deep issues and these very sensitive ones.
I realized that their people think differently. They don’t all think the same. I had
the idea that all the Israelis thought of us as terrorists, but she didn’t show me that
she looked at me as a terrorist or being a part of terrorism and so I respected that
and I appreciated that [female, adult]. (Collier, 2009, p. 360)
OPT participant quotations also contained references to anger and frustration
about the dialogue process and the utilization of language.
We feel uncomfortable discussing [the occupation] . . . outside [the workshops]
because we are sometimes too angry and if she just talks about that subject I’ll
become . . . (she makes a fist and grabs the air with one hand) [female, adult].
(Collier, 2009, p. 358)
When she was talking in Hebrew I feel that she wants to be with the Israeli people
not with the Palestinian. That’s in the beginning. But when she started talking
with me in English or in Arabic, I feel that she is Palestinian, like she is my sister
or something like that [female, adult]. (Collier, 2009, p. 360)
At least one OPT quotation expressed the process an OPT participant executed in order to
represent both herself as an individual and as a Palestinian via the subject of suicide
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bombings. In other words, the quotation outlines a process of ‘suicide bombing
apologetics.’
I personally talked as an individual but I actually tried to convey the ideas of my
delegation or my community as a whole. I mean I told her that, for example, I
didn’t like these terrorist attacks, or I didn’t like this shooting of people, but I also
tried to explain for her why these people do this, I mean the terrorist attacks.
These people don’t come from out of the middle of nowhere and just bomb these
people . . . they have their own reasons. I tried to explain, for in a way I was
saying ‘‘they think’’ (putting her fingers up to signify quotation marks) not ‘‘I
think.’’ Whenever I was saying ‘‘I think’’ then I would put in only my opinion
[female, adult]. (Collier, 2009, p. 362)
OPT participant quotations in this section corroborate IJ participant quotations
that demonstrate intergroup disunity among IJ participants. Also, the consistency of OPT
participant expectations and goals for dialogue participation point to OPT participant
unity that is greater than expressed PCI participant unity. Furthermore, OPT quotations
recorded post conflict management dialogue indicate that dialogue processes served as
opportunities to learn about the reality of Israeli Jewish life and gain motivation for
pursuing further political and social action.
OPT participant quotations recorded after SOP/HOP dialogue. OPT participant
quotations recorded after participating with SOP/HOP refer to the motivations for joining
SOP, which tended to focus on a desire to inform IJ’s about the realities of OPT life and
history.
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To show the Arab countries, the Israelis, the Americans, what we have gone
through as Palestinians and how much we’ve suffered and not just suffered on our
personal level of we’re 14 and 15 year old students and kids but to go back
historically and prove that we had the right and we were the victims at every stage
whether we were talking about 73 or 67 or 48 or 1936, 21, 18 and all the way to
Balfour declaration and the Ottoman Empire. We were going to show them that
Palestinians were always the victims of somebody else’s agenda and at the same
time we still have the right to, we are the ones that have the right to live in this
land, period, and everybody else can take their bags up. And of course you get to
the camp and you’re eager to see the Israelis and you’re eager to tell them [gender
unclear, adult]. (Lazarus, 2011, p. 206)
As numerous OPT quotations indicate, OPT’s enter dialogue with a variety of
essentialized perceptions of IJ’s.
The only thing I knew about Israelis is soldiers and settlers . . . because this is
what I saw in Hebron . . . the settlers . . . sometimes they would come and mess
up the market. I remember two times they would try to break into the mosque and
the soldiers would take them away. The soldiers would come and bang on our
door at four in the morning and would talk to my grandfather and ask him about
questions about who lives here and who lives here. If he didn't know they would
keep him out all night and bring other people to question. Other things I
remember, soldiers coming in and searching the house. These are all this really,
very, very negative and bad images of the Israelis, nothing positive [male, high
school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 89)
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The fact that the camp would be for Arabs and Israelis worried me . . . Before I
went to the camp I was afraid to talk to Israelis. To me they were all the same,
Army, soldiers ... I felt the Israelis were here only to kill us. I saw the army killing
people in front of my own eyes [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman,
2005, p. 90)
I thought of Israelis as being a different nation, aliens coming from somewhere
else and they only have guns in their hands. They don't have people of ten years
old or thirteen years old. They're only 20 and adults. They ride in jeeps and settler
cars. They live far away, next to us but far away. . .. They have lights, they live in
the light and we live in the darkness. These are the things that we knew about
Israelis [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 90)
We're in the same bunk, you're sleeping sometimes next to an Israeli. You look
sometimes when they're sleeping. You're worried, it's something totally new. It’s
not normal, really. You know, if they're actually going to sleep, if they're planning
something . . . . If they wake up like you, what they do when they wake up? If
they shower or not? All these things. . . . and then you think okay, they do the
same things, you have it in the back of your mind, but you still think no, it still
can't be. And then all the things you do are the same. And then you think we're
really the same, we're not different at all. It's just where they live and the barriers
that are between you, and all the things that exist on the ground, really this is what
makes them different from you. And what gives you the horrible picture in your
mind of them [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 100)
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OPT quotations indicate that participation in the dialogue program resulted in an increase
in self-confidence.
After coming back from camp, I had a different character, a different personality.
I was stronger. I was in a way, I don't know, I felt more mature. It's hard to
explain, I was a different person. I knew many things. Now when people asked
me things, I knew how to answer. I didn't have that ability before. Now I had a
stronger character [female, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p.
448)
OPT participant quotations also contain attributions of dialogue participation to an
improvement in interpersonal skills.
Coexistence taught me how to understand and listen to people. When I listened to
their stories and they listened to my stories, I learned they can understand me and
how I live and I can understand them [male, high school teenager]. (MaddyWeitzman, 2005, p. 139)
My second year - all I wanted to do was sit down and listen and hear what they
wanted to say and just to understand them and see why we are where we are
[male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 445)
The main thing I realized in the coexistence sessions is not to be offensive all the
time. If you’re offensive, then they’ll spend their time thinking of a comeback,
being defensive. But when you reach their human side, then they listen and
respect. A lot of arguments towards the end were just Israelis trying to listen
[male, adult]. (Lazarus, 2011, p. 329)
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OPT quotations from participants in SOP contain references to the joy of
experiencing equality with all program participants.
You're wearing the same shirt . . . you call everyone a Seed, you're a Seed from
Palestine, you're a Seed from Israel, from Jordan. All things around you makes
you feel that you're all the same, you're all human beings. Definitely. And you all
deserve to have the same life. And that's so important. Especially for me as a
Palestinian [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 108)
You do everything the same. It's not like the Palestinian delegation has this
activity and the Israeli delegation has this activity. You're all mixed together in
groups. Sometimes you compete with an Israeli against a Palestinian or an Arab.
It all makes you feel that you're all pretty much the same, the same level. You
don't feel different [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 130)
Despite this in-program equality, OPT participant quotations contain references to the
experience of frustration in hearing other participants share historical narratives that
differed from the Palestinian narrative.
It was very difficult because the first time anyone goes to camp I think they have
very firm and fixed ideas and beliefs and it's so hard. Changing them is kind of
impossible, but even questioning them is still difficult. Getting to actually listen to
someone who has opposing views or questions your own beliefs or being open to
someone else's opinion, that was extremely difficult... I wasn't tolerant of all
different opinions. I could not sit quietly and be calm when someone was saying
something that I don't believe in or that sounded so different from what I was
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taught, what I had heard, and from my beliefs. It was very difficult [female, high
school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 120)
At the same time, other OPT quotations refer to the opportunities OPT’s made to teach IJ
participants about the reality of Palestinian life and historical events.
It was something that I'd always wanted to do, to get a chance to talk to an Israeli
and tell him how things really are where I come from and explain to him the
things that he doesn't understand about the Palestinian people and give him the
true image of the Palestinian people [male, high school teenager]. (MaddyWeitzman, 2005, p. 92)
Jerusalem, the refugees, settlements, the situation with the Palestinians currently
at the time, 1998, checkpoints, the past, massacres that happened, occupation, all
of those things, curfews, things that happened to you personally so you can show
them all the horrible things they've been doing to us all this time. Those kind of
things [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 96)
Consistent with OPT quotations from earlier sections, OPT quotations contain references
to a sort of ‘suicide bombing apologetics.’
I just wanted to explain why we are doing things, that we are not terrorists by
nature, we are not terrorists at all. We're just defending our case, that was very
important for me to express ... in that coexistence group I talked, I yelled, I did
whatever I wanted, and then I listened. I listened to what the other people had to
say [female, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 122)
OPT quotations also contain references to a power of joint activity to build trust
between IJ’s and OPT’s.
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When you're up on the ropes and you have an Israeli holding you down with the
harness, so you'll be like, I have my life in the hands of an Israeli, if you fall off
the line it's the Israeli that's holding me by the rope so I won't fall to the ground. It
just builds the trust and it makes you think just because he's an Israeli doesn't
mean I don't have to trust him, just because he's an Israeli doesn't mean he should
be any different than me. He's just another teenager, he's just another person, and
he hates the situation just as much as I do. He wants to make it better just as much
as I do [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 114)
This OPT quotation draws a link between joint activity and OPT ability to listen to IJ
participants.
It's so much easier, so much more useful, so much more productive to actually be
sitting and listening when you trust the person. And you know that they want to
live in peace, and you understand it. It's so important [male, high school
teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 133)
OPT quotations refer to a process of learning about the Holocaust as a dialogue program
outcome.
Yeah, of course, so much about the Holocaust. I didn't know anything about it.
These were the things that the Israelis would talk about. Like I never knew that
the Israelis . . . were so connected to Palestine and Israel. Just sometimes as much
as some Palestinians, you know they're really connected. It's not that they go there
just because they're powerful and they want to occupy it. Not all of them are like
that. So that didn't come to my mind right away. I had to listen to that until I
understood it. Why they wanted to create Israel in the first place. It's not because
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they wanted to make the Palestinians suffer, it was because they were actually
going through suffering in Europe and they had nowhere to go. All these things I
didn't know [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 144)
It's easy for me to see [now] that Jewish people went through the Holocaust and...
how Israelis see soldiers as honored people... I understand the Jewish narrative...
Of course extremism in all these things definitely bothers me, but today I can
listen to the Jewish narrative without being sad [gender unclear, adult]. (Lazarus,
2011, p. 128-129)
Other OPT quotations suggest that dialogue helped OPT’s move beyond
stereotypes of IJ’s related to geotheological concepts.
Well, I learned how to erase stereotypes. You know, stereotypes that you learn
from television, from your community that all Israelis hate Arabs, all they want
from the Arabs is to take the land and to fulfill the Zionist dream of making the
Jewish country from the Nile to the Euphrates River in Iraq. It changes my view
of the whole conflict, of the whole ‘them and us’ thing [male, adult]. (MaddyWeitzman, 2005, p. 429)
I got to find out that some Israelis actually don't agree with what their government
does at all . . . and they sympathize with us a lot. And I mean just to know that
there are Israelis like that, it makes me see the whole conflict from a whole
different perspective. And it really makes me want to reach out even more to
people I haven't met yet, Israelis that I don't know and to find these people who
are like that and bring them out in their society so that we can work together to
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make our world a better place [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman,
2005, p. 430)
This OPT quotation suggests that dialogue with IJ’s represented an opportunity to engage
in conversation deemed impossible in Israeli and Palestinian daily life.
In Hebron I would never dare, I didn't have the courage to tell a soldier or
someone carrying a gun next to me, you're making my life miserable, just get out
of here. Also the soldier would never be able to come to me, with his gun, and tell
me oh, you're making our lives miserable, you're bombing us, you're killing so
many civilians, and that's why sometimes we go and search houses. This doesn't
happen [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 139)
This OPT quotation corroborates IJ participant quotations that describe the experience
of shame and guilt over Israel’s role in the conflict.
The tears affected me the most. When you see them leave the coexistence sessions
crying, not because Israel is suffering, but because their government is making me
suffer, because I am suffering. I am suffering because of what they came to
convince me – we are not equal. We are equal as human beings but we are not
equal on the scale of suffering, on the scale of government, on the scale of power.
We [Palestinians] are the oppressed [male, adult]. (Lazarus, 2011, p. 329)
Though most of these previously cited quotations have featured Israel and Israeli
Jews as the subject of the quotation, other OPT quotations question Palestinian
leadership.
Yeah, before I had total faith in all the Palestinian leaders, and other people. Ijust
thought whatever they're going to do, whatever they say is right. But then I started
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disagreeing and I just thought maybe this is not the best thing we could do. Maybe
we're not doing our best to make things change [female, high school teenager].
(Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 438)
Other OPT quotations indicate a renunciation of suicide bombing apologetics.
What if at some point one of them was . . . somewhere when a bombing happens?
What if they were on the bus that was bombed? [female, high school teenager].
(Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 434)
Consistent with other dialogue participant quotations from previous sections, OPT
quotations refer to an assimilation of the dialogue program identity, in this case that of
Seeds of Peace.
[Seeds of Peace] defines who I am. I actually forgot how I was before being a
Seeds of Peace. It's like, a part of your nationality. When you say I'm a Seed of
Peace, you expect everyone to know what is Seeds of Peace and why you're in it.
It's a source of pride for me [female, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman,
2005, p. 450)
Again, consistent with other participant quotations cited earlier, OPT quotations suggest
the Seeds of Peace identity is compatible with other previously held identities.
I think it means, it doesn’t have a fixed set of beliefs attached to it or associated to
it, I think it involves being yourself, believing in, having your own beliefs and yet
being open to questioning those beliefs or being open to other people’s beliefs.
And respecting other people, regardless of what they believe in. And also the
basic element of Seeds of Peace is understanding and recognizing that peace is the
way of solving things and not war. That’s the basic element that I think any Seed
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of Peace would believe in [female, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman,
2005, p. 154)
This OPT quotation suggests that both IJ’s and OPT’s need to abandon any further
identification with victimhood for the sake of resolving the conflict.
I think we should stop worrying too much about presenting ourselves as the
victims or the victimizers. I think at this point it doesn't matter. Both sides have
been victimized and being the victim does not justify actions against other people.
At some point Israelis were victims, they were victims of the Holocaust, of
discrimination. This is something that should be acknowledged and recognized by
both sides but it should not be used or to justify unjust actions against either side.
The same thing with the Palestinians. Okay, they have seen themselves as victims
since the occupation, since their land was taken away, since the problem of
refugees started, and Jerusalem and all those issues. But then we shouldn't be
stuck in playing that role of being the victim all the time. Because at this point it's
obvious that both sides are suffering. So it doesn't matter who is the victim and
who is the victimizer. Each side has to acknowledge the fact that they have done
mistakes, and yes, they have been victims at one point or another, but they should
not be stuck at that stage because there is no way they can move on if they keep
viewing themselves as victims. It has to be changed [female, high school
teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 145)
This OPT quotations suggests that despite engaging in dialogue, the program has little
effect on the chances of stimulating social change.
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When I hear [IJ’s] say things, and I was like, nothing’s gonna change. There’s no
hope.... Also if you convince some of them, they’ll be back here and remix with
their society and it won’t stay. So I was like, nothing’s gonna change. Nothing
like Seeds of Peace will help. So I just stay focused, and never like give up
something because you are the legitimate owner of this land [male, high school
teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 365)
The quotations from OPT participants cited in this section suggest that both IJ and
OPT participants enter dialogue with similar motivations: to convince the other side of
the rightness of their own perspective. Also, OPT participant and IJ participant quotations
both refer to the lack of contact each had had with the other before entering dialogue; and
this lack of contact result in essentialized perceptions of the other. Whereas IJ participant
quotations contain expressions of shame and guilt over realizing the role Israel plays in
the perpetuation of the conflict, OPT participant quotations recorded after SOP/HOP
dialogue contain expressions of joy after experiencing the sense of equality with Israeli
Jews. Furthermore, OPT participant quotations, like PCI participant quotations, contain
references to a sense of increased self confidence as a dialogue outcome.
Summary of the OPT intergroup dialogue quotations. This section presented
OPT intergroup dialogue participant quotations that were deemed the most representative
and meaningful OPT quotations that address the research questions of this meta-dataanalysis. As was done at the conclusion of Parts 1 and 2 of the data analysis section of
this chapter, what follows here is a general overview of the topical contents that point to
potential themes for describing the OPT intergroup dialogue participant experience.
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These PCI quotations can be placed within the following categories within which topics
developed or progressed through the narrative:
OPT’s successfully conveying the reality of their struggles and challenging
IJ’s in dialogue;
OPT perceptions of IJ’s before and during dialogue; and
positive outcomes of program participation.
OPT’s successfully conveying the reality of their struggles and challenging IJ’s
in dialogue. OPT quotations indicate that a motivation for joining dialogue was the
opportunity to demonstrate to IJ participants the extent of their daily hardships under
military occupation. Consistent with IJ participant quotations in previous sections, OPT
quotations indicate that this message is successfully conveyed to IJ participants which
results in perceived IJ intergroup disunity and, in at least one case, tearful expressions.
OPT participant quotations also contain challenges to IJ participants regarding not only
the clarifications of historical records with the Israeli-Palestinian narratives but also
‘moral’ justifications for perceived injustices perpetuated by Israeli nationalistic
expansion.
OPT perceptions of IJ’s before and during dialogue. Consistent with quotations
from IJ and PCI participants, OPT participant quotations indicate a significant social gap
between IJ’s and Palestinian Arabs prior to entering dialogue. OPT participant quotations
recorded before dialogue portray IJ’s as ‘aliens,’ ‘police,’ or ‘settlers.’ In contrast, OPT
participant quotations recorded during and after dialogue reference an experience of
surprise that Israeli Jews are not homogeneous in perspective and political opinion.
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Positive outcomes of program participation. OPT quotations highlight a number
of positive outcomes from participating in intergroup dialogue. Consistent with previous
PCI quotations that reference dialogue program outcomes, OPT quotations mentioned an
increase of self-confidence and an improvement in interpersonal skills as dialogue
outcomes. OPT quotations include an endorsement for the effectiveness of joint activity
to help built trusting relationships between IJ’s and OPT’s. One OPT quotation attributes
resistance to supporting or executing terrorist activities to the activities of the SOP
program.
Part 4. Findings from the Intersubjective Coding Categories
As described earlier this chapter, all of the intergroup participant quotations
recorded ‘during’ intergroup dialogue within the primary reports that fit the inclusion
criteria were coded within an intersubjective coding scheme. This coding scheme allowed
me to assign a minimum of two different codes to each relevant ‘during dialogue’
quotation: a) one or more ‘holons’ indicating plurality or singularity of the first, second,
or third person perspective of the speaker as indicated by the contents of the quotation;
and b) the quality of the ‘second-person space’ created by the quotation indicated either
as similarity, difference, togetherness, or separateness. Each quotation was also coded
according to its topical content and the national identity, age, and gender of the speaker.
The quotations were then placed within various ‘code concurrence’ tables within Atlas.ti
in order to determine any significant, unique, or surprising associations between or
among the various code categories.
As of this writing, no significant, unique, or surprising associations have been
found among the categories of coded data. Israeli Jews, Palestinian citizens of Israel, and
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Palestinians in the Occupied Territories all rely on a variety of ‘intersubjective’
communication patterns, and multiplicity of codes assigned to each individual quotation
has rendered meaningful or interesting associations difficult to ascertain. However, my
inability to find meaningful associations among the code categories does not necessarily
mean that no associations exist—indeed, another researcher in possession of the same
data may find associations through the same or another coding scheme. (This lack of
significant associations is discussed further in the ‘Limitations’ section in Chapter 5.)
Nevertheless, one significant lack of representation within the intersubjective
‘holon’ coding scheme exists. Only 14 intergroup participant quotations were coded as
‘holon 5’ (third person singular quotations that request or disclose either objective or
subjective information about a person or a thing) and nearly all of these quotations were
attributed to IJ participants. These types of quotations are unusual because they primarily
focus on or refer to a separate person, entity, or idea while the speaker is engaged in
dialogue. For example, the following IJ participant quotation was coded as ‘holon 5’
because it refers to the act of comparing the Holocaust and the Al Nakhba: “This
comparison hurts me” (Helman, 2002, p. 332). Its coding as a holon 5 quotation makes it
an example of one of the few times the holon 5 code was utilized.
The following set of quotations (coded as ‘holon 5’) represent exchanges between
an IJ participant, an OPT participant, and an interviewer.
(IJ) Well, we were talking about . . . the checkpoints.
(OPT) Yea.
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(IJ) And I was saying that I think they are necessary for the safety of
(looks straight ahead and away from ally and interviewer) Israeli citizens and
...uhm ...that, that was my point of view. And ... (gestures to [OPT])
(OPT) And my point of view is that they don’t just stop the men and they
stop sometimes pregnant women. They stop old women and old men. So this is
what I think. I disagree. (tone gets progressively softer)
(Interviewer) So how did you feel when you had that disagreement?
(OPT) I didn’t feel that I am talking to my...my ally.
(Interviewer) What did you feel like?
(OPT) I just called her another name in my mind and I felt like I was
talking to an Israeli and when we finished this, this, uhm, discussion, I just forget
about it and forget that it came from her.
(Interviewer) (to [IJ]) How about for you?
(IJ) Well, it wasn’t nice to find something we disagree on, but . . . it was
obvious to me that we come to a certain point (tone gets very soft) and disagree . .
. [females, adults]. (Collier, 2009, p. 362-363)
These quotations were excluded from the data analysis presented in parts 1, 2, and 3
because the dialogue structure within which the quotations were recorded was different
from the dialogue structures found in all the other primary reports. The dialogue structure
is unique in that the quotations were recorded ‘after’ dialogue within a binational setting
in the presence of an interviewer. The structure is more akin to a mediation than a
dialogue setting—indeed, Collier’s study focuses on the conflict management dialogue
program Building Bridges for Peace. Accordingly, the IJ and OPT participants speak

232

about each other in each other’s presence in the third person. Potential significance of this
dialogue/interview structure and the third person singular quotations it can generate are
discussed later in Chapter 5.
Chapter Summary and Chapter 5 Preview
This chapter presented the findings within the meta-data-analysis performed as
the first stage of a larger, yet-to-be completed qualitative meta-study. This chapter
outlined the procedures that were followed to identify and code the relevant data (in this
case, verbatim intergroup participant quotations found within the primary studies). The
quotations were coded and organized according to a variety of categories including
participant national identity, gender, and age. Quotations were also coded according to
topical content and along two intersubjective coding schemes. The quotations presented
in this chapter represented the most meaningful and/or relevant quotations from the three
groups of identified dialogue participants in Israel-Palestine.
What follows in Chapter 5 are the answers to the research questions and
subsequent discussion related to the limitations and recommendations as pertaining to
this meta-data-analysis. After answering the secondary research questions, I reintegrate
my bracketed experiences and present the overarching themes of experience for Israeli
Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants. Furthermore, Chapter 5
describes the remaining stages of an as-of-yet unscheduled qualitative meta-study for
which this meta-data-analysis represents as its first stage.
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Chapter 5: Answering the Research Questions, Limitations, Recommendations, Future
Research, and Conclusions
The previous chapter’s explication of the most representative and meaningful
quotations served as the basis for answering the research questions. As mentioned
previously, the research questions for this meta-data-analysis were originally developed
as research questions for a four-stage qualitative meta-study as outlined by Paterson et al.
(2001). As such, this chapter begins with a narrative presentation of the answers to the
research questions, based on the data presented in Chapter 4. After that, I present the
limitations of this study, which is followed by recommendations as to how this study
could be improved if the data were to be analyzed further. Next is an overview of the
implications of this study on the potential execution of the second and third stages of a
qualitative meta-study. After that is an overview of the potential contributions this
dissertation can make to the fields of conflict resolution and peace education. This
chapter concludes with final remarks on the overall process in relation to the present
reality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Answering the Research Questions and Identifying the Themes of Experience
As presented earlier, the central research question is what are the themes of
experience of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants? The
synthesized answers to the following secondary research questions ultimately provide a
comprehensive overview that answers the central research question. The secondary
research questions address three general categories: A) the speech of intergroup dialogue
participants, B) the intergroup dialogue model within which the dialogue is conducted,
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and C) the future of intergroup dialogue in Israel-Palestine. To reiterate, the secondary
questions are:
A1. What do Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue
participants say within dialogue processes?
A2. What do Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue
participants say about dialogue processes?
B1. How do dialogue models affect dialogue processes between Israeli Jewish
and Palestinian Arab dialogue participants?
B2. How do these findings compare to those of Hammack et al. (2014)?
C. What new possibilities can this data offer for intergroup dialogue processes
in Israel-Palestine?
Throughout the data analysis sections of Chapter 4, I attempted to remain
consistent regarding the grammatical structure of the presentation of the data. Instead of
referring to ‘what participants said,’ I have striven to present participant quotations
within the frame of ‘what the quotations contain.’ My doing so was an attempt at
remaining transparent in my presentation so as to not ‘interpret’ or ‘read meaning’ into
the words intergroup dialogue participants have shared regarding their experience and
their exchanges within dialogue encounters. From this point onward, my voice will shift
from ‘objective presenter’ to ‘interpreter of findings’ for the purpose of rendering
relevant responses to the research questions that have guided every step of this meta-dataanalytical process.
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A1: What do Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab Intergroup Dialogue Participants
Say Within Dialogue Processes?
Answering this question necessitates a focus on quotations recorded ‘during’
intergroup dialogue. Broadly speaking, Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup
dialogue participants talk about the following topics:
trauma and suffering,
issues of identity,
fear of the other,
religion and geotheological concepts, and
the events of 1948.
Trauma and suffering. OPT participants talk about the variety of ways they
suffer and have been traumatized under Israeli military occupation (i.e. checkpoints,
random seize and searches, lack of basic necessities, harassment and humiliation). This is
consistent with numerous reports that point to the negative physiological and
psychological effects OPT’s display as a result of witnessing and experience violence and
humiliation (Giacaman et al., 2007; Peltonen et al., 2010). Despite their suffering, OPT’s
also talk about hope for reconciliation and express conviction in the power of social and
political activism.
PCI participants talk about another kind of suffering—that of carrying the label of
second class citizen. PCI’s in dialogue speak of the ways they are mis-represented in the
media, accused of traitorous activity, and stereotyped as murderous and violent people.
Despite their suffering, PCI’s talk about the privileges Israeli Jews have within Israel and
challenge Israeli Jews to abandon the definition of Israel as a Jewish state.

236

IJ participants talk about trauma and suffering also, but the trauma they speak of
is related to primarily two events: the Holocaust and the Palestinian Intifadas. Palestinian
Arab participant attempts to draw parallels between the Holocaust and the Al Nakhba
result in IJ expressions of suffering, although those expressions are not unanimously
espoused among all Israeli Jewish participants. Discussions related to the Al Nakhba and
the events of 1948 are discussed further in a subsequent section.
Issues of identity. All three groups of intergroup dialogue participants talk about
issues of identity. However, the exact dynamics of those issues differ among the three
groups. The asymmetrical power relationship between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs
seem to shape the way dialogue participants talk about identity. As such, Palestinian Arab
participants occupying the space of lower social and political power talk about identity in
relation to Israel. PCI participants tend to defend their ‘dual identity’ as Israeli citizens
and Palestinian Arabs. OPT participants express pride in their Palestinian identity but
tend to do so in juxtaposition to Israeli Jewish identity.
IJ participants talk about issues of identity but more so within uninational
dialogues than binational dialogues. Within these sessions IJ participants question the
‘modern’ Israeli Jewish identity and, by extension, the Jewish identity of the state of
Israel. The conclusions individual IJ participants draw in relation to their personal
identities extend outward to other salient subjects, such as the level of responsibility
assigned to Israel for the continuation and resolution of the conflict.
Fear of the ‘other.’ Both Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab participants refer to
their overall lack of regular social contact with members of the other group before
entering into dialogue. Within dialogue, IJ participants speak about a) their fear of
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Palestinian Arabs for perceived capacity to engage in terrorism and b) their fear of
significant identity changes within a future Israeli state that recognizes Palestinian Arabs
as equal status citizens. OPT participants tend to talk about fear of the other more so than
PCI participants, especially in relation to fear of Israeli police and soldiers.
Religion and geotheological concepts. Consistent with the overview of salient
geotheological concepts presented in Chapter 2 related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
as described by Krämer (2008), dialogue participants talk about religion and
geotheological topics within dialogue. The verbatim examples in the primary reports
feature primarily IJ and PCI participant quotations that engage in these topics. OPT
quotations referring to religion and geotheological concepts appeared in the primary
reports as part of the ‘post’ dialogue quotations.
The events of 1948. Consistent with the descriptions of the existence of ‘parallel
histories’ and dominant narratives presented in Chapter 2 that animate individual
perceptions of how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has unfolded, all three groups of
participants talk about the events of 1948 within dialogue. Discussion of these events
tend to elicit surprise from all participants upon hearing alternative versions of the events
surrounding Israeli state independence and the Al Nakhba. OPT participants enter
dialogue with the explicit purpose of ‘educating’ IJ participants about these alternative
narratives, and members of all three groups express either an appreciation for being
exposed to these parallel histories or a rejection of the new information they received.
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A2: What do Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab Intergroup Dialogue Participants
Say About Dialogue Processes?
Answering this question necessitates a focus on quotations recorded ‘after’
intergroup dialogue. Broadly speaking, Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup
dialogue participants talk about the following aspects and outcomes of intergroup
dialogue experiences:
changes in self-perspective;
increased level of understanding of the other; and
changes in political or social opinion.
Changes in self-perspective. Consistent with the topics discussed ‘within’
dialogue, IJ participants often refer to dialogue processes as a significant point in their
lives whereby they realized that the ‘meaning’ of their identity as Israeli Jews was
potentially in flux. PCI and OPT participants tend to emphasize how dialogue
participation increased their self-confidence and served as the impetus to continue
engaging in social and political action. PCI participants frequently express how dialogue
processes helped them ‘work out’ (to varying degrees) the complications of possessing
‘dual identities.’
Increased level of understanding of the other. As mentioned previously, IJ and
Palestinian Arab participants refer to a general lack of ‘real life’ social contact with
members of the other groups. Both groups identify dialogue processes as a means for
overcoming stereotypical and prejudiced beliefs about the other. Through dialogue, IJ
participants describe processes through which they came to see and understand the
suffering Palestinian Arabs endure on a regular basis. PCI participants describe how
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dialogue provides a space for them to see the diversity of perspectives among Israeli
Jews. OPT participants describe how dialogue allowed them to learn more about the
significance of the Holocaust for Israeli Jews. OPT participants also describe how
dialogue processes served to change their opinions, to varying degrees, regarding the
utilization of suicide bombings for achieving political and social change.
Changes in political or social opinion. In general, dialogue participants describe
how dialogue participation changed or complicated their perspectives and opinions on
political and social issues. Israeli Jewish participants point to dialogue participation as an
impetus for becoming ‘anti-occupation’ and ‘anti-Zionist’ regarding Israel’s military
actions and ideological stances. PCI participants point to dialogue processes as the
motivating factor that convinced them to become more politically active, especially
regarding activities within Israel intended to promote the social standing of PCI’s. OPT
participants express not only readiness but an urgency to engage in political and social
action to improve the living conditions in which OPT’s currently endure.
B1: How do Dialogue Models Affect Dialogue Processes between Israeli Jewish and
Palestinian Arab Dialogue Participants?
Answering this question requires a comparative analysis of the contents of
quotations from dialogue participants within the models represented within the primary
reports. However, the results of such a comparative analysis in this specific study may
not be particularly reliable due to the ‘over-representation’ of ‘mixed model’ dialogue
model participant quotations (specifically Seeds of Peace/Hands of Peace) compared to
the other six dialogue models represented within the primary reports. Furthermore,
because this question inquires about the processes between IJ and Palestinian Arab
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dialogue participants, the most useful data for answering this question would be those
quotations recorded ‘before’ and ‘during’ dialogue processes. As demonstrated by Table
2 below, ‘before’ dialogue process quotations are largely absent from the primary reports
and chiefly represented by the ‘mixed’ model studies in the primary reports. The ‘during’
quotations appear more often within the ‘confrontational’ dialogue model primary reports
than the other primary reports.
Table 2
Distribution of Coded Quotations: Before and During Dialogue
Activist

Coexistence

Conflict
Management

Confrontational

Mixed
method

Narrative

Track
2

Number of Coded
Quotations Recorded Before
Dialogue

-

-

-

1

40

-

-

Number of Coded
Quotations Recorded During
Dialogue

1

22

1

113

37

10

12

As such, a fully comprehensive analysis demonstrating how the dialogue models
represented within the primary reports affect dialogue processes is not feasible.
Nevertheless, due to the higher number of coded quotations represented within the
primary reports that feature coexistence, confrontational, and mixed model dialogue
approaches, what this data can yield are general observations regarding the nature of the
contents of participant quotations within the coexistence, confrontational, and mixed
method models. These observations are what is sought by the next research question. As
such, those observations are presented in the next section in order to answer the next
section’s research question.
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B2: How do these Findings Compare to those of Hammack et al. (2014)?
As was explicated within the literature review in Chapter 2, one of the purposes of
this dissertation was to gather any relevant Israeli-Palestinian intergroup dialogue
participant quotations since 1999 in order to compare them to the findings presented by
Hammack et al. (2014). To reiterate, Hammack et al. set out to address the ‘dearth’ of
research related to the meaning-making processes of participants in intergroup dialogue
building programs especially in regions of intractable conflict (p. 296). The study
Hammack et al. devised and executed resulted in qualitative and quantitative data that
shed light on the “interaction of nationality and contact paradigm on the experience of
contact . . . [and to see] whether the experience for certain national groups changes as a
function of the contact paradigm employed” (p. 297). Among the more salient findings in
relation to this current dissertation presented by Hammack et al. (2014) were the
following:
“(participants’) diary entries in the [confrontational model] condition were
more likely to contain entries reflective of negative psychological experience
(e.g. confusion, frustration, and fear/anxiety) than diary entries in the
[coexistence model] condition” (p. 312);
“participants in a [confrontational] condition of dialogue reported lower levels
of self-consistency and higher levels of intergroup differentiation over time,
suggesting the effectiveness of this approach to initiate a process of selfreflection and intergroup distinctiveness” (p. 296); and
the confrontational model of dialogue was more likely to be associated with
“higher levels of empowerment and positive mood throughout contact”
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especially for Palestinian participants, which suggests an “effectiveness of
[the confrontational] approach to challenge power asymmetries and its
positivity for the low-status group” (p. 296).
As such, what follows here is a brief presentation of the most meaningful and
representative data from the primary reports that feature quotations from participants
within the confrontational and coexistence dialogue models. In order to avoid duplicity of
data in this section, I have excluded Pilecki and Hammack (2014) because this primary
report is based on the same data as Hammack et al. (2014). Because the mixed model
Seeds of Peace/Hands of Peace studies do not sufficiently differentiate between ‘during’
quotations recorded within ‘confrontational’ sessions versus ‘coexistence’ sessions, they
too are excluded from this section.
The confrontational model’s likeliness to provoke negative psychological
experiences. Numerous quotations recorded during confrontational model dialogue were
located within the primary reports that point to negative psychological experiences. Most
of these speakers refer to the unpleasant feelings they experienced when engaged in
dialogue due to a variety of reasons. Examples are presented here first from IJ
participants followed by one PCI participant quotation.
IJ participants during binational talks refer to frustration felt because of intergroup
disagreement over the meaning of the Holocaust in comparison to the Al Nakhba.
[IJ, during binational] You [speaker A] really hurt me. It hurts that you agreed
with her [PCI participant] and you feel ashamed. Because it is not the same as
they (the Nazis) did to us. You were a soldier in the Occupied Territories, and I
was not. But I have relatives that are Holocaust survivors and I can’t listen to
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things like this. This comparison hurts me [female, university student]. (Helman,
2002, p. 332)
IJ participants also express fear over a perceived threat of violence from Palestinian Arab
participants.
[IJ, during binational] I want to say that I do not intend to sit in the same room
with people who justify attacks on civilians, in no situation does that seem to me
something that I have to do [male, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010,
p. 52)
Within uninational dialogue settings, IJ participants openly express their negative
feelings related to guilt, shame, anger, fear, and confusion.
[IJ, during uninational] What frustrates me the most at this workshop is that I
came here knowing exactly what I want, and what is good for them, and with each
meeting that passes I leave the workshop agreeing less with them. Not because of
the ideas they present, but because of how they present it. And I am angrier with
myself than I am with them. Sometimes I'm angry with myself because I don't
have the courage to say: This and this is important to me. Right, it might sound
primitive; maybe I sound like some hawkish representative. But it's important to
me. Why can't I say so? That's the feeling I have at this workshop. Now I can say
that I am afraid of what will happen, of the idea that the conflict will not end with
the establishment of a Palestinian state: I told my family this at home and they
said, 'So what's new?' [male, university student]. (Maoz et al., 2002, p. 949)
[IJ, during uninational] You are really confusing me here . . . It’s very dangerous
to be a Jew. I don’t know, it seems self-evident, kind of axiomatic . . . that it’s
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dangerous, that we have been and will continue to be victims if we don’t watch
out for ourselves . . . We don’t want to conquer anybody . . . We do everything to
protect our existence as a Jewish people [male, university student]. (Sonnenschein
et al., 2010, p. 51)
[IJ, during uninational] From the start, really from the first meeting, they said,
“We are Palestinians” and to me it felt subversive . . . I said how could [you] be
Palestinian. Palestinians are at war with us . . . When they said “Palestinian,” I
heard “terrorist” [male, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 52)
[IJ, during uninational] [Israel] won’t belong to the Jews, it will belong to some
other people too. . . How would a binational state look, one where Arabs also rule
and there are Arab cultural symbols here? . . . For me, it really makes me despair
[male, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 53)
[IJ, during uninational] This makes us awfully frustrated because we were
attacked at the beginning, and our feelings were not given legitimacy. And we felt
terribly guilty. And that’s what we kept feeling, and in the end we had no way to
fix the situation. We were blamed and our hands were tied [female, university
student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 55)
[IJ, during uninational] I feel like there is some kind of feeling that what is hard is
to be within this experience and this process of internalizing. That is, there are
two possible responses: either to say it is really us, we are the murderers . . . And
the other response is that it isn’t us at all, and they are awful and terrible and like
that [female, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 59)
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[IJ, during uninational] The threat defines for you who you are. This is
comfortable to some extent, and when you take it away, you don’t know what to
do . . . Something else has to be put together instead, and that’s hard. You have to
start over and create new values and beliefs [female, adult]. (Sonnenschein et al.,
2010, p. 57)
In quotations recorded after intergroup dialogue, IJ participants continue to
discuss the negative feelings experienced while in dialogue and how they tried to
reconcile those feelings.
[IJ, after dialogue] Frustration is a powerful feeling. I would say, I don’t know
what to call this—pangs of conscience? Thinking about this as you get into bed
and it’s on your mind . . . and why are things this way? And how should things
have been different? And we’re not such innocent, good . . . Like, it’s
uncomfortable, like it was more comfortable to be in that place of, like,
everything is sort of clear [male, adult]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 55)
[IJ, after dialogue] It’s not pleasant to feel inferior, when they [Palestinians] are
analyzing you, overall it really gives a feeling of being less. It sounds funny but I
felt that my life was threatened during those segments. I mean, it connects with
the feeling from before, the threat of their wanting to kill me . . . as if showing me
the outside, that if they are so strong, they will start a war and kill us [female,
adult]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 54)
Negative feelings in confrontational settings were not unique to only IJ
participants. This one quotation from a PCI participant indicates felt anger during a
binational dialogue session.
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[PCI, during binational] It outrages me that you say that human life is not
cherished by us. . . You are wrong when you say that among us (the Arabs) the
value of human life is inferior to you (the Jews) [female, university student].
(Helman, 2002, p. 341)
Though these quotations come primarily from IJ participants and only one from a
Palestinian Arab participant, there appears to be adequate examples within the primary
reports demonstrating that dialogue participants within the confrontational model
experience negative psychological experiences. However, there can be no conclusive
statement on the comparative relationship to the coexistence model because there exists
little to nothing in the coexistence model primary reports that indicate negative
psychological experiences among participants. A lack of evidence in these reports does
not necessarily mean coexistence model participants do not have such experiences.
Nevertheless, the data clearly contains numerous examples of participants in the
confrontational model having negative psychological experiences.
The confrontational model’s effectiveness in initiating self-reflection and
intergroup distinctiveness. Numerous quotations recorded before and after
confrontational model dialogue refer to the two dimensions of ‘self-reflection’ and
‘intergroup distinctiveness.’ The following four quotations are attributed to PCI
participants and are presented in order relative to dialogue process stage. The first PCI
quotation acknowledges intergroup differences but suggests that comparing cultural
differences is a fruitless endeavor.
[PCI, during binational] Each of us wants to defend his own culture, so we should
not compare, and in addition we cannot generalize from a few cases [of women’s
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killings] to the value we grant to human life [male, university student]. (Helman,
2002, p. 342)
This PCI participant quotation suggests that further intergroup distinctiveness will be
possible once a two-state solution is realized.
[PCI, during binational] I think that once there is a Palestinian state, it will be
easier for us to define ourselves as Palestinians living in Israel [male, university
student]. (Maoz et al., 2002, p. 947)
This brief statement from a PCI participant indicates meaningful self-reflection has
occurred as a result of dialogue participation.
[PCI, during late stage binational] Maybe I have learned to listen at the workshop
[male, university student]. (Maoz et al., 2002, p. 952)
This ‘post’ dialogue statement points to a strong opinion regarding the maintenance of
Palestinian Arab cultural distinctiveness no matter how it differs from secular Israeli
culture.
[PCI, after dialogue] I’m not in favor of assimilating . . . I know that the Arab
boys were influenced. I saw that with my own eyes, how they behaved with the
Jewish girls. I got angry and told some of them off, and they kept quiet and didn’t
know what to say to me [female, high school teenager]. (Halabi & Zak, 2014, p.
66)
IJ participant quotations contain examples of penetrating questions to get to the
core of understanding intergroup distinctions between themselves and Palestinian Arabs.
The following quotations demonstrate this process in relation to PCI identity,
hypothetical historical reciprocity, and religion.
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[IJ, during binational] No, I am quite listening to what she is saying, that she has a
principle that she is not at all interested in this [Israeli] state. That is, it is a state
that conquered her, and in no way is she willing to contribute to it, right? (to PCI
participant) because you don’t acknowledge the state as legitimate, this is what
you are saying? [female, university student]. (Maoz, 2001, p. 202)
[IJ, during binational] What would have happened to us [the Jews] if in 1948 an
Arab state would have been established here? What would have happened if we
were the minority and you the majority? [male, university student]. (Helman,
2002, p. 331)
[IJ, during binational] I would like to know how the Koran conceives of the
relations between different peoples because I don’t know much about it. The
reason I am asking is because you said that under Moslem rule, the Jews were not
discriminated against, they got fair treatment [male, college student]. (Helman,
2002, p. 333)
The following written reflections from IJ participants demonstrate how the
confrontational model can instill opportunities for self-reflection.
(IJ, written, during binational) Members of the Arab group presented a difficult
picture and agreeing to see myself in that mirror was painful . . . as part of the
Jewish people would prefer not to see, and to a great extent before these meetings
I actually did not see [. . .] So the option of taking even more extreme positions
was abandoned by me and I was left with the not simple choice of attempting to
show empathy and identify insofar as possible [diary entry] [female, university
student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 59)
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[IJ, written, during binational] Will my Jewish identity and my physical existence
be preserved if I stop fighting? [male, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al.,
2010, p. 57)
The IJ uninational sessions also provided opportunities for IJ participants to share their
inner dialogue with other group members.
[IJ, during uninational] And here let’s say I feel that way. I have never felt more
Jewish and Israeli than I do in this group. And really, most of the things I think
here are tied to that [male, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 56)
Further ‘post’ dialogue quotations from IJ participants provide examples of how
self-reflection can lead IJ participants to draw new conclusions regarding the nature of
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
[IJ, after dialogue] Today I am ready to hear because I see that this does not hold
up against that. As soon as you take . . . all kinds of guilt, it’s a lot harder for you
to keep on justifying your place. But I think that on the individual level, this is
some kind of growing up, that you know that you can be guilty, not perfect, and
still you can stick to your position, or give some different shades to your position.
But that doesn’t mean that your whole position breaks down . . . that the Jewish
people had done bad things to the Palestinian people doesn’t necessary mean that
there is no justification to my existence here [male, adult]. (Sonnenschein et al.,
2010, p. 59)
[IJ, after dialogue] I discovered that, on the one hand, I am very ready to give up
the things connected with my identity, symbols, the desire that this connection
between the state and the people, that this state is only mine. Before that, it was
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very clear to me that this state is mine and only mine and something here moved a
little [male, adult]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 58)
[IJ, after dialogue] Now their culture does not seem as different from ours. I mean
they are basically students like we are, and we all take exams. Before, I thought it
was this culture like the Bedouin. What stands out more for me is the situation
they are in as opposed to the situation we are in, and not the cultural markers, but
that they are in a situation of the minority, of occupation, of a very hard daily
reality [female, adult]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 58)
Quotations that indicate processes of intergroup distinctiveness also occur within
coexistence dialogue models. However, the examples presented here are few because the
primary reports for this study include only one article that focuses on the coexistence
model (besides that of Pilecki & Hammack, 2014). The following quotation from an IJ
participant refers to certain ‘concerns’ the speaker is experiencing regarding the position
of PCI’s in a hypothetical future Palestinian state. The speaker’s quotation may indicate
uncertainty about how to make a clear intergroup distinction between herself and
Palestinian citizens of Israel.
[IJ, during binational] [T]here’s there’s a double voice meaning also the citizens
of the country of Israel and also the citizens of the country of Palestine that . . .
not citizens, not you but also in the name of the citizens of the country of
Palestine that will arise, and also as part of the Palestinian nation and this,
meaning . . . we (always) talked about different kinds of meaning in your different
kinds of voices. Am I, like, making myself clear? [female, adult]. (Bekerman,
2009, p. 212-213)
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The following IJ quotation suggests a resistance to the idea of a two state solution by
emphasizing how PCI’s should be a bit ‘less’ distinct in their identity as Israeli citizens.
[IJ, during binational] If this country is worthwhile, for you and for us, so surely
you’ll have to relinquish, or I don’t know, it changes . . . culture changes, like the
. . . even the ultra-orthodox [Jews] that they are part, that they would like to be
only ultra-orthodox and to insolate [sic] themselves, and that their Judaism will be
observed, the living besides um: beside something else, the shared life changes
them, and they do relinquish some of their traits [gender unclear, adult].
(Bekerman, 2009, p. 215)
The next two quotations suggest borders to the process of intergroup
distinctiveness within the coexistence model. The first quotation from an Ashkenazi IJ
participant refers to the friction she feels when in the presence of Sephardic-Arabs (Jews
of Middle Eastern ethnic descent).
[IJ, during binational] I want to tell you something, just a second, just a second. I
go to a [Sephardic-Arab] home I feel different from when I go into an Ashkenazi
home I feel estranged [in the Sephardic-Arab home]... [female, adult]. (Bekerman,
2009, p. 215)
Yet moments later, a PCI participant abandoned this potential opening to find
commonalities between Palestinian Arabs and Sephardic-Arab Jews through this
statement: “But in the end you are all Jews [PCI, during binational, gender unclear,
adult]” (Bekerman, 2009, p. 216).
What these quotations seem to indicate is that the processes of self-reflection and
intergroup distinctiveness can occur in both coexistence and confrontational models, but
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the processes differ between IJ and PCI participants. PCI participant quotations indicate
that these participants are compelled to both defend the practice of certain cultural
traditions and subsequently downplay the significance of those same traditions in order to
maintain positive interactions (or even ‘save face’) with IJ participants. PCI participant
quotations also indicate that the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will
substantially aid PCI processes of self-reflection and intergroup distinctiveness. IJ
participant quotations indicate that these participants enter dialogue with the intent of
compelling PCI participants to reflect and distinguish themselves as citizens of Israel;
however, as dialogue progresses, IJ participant quotations suggest that these same IJ
participants are then themselves compelled to reflect on their own identities and the
definition of the Israeli nation itself.
The confrontational model’s effectiveness in empowering Palestinian Arab
participants and promoting positive feelings. Numerous quotations from PCI
participants indicate that confrontational dialogue settings allowed for PCI participants to
make bold statements and posit challenging questions to IJ participants. The following
five quotations serve as examples of this empowerment.
[PCI, during binational dialogue] No, she meant that there is something
reciprocal. Let’s say that a state, let’s say like Israel, that bombards Gaza in the
middle of the night, this is not called a terror attack even though everyone there
relates to it as a terror attack. I definitely think that it’s not justified to hurt any
side if they are innocent civilians, let’s say he blows himself up on a bus or that a
state like Israel bombards [male, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010,
p. 52).
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[PCI, during binational dialogue] I condemn, in every way, any form of terrorism
involving killing innocent civilians . . . But I can’t ignore what is happening there
in the territories and in Gaza when the Israeli army is attacking them all the time
[female, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 52)
[PCI, during binational dialogue] Maybe the power of the Arab group here, the
Palestinian group, [is] to bring things, like, to the same level, and you feel that
there’s a group here that has rights . . . Maybe you have that sense of a threat
[female, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 54)
[PCI, during binational dialogue] Why do you think you’re more human? Do you
feel you are more human? [male, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010,
p. 54)
This fifth quotation from a male PCI participant recorded during middle stages of
binational dialogue is a succinct example of Palestinian Arab empowerment: “We'll
change you” (Maoz et al., 2002, p. 949).
The following quotations recorded after confrontational dialogue clearly link an
increase in self-confidence to confrontational dialogue processes. The first quotation even
calls for a bold statement of political activism and refers to Asil—a PCI Seeds of Peace
participant who was killed by Israeli police action.
[PCI, after dialogue] I wanted to come today dressed in a map of Palestine, so that
they would know that this is a message from Asil, so that they’d know that I am
not giving up my religion or my nationality. It’s true that I am with you and I love
you, but I am not giving up my national identity [female, high school teenager].
(Halabi & Zak, 2014, p. 65)
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[PCI, after dialogue] This encounter increased my self-confidence. Just as I stood
before the Jews in that meeting, I can do it again in the future. In the past, I was
not involved with these things, but this encounter encouraged me to do things like
this in the future [female, high school teenager]. (Halabi & Zak, 2014, p. 64)
[PCI, after dialogue] The encounter improved our self-confidence because, at the
beginning, on the first day, we did talk, but quietly, we had no self-confidence;
then on the second day we started talking louder and more nonstop. Within a day,
we started to talk and to raise our voices and to argue . . . at first I would tell
myself, I don’t want to raise this point, because it could cause problems; then later
I saw that that was a mistake. They were saying whatever they wanted to say, why
shouldn’t I? If I don’t talk, I won’t get my rights. So long as I’m afraid and I keep
quiet in life, I won’t get anything [female, high school teenager]. (Halabi & Zak,
2014, p. 64)
These quotations clearly contain multiple examples of how PCI participants
experience both empowerment and positive feelings as an outcome of confrontational
dialogue. Nevertheless, as previous sections of this study have demonstrated, both PCI
and OPT participants experience empowerment and positive feelings as an outcome of
multiple other dialogue models, such as the activist, narrative, conflict management, and
the Seeds of Peace mixed model. As such, though this data corroborates Hammack et
al.’s (2014) finding, no conclusive statement regarding the confrontational model’s
exclusive effectiveness for empowering and engendering positive feelings among
Palestinian Arab participants can be made here.
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Summary of findings in relation to Hammack et al.’s (2014) findings. The
above quotations, all recorded and cited within research articles published before
Hammack et al. (2014) and Pilecki and Hammack (2014) generally corroborate
Hammack et al.’s (2014) findings. Numerous quotations from other confrontational
dialogue model studies indicate that participants experience negative psychological
experiences, that participants engage in processes of self-reflection and intergroup
distinctiveness, and that Palestinian Arab participants feel empowered and positive
during and after dialogue participation. However, these corroborations should not be
considered conclusive for two reasons: a) none of the confrontational model primary
studies referenced here contained quotations from Palestinians in the Occupied
Territories and b) only one article referenced here focused on the processes experienced
within the coexistence model. This entire analysis has focused on the distinct differences
between PCI and OPT participants, so without any OPT representation, this overview
cannot be considered conclusive. Furthermore, without at least a comparatively similar
number of quotations to reference from coexistence model participants, any final
conclusion regarding the comparative ‘effectiveness’ of dialogue processes between
confrontational and coexistence models cannot be considered conclusive here.
C: What New Possibilities can this Data Offer for Intergroup Dialogue Processes in
Israel-Palestine?
Many of the salient points and theories presented within the literature review in
Chapter 2 can be applied to the findings thus far presented within this meta-data-analysis.
Consistent with contact theory and its various amendments, numerous intergroup
dialogue participants attribute significance to the power of friendship to make intergroup
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dialogue processes truly productive in terms of increasing empathy, breaking down
stereotypes, and willingness to engage in difficult or challenging conversations about
sensitive information. Geotheological arguments were used by some participants to
justify opinions or to lend credence to certain components of national narratives.
Suffering and trauma were discernable within participant quotations, especially those of
Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. Furthermore, as just described above, the
findings of Hammack et al. (2014) are mostly corroborated in spite of a lack of a
significant number of research articles from which to draw data.
As such, the data in this meta-data-analysis offers little in the way of ‘new’
information. However, what this meta-data-analysis does offer is a clear exposure of what
does not exist in current literature on Israeli-Palestinian intergroup dialogue programs
and participant experience and their research thereof. What follows is a brief overview of
four possibilities for intergroup dialogue processes and research among IsraeliPalestinian intergroup dialogue programs and participants.
An integration with interreligious dialogue models. The break between
interreligious dialogue models and secular models in Israel-Palestine is no accident. As
mentioned in Chapter 2, Newman (2012) states, “The peace movement in Israel has
emerged from secular Israeli society. The relationship between secularism and the Israeli
peace movement is more than just a correlation. It represents a causal relationship as
well” (p. 485). Though the inclusion criteria for the primary reports for this study would
not exclude interreligious dialogue models, none of the primary reports that met the
inclusion criteria for this study featured an interreligious dialogue model. It is safe to say
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that secular intergroup dialogue models dominate the intergroup dialogue research field
in Israel-Palestine.
However, as shown in the selected quotations of this meta-data-analysis, topics of
religion and geotheology occur within these secular intergroup dialogue models.
Whenever Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab dialogue participants face an issue related
to religion or geotheology, they have no expert within the dialogue group to which to turn
for guidance. Participants are largely left to hash out interpretations through hearsay and
conjecture. As such, a new possibility for secular intergroup dialogue processes is to
incorporate elements of interreligious peacebuilding for the purpose of providing
expertise on matters of theology and the interpretation of religious texts. Though such an
incorporation does not guarantee all dialogue participants will be satisfied, at the very
least a new kind of dialogue can be generated that will enrich the overall dialogue
experience.
Fill the void of research featuring OPT participants. OPT participants were the
least represented group of participants within the primary reports for this study. The
primary reason for their comparatively smaller numbers is due to the difficulty in
reaching them and for them to reach dialogue sessions. Perhaps a solution to this problem
is to conduct online dialogue sessions via Skype or other such video and audio platform.
Generate more research that tracks pre, during, and post dialogue
experience. Of the 17 primary reports included in this study, only one (Hammack, 2006)
included quotations that tracked the same participant through all three stages of pre,
during, and post dialogue. Though hindsight evaluations from former intergroup dialogue
participants yield valuable information regarding how participants attribute changes in
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self to dialogue participation, data that tracks individuals through all three stages will
yield more data regarding actual dialogue processes and changes in participant identity.
Conduct more post-dialogue interviews as triads. The majority of ‘post’
dialogue interviews featured in the primary reports here were largely conducted as ‘dyad’
interviews—the research study author spoke with each individual participant and
recorded the participant’s answers accordingly. However, Collier (2009) interviewed
post-dialogue participants as a triad: one Israeli Jew, one Palestinian Arab, and herself as
the interviewer. As the example given earlier in this chapter shows, the quotations
generated from these interviews yielded interesting results that provide a richer
intersubjective perspective on dialogue processes. The interviewees spoke about the other
in the third person while that person was present in the room. This triad structure serves
to ‘triangulate’ the interview data—were one interviewee to say something that the other
believed to be inaccurate, the other could respond immediately and correct the former
statement. Were more post-dialogue interviews conducted as a triad, new opportunities
for reflective dialogue could be generated for shedding light on dialogue processes.
The Themes of Experience for Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab Intergroup
Dialogue Participants
Before presenting the general themes of experience and thereby answering the
central research question, it is necessary for me to return to the bracketing of my personal
experience, ontological paradigms, and interest in the outcome of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. To this point I have attempted to ‘bracket out’ these elements of myself as a
researcher in order to remain open and transparent with the data. However, in order to
complete the identification of the themes of experience for these intergroup dialogue
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participants, I will now “reintegrate” my bracketed experiences in order to generate a
more nuanced, interpretive set of themes (Gearing, 2004, p. 1434).
To reiterate: my personal identity, based on both my ancestral history and my life
experiences, is multi-layered. In short, I am the descendent of German and (potentially)
Jewish immigrants to the Midwest USA who within a generation converted to Protestant
Christianity. I myself am a convert to the Bahá'í faith—an independent religion that has
its global center in Haifa, Israel. In addition, I am married to a Syrian Arab, and have
lived more than 10 years in the Middle East. Therefore, my interest in the resolution of
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is related to more than merely academics or pragmatism. I
see Israel-Palestine as my spiritual home, though I have never actually visited IsraelPalestine. Furthermore, I am deeply influenced by the tenets of the Bahá'í faith that
emphasize the importance of personal ‘independent search for truth’ and a prohibition on
conflict and contention. With these elements of my personal identity reintegrated into the
study, what follows is an overview of the themes of experience of Israeli Jewish and
Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants.
IJ, PCI, and OPT participants enter dialogue carrying various forms of fear and
anger. Broadly speaking, they carry:
fear of living unfulfilled lives and
anger for not being universally appreciated.
After unsuccessfully resolving their anger and fear, these individuals begin to:
question their inherited social paradigms, and, by extension,
reach the limits of their own inherited identity/ies.
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As such, by entering into intergroup dialogue, these participants (to greater and lesser
degrees) engage in more than just an exchange of words and ideas. They are:
seeking truth,
pursuing justice, and
realizing unity.
Fear of living unfulfilled lives. All three groups of dialogue participants live
with the fear that a tragic event could cut down their life or the lives of those dear to them
at any time. Israeli Jews live with the threat of suicide bombings and are taught that Jews
have been victims of history for generations. Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel fear they
will always be second class citizens and have been the targets of police brutality for many
years. Palestinian Arabs in the Occupied Territories have lived under military rule for
decades and suffer humiliation and violence on a regular basis. Collectively, all three
groups of people experience fear of not living a life of complete freedom and fulfillment.
Anger for not being universally appreciated. Closely related to fear is anger,
and all three groups experience anger over a lack of universal appreciation. Israeli Jews
carry anger towards Palestinian Arabs for not appreciating their safety and security.
Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel carry anger towards the Israeli government for not
granting them equal status as Israeli Jews. Palestinian Arabs in the Occupied Territories
carry anger towards the Israeli government for perpetuating military rule.
Questioning their inherited social paradigms. Unabated anger and fear are
destructive emotions, so people naturally seek means to overcome them. They seek
answers to their questions about who or what is responsible for the dangerous
environment in which they live. They ask questions about how the situation could
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become what it has become. When inherited social structures such as governments,
religions, and historical narratives fail to provide adequate answers, some are motivated
to look elsewhere for answers.
Reaching the limits of their own inherited identity/ies. The ‘elsewhere’ they
begin to look may require them to look beyond the sets of ‘truths’ they have learned from
family, the media, and all the other various social systems that give their lives a
semblance of order. By looking beyond the learned ‘truths,’ individuals come to realize
their entire sense of self is in the balance. They realize that resolving the fear and anger
requires connection with ‘the other.’
Seeking truth. Upon entering dialogue, all three groups instinctively believe they
hold the truth while the other espouses falsehood. Upon realizing that the complete truth
lies with neither side, participants must find ways to engage with the other in a manner
that will lead them to the truth. Truth exists for all participants; it is a matter of them
deciding to courageously search for it.
Pursuing justice. Closely related to the search for truth is the pursuit of justice.
As difficult as this pursuit is, participants acknowledge that this active pursuit is better
than resignation to anger and fear. The pain of the past is real and cannot be forgotten,
but perpetual blame only allows fear and anger to return.
Realizing unity. Despite all the historical pain and present mistrust, dialogue
participants instinctively experience the urge to engage with the other. While very few
participants consciously realize the unity between and among them, there is an
underlying need for all of them to be in the presence of the other. After having
experienced these levels of interaction, the participants return to the original ‘inherited
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world’ with, to greater and lesser degrees, a new perspective through which to operate
and to engage with others struggling to overcome their anger and fear.
Limitations
The data from which this study’s findings are drawn are the outcome of dialogic
processes. Such processes of facilitated dialogue have been generally assumed to be a
critical means for guiding participants directly affected by or involved in intractable
conflict towards peaceful and empathic relationships. The authors of the primary reports
identified for this qualitative meta-data-analysis largely subscribe to this perspective of
the teleological purpose of dialogue processes, despite the relative lack of understanding
of what actually happens for dialogue participants. What follows in this section are two
topics: a) an overview of some of the salient critiques of dialogue processes in general,
and b) a description of the limitations of this study specifically. These limitations are
presented for the purpose of providing readers the opportunity to evaluate this study both
within the context of dialogue research in general and the parameters of this meta-dataanalysis specifically.
The Limitations of Dialogue Research
Despite the data that points to the effectiveness of dialogue processes for affecting
change among participants, a number of critiques regarding the theoretical bases of
dialogue persist. One critique is related to the apparent incompatibility of the foundation
of dialogue processes to today’s versions of dialogue models. Though the core historical
root of dialogue is often attributed to Plato and the application of the Socratic Method
(Dessel & Rogge, 2008), there exists a monolithic epistemological basis of Platonism: “a
view of knowledge as absolute, unchanging, and humanly attainable through
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recollection” (Burbules, 2000, p. 254). Considering that many of the theoretical
underpinnings of dialogue models and processes today are based on variations of social
constructivism, such an absolutist perspective on on the nature of reality would prove to
be incompatible with the epistemological stance of dialogue scholars today.
A second critique of dialogue is related to the intersubjective perspectives that
also underlie dialogue processes. Dialogue processes based on intersubjective theories
such as those of Martin Buber tend to emphasize the importance of ‘dialogic moments’
whereby new understandings and empathic concern for the other is achieved within a
space created by the meeting of ‘I’ and ‘Thou’ (Buber, as cited in Steinberg, 2004). This
intersubjective stance is problematic for two reasons: it stands in sharp contrast to the
absolutist stance upon which Platonism is based (Burbules, 2000), and recent studies
indicate that empathic concern for the other can result in unexpected negative outcomes
such as defensiveness, denial, and conflict avoidance (Stephan & Finlay, as cited in
Steinberg, 2004). These epistemological inconsistencies and undesirable outcomes of
empathic concern represent potential challenges to the long-term reliability of discourse
and dialogue.
A third critique of dialogue processes is related to the perceived ‘separateness’ of
dialogue experience from the reality of the participant’s macro social worlds. As
explicated by Burbules (2000), dialogue is frequently perceived as a “momentary
engagement. . . situated against the background of previous relations involving them and
the relation of what they are speaking today to the history of those words spoken before
them” (p. 263). In reality dialogic encounters are a continuation of a dialogue that will
also continue beyond the interactions of the facilitated encounter. Burbules suggests that
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dialogue encounters do not have a “unitary, goal-oriented . . . beginning, middle, and
end” (p. 263), but rather are part of a conversational continuum and need to be described
and conceived by practitioners and scholars as such.
Uncertainty of an Exhaustive Search
Paterson et al. (2001) state that the likelihood of finding every single potential
primary report that could be included within a meta-study is slim. These authors relate
their own experience in conducting meta-studies whereby at the conclusion of a study
they are ‘surprised’ to find how many articles were missed that could have been included
(p. 35). As such, there is an excellent chance that I did not find all the studies that could
have been included in this meta-study according to the inclusion and exclusion criteria I
developed.
Loss of Context
Paterson et al. (as cited in Timulak, 2009) suggest that because qualitative metaanalysts usually do not have direct access to the data of studies being synthesized,
qualitative meta-analyses could fail to present the contextual background from which the
data was originally collected. This loss of context could result in an analysis too heavily
based on ‘description’ rather than ‘interpretation.’ In the case of this particular study I
have tried to maintain a balance between description and interpretation by coding as
much of the contextual data as possible (participant identities, structure of the dialogue,
intersubjective communication). If this meta-data-analysis becomes part of a larger metastudy, this issue of balance between description and interpretation would likely be
resolved more satisfactorily.
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Furthermore, because I as a meta-data-analyst do not have access to the primary
reports’ authors’ full data set of quotations and observations, the report produced here is
potentially of limited value. Meta-studies are only as good as the data provided by the
original authors and the quality of the original studies. My utilization of the ‘primary
report appraisal tool’ was intended to flesh out the highest quality studies to ensure that
the data within would best represent the actual state of intergroup dialogue in IsraeliPalestine today.
Exclusion of Meaningful Data
One of the significant challenges I experienced while selecting meaningful and
representative data for the final analysis was deciding how to handle quotations that were
significantly different in their structure, content, or some other characteristic. Two such
sets of quotations were excluded from the final analysis: specific intergroup dialogue
quotations recorded by Maddy-Weitzman (2005) and Lazarus (2011) and quotations
containing references to social ‘re-entry.’ The details and justifications for these specific
quotations are provided below.
Maddy-Weitzman (2005) recorded IJ and PCI Seeds of Peace participant
quotations before they engaged in binational dialogue during the early stages of the
second intifada. These quotations have meaningful content and the timeframe as ‘pre’
made them rare and potentially valuable for providing insight on dialogue processes.
However, the timeframe of the dialogue itself was unique among all the other intergroup
dialogue structures among the primary reports because it featured participants who had
already engaged in dialogue a few months earlier. These quotations were the only ones of
their kind that contained ‘expectations’ and ‘motivations’ for engaging in dialogue after
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having already engaged with the same intergroup participants. As such, I was unable to
properly code the time frame of the quotations. They were not ‘pre’ dialogue because,
unlike the other quotations coded ‘pre,’ these participants had already engaged in lengthy
dialogue sessions and were already very familiar with each other. Similarly, they were
not ‘post’ because the quotations referred to dialogue that was yet to come.
Another set of quotations that I excluded from the final analysis were recorded by
Lazarus (2011). These quotations were also attributed to IJ, PCI, and OPT Seeds of Peace
participants who had been engaged in numerous dialogue sessions over a span of many
months and, in some cases, years. Lazarus devotes a considerable portion of his
dissertation to an analysis of the experience of IJ Seeds of Peace participants who later
joined the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). Numerous quotations are included from IJ, PCI,
and OPT participants regarding their perspectives on Seeds of Peace members who
simultaneously perform duties for the IDF. Though these quotations were quite
meaningful, they were the only quotations of this kind that contained these kinds of
references among the primary studies.
Finally, because the research questions of this meta-data-analysis focused on
dialogue processes and the effects of dialogue models on said processes, I excluded
participant quotations that contained references to the process of ‘social re-entry’ after
engaging in dialogue. I also excluded quotations that contained descriptions of how
family members and friends responded to the dialogue participant after returning from the
dialogue program. Though this topic of social re-entry is quite meaningful and revealing,
they fell outside the parameters of the research questions and were thus excluded from
the final analysis.
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Recommendations
As described in previous chapters, I utilized an intersubjective coding scheme for
all the quotations that were recorded within or during dialogue sessions. The intention of
using these intersubjective schemes was to identify any interesting or revealing
association between or among the other coded categories in relation to the intersubjective
codes. For example, I had assumed I would be able to find a relationship between ‘first
person singular’ quotations and participant identity. However, after searching for
meaningful, interesting, or unexpected associations between and among the codes, I was
unable to find anything conclusively worthy of reporting.
Having completed the data-analysis process, if the data were to be re-analyzed, I
would recommend a different coding scheme than the intersubjective scheme I utilized.
Because the intergroup dialogue participant quotations contain considerable references to
the role of identity and how identities change before, during, and after dialogue
processes, I would recommend a coding scheme based on Glaser and Strauss’ six
dimensions of status passage (1967):
1. is the passage scheduled or non-scheduled?
2. is the passage institutionally-prescribed or not?
3. is the passage regulated or unregulated?
4. is the passage desirable or undesirable?
5. is the passage inevitable or not?
6. does the passage exhibit clear or ambiguous transitional phases? (p. 85-87)
The six dimensions of status passage could be utilized to develop a coding
scheme that would place intergroup participant quotations within a variety of descriptors
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to indicate the type of identity change the participant is experiencing. For example, an IJ
participant who is a Seeds of Peace participant who wants to join the IDF is going
through an identity change. Quotations related to his experience of that change could be
coded accordingly: the passage is scheduled, institutionally-prescribed, and regulated; but
the degree to which the passage is desirable and inevitable and whether or not it exhibits
clear transitional phases could only be determined by the quotation and the quotation’s
context. A coding scheme of this kind would shift the focus of the data analysis away
from ‘communicative grammar’ and more towards ‘identity within multiple systems;’
plus, a coding scheme of this kind would allow a full integration of the quotations I
purposefully excluded from the final analysis.
Future Research
As mentioned previously, this meta-data-analysis was developed and executed
with the intention of it being the first step of a qualitative meta-study. If such a metastudy were to be conducted in the near future, further research questions would need to be
added to the ones already addressed in this study. What follows here is a brief overview
of the additional steps of the meta-study and the research questions that would guide
those steps.
Meta-Method
As described in detail in Chapter 3, the second stage of qualitative meta-study is
meta-method, whereby the ‘epistemological soundness’ of the primary reports is
analyzed in order to ascertain how “the methodological applications may have influenced
the findings that are generated” (Paterson et al., 2001, p. 71). The focus in this step is on
the actual data collection and research design of each of the primary studies. As such, a
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general research question that would guide this process is: What influence do researchers’
methodological frameworks have on findings of these primary reports? The 17 primary
reports identified for this meta-data-analysis feature a variety of different research
methodologies such as participant observation, qualitative interviews, transcript analysis,
and more. Clearly this stage of the process would require extensive analysis to ascertain
the degrees to which each author’s epistemological stance influenced the generation of
the original data.
Meta-Theory
The third stage of qualitative meta-study is meta-theory, defined by Neufeld (as
cited in Paterson et al., 2001) as “a critical exploration of the theoretical frameworks or
lenses that have provided direction to research and to researchers, as well as the theory
that has arisen from research in a particular field of study” (p. 91). Where meta-method
focuses on the methodology in which the data was collected, meta-theory focuses on the
frameworks within which that data was analyzed. A general research question that would
guide this step is: What influence do researchers’ theoretical assumptions have on the
findings of these primary reports? The primary reports utilized in this meta-data-analysis
feature a range of theoretical orientations including social identity theory, social
unconscious theory, postcolonial theory, and contact theory. This stage of the process
would likely be comparatively less intensive than the meta-method stage because of the
relatively smaller range of different theoretical frameworks represented within the
primary reports.
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Potential Contributions to the Fields of Conflict Resolution and Peace Education
In Chapter 4, four areas for future Israeli Jew and Palestinian Arab intergroup
dialogue process research and practice were presented based on a perceived shortage of
research in these areas. These areas are: a purposeful integration of secular and
interreligious dialogue processes; an intensified effort on recruiting and engaging
Palestinian Arabs in the Occupied Territories as dialogue participants; the generation of
research that tracks participants through pre, during, and post dialogue experiences; and
the utilization of triads for post-dialogue interviews with participants. What follows here
are explications of two further areas of potential research that this dissertation could serve
as a catalyst towards achieving within the fields of conflict resolution and peace
education.
Expanding the Research into a Diversity of Dialogue Models
Among the 17 primary reports from which the data was drawn for this meta-dataanalysis, more than half of the reports focused on either the Confrontational Model or the
Seeds of Peace mixed model. In terms of the type of research conducted on these models,
the Seeds of Peace model has been the subject of at least three Ph.D. dissertations since
1999—totaling nearly 1000 pages of research. Though this research is invaluable for
understanding the role these dialogue models play in the pursuit of a resolution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, numerous other dialogue models have been developed and
executed in Israel-Palestine and have been comparatively far less researched and
documented than the Confrontational Model and the Seeds of Peace mixed model. This
dissertation highlights this incongruity, and serves as justification for expanding research
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into the execution and development of other models, especially narrative, activist, and
conflict management models.
Developing Systems for Matching Participants with Dialogue Models
If the recommendation above regarding the expansion of research into a greater
variety of dialogue models is taken seriously, then the knowledge gleaned from such
research would allow for a better matching of individual participant characteristics with
the most suitable dialogue model. The data presented within this dissertation shows that
Israeli Jews, Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel, and Palestinian Arabs in the Occupied
Territories exhibit a diversity of individual differences in terms of political opinions,
epistemological ideologies, religious observance, and personality types. At present,
dialogue models tend to focus primarily on participants’ identification as Israeli Jewish or
Palestinian Arab. If greater attention is devoted to the individual differences within these
two broad categories of participants, criteria for establishing the suitability of certain
dialogue models and processes for particular individuals could then be generated. Such
criteria could serve the purpose of ensuring individual participants are placed within a
model of dialogue that best serves their particular interests, personality, and perspectives
and, subsequently, increases the chances that genuine friendships would result as a
dialogue outcome. Such cross-group friendships, as the data in this dissertation
corroborates, are one of the greatest factors that make possible the hope of resolving the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Dissemination of Research Findings
The strength of this meta-data-analysis is not the ‘new’ insight it provides—
actually very little of the findings represent anything ‘new’ in that the findings largely
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corroborate previous research in the field and are consistent with theories and concepts
presented within the literature review. Instead, the strength of this meta-data-analysis lies
what it reveals for potential ‘growth areas’ within the field of intergroup dialogue
research and practice, especially within Israel-Palestine. Under-represented dialogue
participants (especially Palestinian Arabs in the Occupied Territories), interreligious
dialogue models, and triad interview structures are three potential growth areas for both
practice and research. Furthermore, the overarching themes of experience could represent
a framework that offers a teleological perspective on intergroup dialogue outcomes.
In light of these strengths, future dissemination of these findings can come in a
variety of relevant forms. The most salient points can be summarized and published as an
editorial response to criticisms of dialogue programs in Israel-Palestine and thereby
serving to advocate for continued support for peace educators and dialogue facilitators.
The themes of experience revealed by the data serve as reminders of the universal
struggle for recognition and respect within one’s identities—both those chosen and those
socially appropriated. As such, these findings are salient contributions to the ongoing
conversations surroundings the power of master narratives not only in Israel-Palestine but
within any region of intractable conflict. Finally, because the data corroborates previous
studies that point to a variety of positive outcomes from intergroup dialogue interactions,
the results of this meta-data-analysis can serve as a reminder that dialogue can spur
positive systemic and structural changes even within environments characterized by less
complex episodes of conflict and disagreement.
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Conclusions
Hammack (2006) mentions in the conclusion of his Ph.D. dissertation that the
process of helping Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs move beyond their present
competing identities, which renders them stuck between irreconcilable narratives,
requires “a revolution in the narrative stalemate” (p. 441). Hammack’s criticism
throughout his dissertation was that programs that attempt to instill a new ‘third’ identity
in the hearts and minds of young Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs cannot fully succeed
because these youths need to be “guided by some existing ideology in order to forge a
revolution” (p. 441). In other words, Hammack suggests that programs like Seeds of
Peace, Sadaka Reut, and Peace Child Israel that strive to provide young participants a
purpose, drive, or identity that extends beyond their inherited cultural and social
frameworks can only go so far. These dialogue programs do not necessarily represent an
ideology that can bring about peace; they are extensions of extant ideologies that have
allowed (or created) an environment to develop that encourages the conflict to continue.
As such, sustainable peace in Israel-Palestine can only happen through “the demise of
that social structure [that relies] on the structural conditions of conflict” (p. 442).
As the themes of experience of Israeli Jew and Palestinian Arab intergroup
dialogue suggest, and in harmony with Hammack’s (2006) observations above, the
conflict between these two peoples is (at least in part if not primarily) the outcome of
social structures that hinder the seeking of truth, the pursuit of justice, and the realization
of unity. Though the specific details of the history of the conflict are unique, the general
lessons from it are universal: when people cannot be free of fear and anger, the system
within which that fear and anger is generated will gradually lose relevance until it is
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replaced entirely. The nature and structure of that new system is not something anyone
can define but Israelis and Palestinians themselves; nevertheless, the process is one that
must be supported locally, regionally, and internationally. Until that time comes, the data
presented here clearly shows that despite current limitations on the overall understanding
of the processes of intergroup dialogue programs and models, their very existence allows
individual Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs who have begun to question and doubt the
capacities of their current social systems to bring peace the opportunity to seek solutions
in partnership with ‘the other.’
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Appendix A: Example of the Utilization of the Modified Primary Report Appraisal Tool
Document: 26
Lazarus, N. (2011). Evaluating peace education in the Oslo-intifada generation: A longterm impact study of Seeds of Peace 1993--2010. (3465403 Ph.D.), The American
University, Ann Arbor.
Name, Location, Emphasis of Peace Ed. / Dialogue Program:

Seeds of Peace

Major Construct/Theory Investigated (if applicable): long-term impact of peace
program participation on life experience and choices; role of macro environment on
micro decisions; under what conditions do participants engage in peacebuilding post
dialogue program participation.
Genre of Study (e.g., grounded theory, phenomenology, narrative analysis): mixed
method case study
(*Note: If stated genre does not appear to match the research design, elaborate on the lack
of fit.):
Nature of Sample: FOCUS IN THIS APPRAISAL IS ON QUALITATIVE
COMPONENT ONLY
Total Number: 200+ Seeds of Peace
graduates
Ages: 21-30
Number of men: not stated
National / Ethnic / Religious identification
of sample: Israeli Jew; OPT; PCI
Education of sample: high school and
college

Economic status: not stated
Mean ages: not stated
Number of women: not stated
Years data collected: 2006-2010
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Other characteristics: Interview data focuses on the ‘meanings of program impact’, and
what is the relationship between those meanings and membership in Seeds of Peace.
EXTENSIVE data sources, coming in multiple forms, over a span of ten years
General Description of Research Approach: qualitative component follows a grounded
theory approach; ‘backward mapping’
Major Findings: most alumni involved in peacebuilding activities during high school;
military involvement discouraged peacebuilding involvement; about 20% of alumni
continued involvement in peacebuilding as adults; and long-term commitments to
peacebuilding strongly related to post program follow up.
Meaningful "follow-up" events are a necessity for successful intergroup dialogue
outcomes.
Research Design:
1. Problem statement
a. Statement of the phenomenon leads directly to the purpose of the study
and the research question ( Y or
N)
2. Purpose of the research
a. Clearly expressed? ( Y or N):
b. Significance of research problem clearly indicated? (
3. Research questions
a. Explicitly expressed? ( Y or N):
4. Evidence of flow from the phenomenon? ( Y or

Y or

N)

N)

5. Identification of assumptions, preconceptions, presuppositions of researcher?
( Y N n/a)
6. Identification of theoretical framework? ( Y or N)
a. If yes, name framework (if it is not well-known, include a description):
Based on theoretical principles from Pearson d’Estree, Ross and Spurk.
i. concrete, measurable criteria of assessment is complex but possible
and essential.
ii. pluralism in assessment approaches to measure peacebuilding
activity
iii. measured outcomes must be realistically achievable as a result of
peacebuilding activity
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iv. Assessment must be long-term
7. Clarification of influence of theoretical framework? (

Y

N

n/a)

8. Researcher credentials
a. Documentation of researcher’s discipline? ( Y or N)
i. If yes, name it: International Relations
b. Any other pertinent information about the researcher (e.g. methodological
preference, conceptual preference)?
c. Name(s) of persons acknowledged by the author(s): Chair: Mohammed
Abu-Nimer; Susan Shepler, Anthony Wanis St.- John, Herbert Kelman,
Susan Allen Nan, Peter Weinberger, and the late Dan Bar-On; Emile
Bruneau, Michelle Gawerc, Maia Hallward, Phillip Hammack, Sonja
Arsham Kuftinec, Edie Maddy-Weitzman, and Ahsiya Posner; Bob
Bordone, Ron Fisher, Louis Goodman, Susan Hackley, Scott Lasensky,
Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, David Matz, Bob Mnookin, Fathali
Moghaddam, Stephen Silvia and Craig Zelizer; Shai Fuxman, Michelle
Gawerc, and Karen Ross
9. Role of researcher
a. Nonresearch relationship of researcher to participants (e.g. staff member,
no previous relationship, unknown): former staff member
b. Evidence that researcher has considered the effect of his/her presence on
the research findings? ( Y or N)
c. Evidence that researcher has considered possibility of researcher bias or
misinterpretation? ( Y or N)
10. Sampling and participants
a. Description of type of sampling procedure? ( Y or
b. Identification of inclusion criteria? ( Y or N)
c. Discussion of attrition in longitudinal studies? ( Y

N)
N

n/a)

11. Data gathering strategy(ies)
a. Clear description of data gathering procedures? ( Y or N)
i. If no, how could the description be improved?:
b. Description of gaining access? ( Y or N)
c. Discussion of time frame of data gathering? ( Y or N)
d. Data analysis strategies
i. Description of the method(s) used? ( Y or N)
ii. Identification of categories or common elements found? ( Y or
N)
iii. Report of the participants’ response to the analysis? ( Y or N)
iv. Data analysis presented in a clear framework (identification of
central themes and categories)? ( Y or N)
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v. Data presented in such a way that relationships between
categories/themes are clear? ( Y or N)
vi. Analysis well supported by representative quotes/findings? ( Y
or N)
vii. Provision of evidence as to how representative in the sample the
various findings were? ( Y or N)
12. Conclusions, discussion, implications, suggestions for further study
a. Identification of limitations of study? ( Y or N)
b. Specific limitations identified: attitudinal change as our primary
“indicator” of impact;
c. Discussion pertains to all significant findings? ( Y or N)
d. Interpretive statements correspond with findings? ( Y or N)
e. Examination of findings with existing body of knowledge? ( Y or N)
f. Clear indication of directives for future research? ( Y or N)
g. If yes, indicate directives identified: A comparison of program content
between this case and the peace education programs cited in Salomon’s
study
Other considerations/thoughts:
Decision to include in meta-study: (

Y

N

Undecided) (explain below):

+ This Primary Research Appraisal Tool was modified from the original tool as presented
on pages 135-139 in
Paterson, B. L., Thorne, S. E., Canam, C., & Jillings, C. (2001). Meta-study of qualitative
health research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
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Appendix B: Overview of Selected Primary Reports
Author(s)
(Publication
Year);
Publication
Type

1

2

3

4

Maoz, I.
(2000); journal
article

Maoz, I.
(2001); journal
article

Helman, S.
(2002); journal
article
Maoz, I.,
Steinberg, S.,
Bar-On, D., &
Fakhereldeen,
M. (2002);
journal article

5

MaddyWeitzman
(2005); PhD
dissertation

6

Hammack,
P.L. (2006);
PhD
dissertation

7

Bar-On, D.,
Litvak-Hirsh,
T., & Othman,
R. (2007);
journal article

Date of Data
Collection

spring 1998

Dialogue model/Name of
Program
Transformative Dialogue
through narrative,
administered by a jointly
managed Israeli-Palestinian
NGO: the peace education
project at the IPCRI
(Israel/Palestine Center for
Research and Information)

Dec. 1998 to
May 1999

Confrontational model;
college classroom,
'intercultural communication
in conflict'

1995-1996

Confrontational model;
intergroup workshop, not
interpersonal;

Oct 1996 June 1997

Confrontational model; joint
activity included

early to mid
1990's; 20002004

2003-2006

2003-2004

Seeds of Peace, USA coexistence model & mixed
method model
Seeds of Peace, USA; Hands
of Peace, Israel & Palestine coexistence model; mixed
methods model

Workshop: 'Life Stories as a
Means Toward Co-Existence;'
utilized 'life story-telling
model'

Major Findings
(Take-Home Message)

Transformative dialogue
practice can help change
participants' perceptions of
members of the other group, but
long term sustainability is
uncertain.
As dialogue progresses, turn
taking moves towards a
symmetrical balance despite
starting as heavily JewishIsraeli. Jews pose more
challenging questions to
Palestinians than vice versa;
Palestinians did not once pose
challenging questions withingroup.
Structural inequality can be
replicated in dialogic encounters
between groups.
Both intergroup empathy and
friendships can be fostered
within confrontational dialogue.
Israeli and Palestinian
adolescents are best served by a
mixed method approach:
confrontational and coexistence.
Youth identities are determined
by the cultural context of human
development.
Jewish-Israeli students are
shifting away from 'Zionist'
narratives and towards
'refugeeism' narratives. When
group members allow power to
shift towards a symmetrical
balance, space is created for
participants to explore variances
within national groups.
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1998-1999

1997-1998

2000-2001

2006-2010

Summer 2006

2003-2004

Not stated

Aug 2010 April 2011

2003-2006

Dialogue/Encounter course Sensitivity training
(Narrative)

Building Bridges for Peace human relations emphasis
(relational skills) (Conflict
Management)

Confrontational model

Intergroup encounters provide
brief moments to break
hegemonic national ideologies
and engage in critical discourse,
but those moments are difficult
to maintain.
Intergroup dialogue models
need to incorporate contextual
factors like history, politics,
social hierarchies, and agency;
post-dialogue relationships are
rarely maintained.
Israeli-Jewish participants
experience/perceive four
categories of threat: “permanent
existential threat; realistic threat
from Palestinians, threat to
Jewish hegemony in Israel, and
threat to moral worth of
(Jewish) national identity”
(p.47)

Seeds of Peace, USA coexistence model, mixed
methods model

Encounter programs in regions
of intractable conflict must
include sustainable long-term
engagement post-dialogue.

Track two workshop focused
on two-state solution

A superordinate ‘peacenik’
identity leaves participants less
able to represent the claims of
their respective national groups.

Activist Model and
Autoethnographic mapping tool utilized within university
dialogue facilitation course
Conflict management
dialogue workshops
Sadaka Reut (extended
communal living, social and
political activism focus)
(Activist model); Peace Child
Israel (apolitical, theater and
role play based) (Narrative)
School for Peace Confrontational Model

Autoethnographic mapping
creates a space that allows
meaningful exchange and
solidarity building.
Extended participation in
dialogue workshops increases
awareness of the IsraeliPalestinian conflict’s
complexity.
The conceptual and intentional
focus of a dialogue program can
influence participants' beliefs in
different ways especially in
regards to group narratives
related to Israel's definition as a
state.
Short-term dialogue encounters
do little to change underlying
perceptions of national and
social identities.
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Not stated

Two groups: Confrontational
model; Coexistence model

Neither confrontational nor
coexistence models led
participants away from
polarized historical narratives
about the origins of the IsraeliPalestinian conflict.

